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ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyzes the case of Vietnam’s decision to accede to the ‘Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1987’ 
(CAT) in the period of 2013-2014, with the hope of more deeply and comprehensively 
understanding the socialist state’s ratifying behavior toward the core international 
human rights treaty. This could contribute to the contemporary study and debates of 
those theoretical approaches (i.e. normative, rationalist, and reward-based model and 
sovereignty) that explain state behavior regarding this issue.  
In order to do so, this study explores key factors that caused Vietnam to decide to 
sign and ratify the CAT at that particular period of time. Therein, it is essential to 
determine whether such a decision of the socialist state was shaped by the alignment of 
domestic and international cognitions on human rights values and interests, by the 
state’s calculation of costs and benefits that would be brought by its ratification 
behavior, or by the impact of sovereignty. Via the case of Vietnam, the study also 
analyzes and compares the influences of external and internal dynamics on the state’s 
decision behavior as well as determines the actual role of relevant external threats and 
pressures and whether they significantly impacted socialist state behavior in addressing 
this issue.     
This thesis argues that the socialist state’s ratification behavior toward the 
international human rights treaty was not due to the changing of such state’s cognitions 
of human rights values and interests. Furthermore, the alignment of domestic and 
international cognitions on human rights values and interests cannot be considered a 
factor that can help to predict socialist state behavior toward human rights treaties. This 
thesis also determines that the socialist state’s calculation of benefits that the ratification 
behavior toward human rights treaties would offer was indeed a crucial factor in 
predicting not only the state’s decision regarding this issue but also the timing for 
implementing such decision. Moreover, the results also counter views indicating that 
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developing states in general do not receive important payoffs for their ratification 
behavior toward international human rights treaties, and that the particular ratification of 
the CAT has no relation with European aid policies and programs. They also contribute 
to the lack of empirical support for the reward-based model.  
Exploitation of human rights issues to increase the interference of dominant 
outsiders in internal affairs of the socialist state indeed played an essential role in 
shaping the state’s ratification behavior, as this had been considered necessary and 
important for the socialist state to maintain and protect its sovereignty, the socialist 
regime, and domestic political and social stability. Therefore, instead of ignoring 
international human rights instruments in order to avoid being held responsible for poor 
domestic human rights protection by the international community, socialist states have 
chosen to accede to core human rights conventions with the aim of proving that they 
respect human rights and have a strong will to implement international standards of 
human rights protection in the domestic field. 
In regard to comparing the impacts of internal and external dynamics in shaping 
the socialist state’s decision behavior, this thesis ascertains that external dynamics (and 
international politics) played a more determinant role in influencing the socialist state’s 
ultimate ratification behavior toward the CAT. This thesis determines that internal 
politics were the necessary condition, while international politics were the sufficient 
condition, and that together they drove the socialist state to accede to this convention at 
that specific period of time. Finally, in the contemporary globalization context, socialist 
states cannot avoid responding to mounting threats and pressures from outsiders, 
especially in the field of human rights, as they would cause domestic instabilities within 
these states as well as create negative impacts for their other crucial national interests. 
In the case of Vietnam, the state’s decision to accede to the CAT was indeed considered 
to be the most appropriate approach to respond to this issue.            
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter has two sections. The first section introduces the background and 
goal of this study; therein, it outlines the development of the theme of this study, the 
statement problem, the purpose and explicit goal of this dissertation, and the necessity 
and importance of conducting such research. The second section of the chapter details 
the structure of this dissertation.     
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SECTION 1: BACKGROUND AND GOAL OF THE STUDY 
 
In the recent global context, the international community has generally 
acknowledged and respected the current international human rights regime; yet, the will 
to accede to international human rights instruments is essentially based on the voluntary 
action of each state. This highlights the study of state behavior toward the ratification of 
international human rights treaties as an interesting topic that has attracted significant 
attention from scholars all over the world. In this regard, the central question is why 
states decide to accede to international human rights instruments. 
 Deeply and comprehensively answering this central question is definitely a 
difficult task, as states with different political-legal ideologies may possess divergent 
understandings and cognitions of domestic human rights protection and the role of 
international human rights law, and it is known that this kind of treaty is built especially 
to monitor and enforce the compliance of all parties with common (international) human 
rights protection standards in their domestic fields. For example, it has been identified 
that democratic states are more likely to join human rights treaties compared to 
autocratic ones because democratic regimes reportedly tend to recognize values and 
interests in protecting fundamental human rights that are more similar to those that 
international human rights instruments establish, making it easier for them to decide on 
ratification of these treaties.  
On the other hand, the ratification of human rights treaties by autocratic regimes 
may impose high costs on these states in many ways. These include requirements to 
change a state’s current domestic legal settings and policies in order to cope effectively 
with treaty provisions as well as the possibility of enabling outsiders to interfere in a 
state’s internal affairs, which these types of regimes must usually avoid. Nevertheless, 
since various autocratic regimes have ratified many important international human 
rights treaties, the problem statement requiring clarification here is why autocratic states 
decided to accede to international human rights treaties. In other words, what caused 
autocratic regimes to pursue such a decision, given that this behavior would impose 
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negative consequences to their domestic field, as mentioned above?  
For instance, with a core international political and civil rights treaty such as the 
‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1987’ (CAT), it is evident that as of October 2016, 159 international 
member states – including both democratic and autocratic regimes – have already 
acceded to this convention. This convention supposedly has a far-reaching scope of 
enforcement procedures, with a strong monitoring mechanism and the ability to require 
state parties to alter their domestic legal systems to properly contend with a broad range 
of torture behaviors as well as all possible violating subjects that are not limited to state 
leaders, government officials and their supporting groups, etc.  
In fact, initially the international community could not reach consensus on some 
contents of this convention. Firstly, it was about the definition of torture, as the concept 
of torture which was outlined in the ‘Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from 
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1975’, known as the foundation for the development of the CAT, had been 
criticized in various points. The broader and more complicated definition of torture as 
seen in Article 1(1) of the CAT is the result of many discussions. Secondly, debates also 
focused on the concept of universal jurisdiction, especially for torture activities 
committed by persons whom are not the citizens of a nation and peformed outside the 
nation’s territory. At the end, the principle of universal jurisdiction had been finally 
accepted and recognized at Article 5(2) of the convention. Last but not least, as the 
effectiveness of the convention would strongly depend on its enforcement system, and 
most of the provisions under this convention mainly relate to the responsibility of 
member states in this issue, the implementation of this convention at the domestic level 
also created intense talks. 
On a different note, interestingly, among the last 28 states that have not taken any 
action toward the CAT, three are from the Southeast Asia region: Malaysia, Myanmar, 
and Singapore. In fact, the international community has considered many Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states to be authoritarian regimes that are 
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strongly concerned about external criticism of their domestic human rights issues. These 
states believe that outsiders – especially the political opposition – would exploit this 
field in order to interfere with their internal affairs and pursue their own interests, which 
are not limited to undermining these regimes. However, it is interesting that the 
one-party socialist states in this region (i.e. Lao PDR and Vietnam) have indeed recently 
decided to accede to this core convention, as socialist regimes have typically maintained 
different political-legal ideologies and cognitions, especially with regard to issues of 
human rights and the role of international law in human rights.  
In view of this, the purpose of this study is to particularly analyze the socialist 
state’s ratification behavior toward the CAT. The goal of this dissertation is to determine 
why socialist states, representing a type of autocratic regimes, decided to sign and ratify 
this core international civil and political human rights convention. This can contribute to 
the broader contemporary literature and debates about state behavior toward the 
ratification of international human rights instruments. In order to do so, this research 
selects the case of Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT during the period of 2013-2014 as a 
case study. This case is suitable for the study because Vietnam is a one-party socialist 
state located in Southeast Asia that possesses different political-legal ideology and 
cognitions with regard to the field of human rights and the role of international human 
rights law and which emphasizes the significance of protecting state sovereignty from 
outside interference in internal state affairs, yet has still decided to alter its domestic 
legal settings to accede to and obey the provisions set out by the CAT.        
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SECTION 2: STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
This dissertation contains six chapters in total. The first chapter introduces the 
area and background of the research, the problem statement, and the goal of this study. 
It also explains the selection of the case study and the structure of this thesis. 
The second chapter covers the literature review of this study. Therein, the first two 
sections of this chapter outline the theoretical literature and empirical literature, 
respectively, on the study of state behavior toward the international human rights regime. 
In detail, the theoretical frameworks that this research uses include the normative 
approach, the rationalist approach, the reward-based model, and the sovereignty 
approach. There is a need to discuss not only current scholarly debates regarding these 
theoretical approaches to explaining state’s ratification behavior toward human rights 
treaties but also the knowledge gaps and puzzles that warrants further research to 
contribute knowledge to field (i.e. studies on autocratic state’s ratification behavior 
toward human rights treaties).  
Since this research chooses the one-party socialist state as the case study, the 
thesis focuses its empirical and theoretical literature reviews on the socialist regime and 
its behavior toward this kind of treaty. Therein, it analyzes the socialist law tradition and 
the state’s characteristics. This part also outlines the socialist view of human rights as 
well as its understanding and interpretation of the role of international law in order to 
identify points of inquiry that can fill the knowledge gaps found in the above theoretical 
literature review and contribute to relevant academic debates of scholars in this matter.  
Given that the case study concerns Vietnam and its ratification of the CAT, the 
literature review chapter also presents an introduction and brief discussion of the CAT. 
The content and characteristics of this convention can facilitate the study of state 
behavior and the ratification of this convention by international member states, ASEAN 
member states, and socialist states. The review also discusses the context of Vietnam, as 
it is necessary to be familiar with the general background of the state, its political-legal 
system and particularly the civil and political rights in the domestic field, its previous 
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human rights treaty ratifications, and the compatibility and conflict between the CAT 
and the state’s domestic legal settings. This information can contribute to an explanation 
of Vietnam’s ratification behavior toward the CAT.       
The third chapter concerns the research design. Therein, it is necessary to 
establish which objectives the research must fulfill in order to address the inquiries 
mentioned in the literature review. In order to achieve this, the second section of this 
chapter identifies research questions that can support such objectives and inquiries as 
well as reduce the knowledge gaps and contribute to relevant debates of scholars, as 
outlined in the literature review chapter. The final section of this chapter outlines the 
methodology employed in seeking data to answer the research questions. Therein, it is 
necessary to identify sources for collecting relevant secondary data, the need for 
primary data, and how to design questions and methods that can pursue such data. The 
final part of this chapter specifies the methods for analysis and interpretation of all data 
collected by the study in order to address the research questions.    
The fourth chapter covers the findings of the case study of Vietnam’s ratification 
of the CAT, which are divided into five sections. The first section identifies relevant 
domestic regulations and procedures required for the signing and ratification of an 
international human rights treaty such as the CAT and briefly outlines the process when 
Vietnam first started to research and consider the possibility of the state acceding to this 
convention until Vietnam’s National Assembly actually ratified the convention in 2014. 
After that, the first part of the second section of the chapter identifies the 
decision-maker and parties involved in the abovementioned process. Since the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) is deemed the sole decision-maker, and since its 
perspectives and policies comprise the contents that all state and government agencies 
must implement at all levels, it is necessary to understand the party’s views regarding 
the field of human rights in the contemporary global context as well as its existing 
cognition and perspectives of human rights issues. Additionally, the findings on CPV’s 
policies in the field of human rights are essential for understanding why the state acts in 
a certain way. The final part of the section analyzes those factors that have been 
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considered to be internal driving forces that shape the state’s ratification behavior 
toward an international human rights treaty such as the CAT.   
The third section of the findings chapter examines external dynamics and their 
role and impact on Vietnam’s field of human rights as well as on the process of 
considering joining the CAT in particular. This provides insight into whether and why 
they are significant and relate to certain behaviors of Vietnam in this field. The fourth 
section outlines those obstacles that have hindered state ratification of this convention. 
More importantly, it identifies the state’s determination of its implications from the 
decision to ratify the CAT in the period of 2013-2014. This can support the thesis in 
comparing with the above findings on CPV’s cognition, perspective, and policies in the 
field of human rights and the impacts and influence of external dynamics in order to 
assess which factors informed the state’s decision to ratify the CAT during that 
particular period of time. Finally, the last section of the chapter summarizes all key 
findings and analyses of relevant internal and external dynamics that have impacted 
Vietnam’s domestic field of human rights and the CAT as well as how they led to the 
state’s decision to accede to this convention in the period of 2013-2014.  
The fifth chapter discusses the findings in greater detail in order to formulate 
answers to the relevant research questions and, in turn, fulfill the puzzles, reduce the 
knowledge gaps, and contribute to the scholarly debates identified in the literature 
review chapter. This chapter is composed of five sections. The first three sections fulfill 
the first objective of the study and provide answers to the sub-research questions under 
the first research question, which concern the applicability of the normative approach, 
the rationalist approach, and the reward-based model to the ratification behavior of 
Vietnam, as well as about the state’s consideration of sovereignty and its effects on state 
behavior in this matter.  
The fourth section of this chapter specifically addresses the first research question 
by indicating and explaining those factors that shape the state’s ratification behavior. 
The final section of the chapter fulfills the second objective of the research and 
addresses the second research question of whether internal dynamics played a more 
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determinant role in shaping state behavior compared to external dynamics and the actual 
role of threats and pressures and their potential link with the state’s ratification behavior. 
This also contributes to reducing the second knowledge gaps and advancing relevant 
scholarly debates identified in the literature review chapter.  
Lastly, the final chapter concludes the dissertation in three sections. The first 
section summarizes all the study’s findings. The second section presents relevant 
academic contributions and theoretical implications that are under analysis in the 
discussion chapter. The final section specifies the limitations noted by the author of the 
study as well as some directions for future research based on this work.       
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter contains four sections. The first section represents the theoretical 
literature review of the study and discusses the current international human rights 
regime that has become an interesting topic for studying state behavior. It also engages 
with the general theoretical frameworks of normative, rationalist, reward-based, and 
sovereignty approaches, which assess why states ratify international human rights 
treaties, as well as scholars’ agreements and disagreements regarding the practical 
applicability of these approaches, especially for explaining the behavior of autocratic 
regimes. Finally, it indicates the knowledge gaps arising from these debates.  
For the empirical literature review, the second section focuses on the socialist 
system, as it is considered as a kind of autocratic regime. Therein, it analyzes the 
socialist law tradition, state characteristics, views on human rights, and interpretation 
and attitude toward contemporary international law of human rights. This is done in 
order to determine and compare the puzzles that arise from a socialist state’s ratifying 
behavior toward international human rights treaties with the abovementioned 
explanations of autocratic state behavior, which necessitate empirical data. 
The third and fourth sections concern the specific case study that is chosen for this 
thesis: Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT. Therein, section three discusses the brief 
history, core contents, commentary, and ratification of the CAT. The final section of this 
chapter analyzes the context of Vietnam, including its current domestic political-legal 
system and regulation of human rights, the state’s previous ratification of international 
human rights treaties, and the compatibility and conflict between CAT provisions and 
Vietnam’s present domestic legal settings. 
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SECTION 1: THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1.1 Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime and the Study of 
State Behavior 
First of all, the international human rights regime is defined as “those norms, 
processes, and institutional arrangements, and activities of domestic and international 
pressure groups that are directly related to promoting respect of human rights” (Amiri 
2013, p.132). The role of the United Nations in constructing and implementing the 
human rights protection work of the regime is considered crucial, although it only 
represents one part of the whole system. Indeed, since the adoption of the ‘Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’ by the United Nations General Assembly on December 
10, 1948, there have been substantial developments in international legal instruments 
that the international community has constructed with the aim of turning the goals of 
protecting human rights into practice. This ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948’ together with the ‘International Human Rights Covenants 1976’, which include 
the ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ and the ‘International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, are claimed to be “the most 
important statements of the norms of the international human rights regime” (Donnelly 
1986, p.606). 
According to Nickel (2002), those two abovementioned international covenants, 
which help to “give legal status to the Universal Declaration” by representing the first 
two parts of the declaration, were actually submitted to the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1953 and received no approval until 1966. It then took the two treaties 
another 10 years to finally obtain the 35 state ratifications in 1976 that were required for 
them to come into force. The international community has since created and 
implemented many international human rights treaties in similar procedures, such as the 
CAT and the ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990’. 
Many scholars believe that crucial international players have thus far “almost 
universally” respected, or at least acknowledged, the international human rights regime 
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(Schaffer, Follesdal & Ulfstein 2013). Hafner-Burton (2012) has also shared this view 
in affirming that all modern governments have made certain promises or commitments 
to promote at least some areas that this international regime covers. However, Donnelly 
(1986) has asserted that since states are allowed to have their own declarations known 
as “self-selected national exemptions” together with reservations when joining 
international instruments, the effectiveness of implementing these instruments is 
“limited.” Moreover, it has been argued that human rights treaties usually have weak 
enforcement mechanisms (Donnelly 1986; Hafner-Burton 2005, 2012) through which 
they can hardly make states comply fully with their provisions in ensuring domestic 
human rights protection with international standards. 
Thus, it is apparent that a state’s decision of whether or not international human 
rights treaties should be ratified is founded on the voluntary basis of such state. The 
study of state behavior in this area has become a topic that has attracted many extensive 
research activities. One central question that scholars often ask and debate is why states 
decide to ratify international human rights treaties despite knowing that these treaties 
are built to “establish and monitor compliance with (international) human rights 
standards” in the domestic field of states (Hafner-Burton 2012) and that “human rights 
are by definition principally a national matter” (Donnelly 1986, p.616). 
Besides the development of various theories and frameworks aiming to answer the 
abovementioned question, scholars have analyzed and discussed many smaller aspects 
of this issue in detail. For example, Amiri (2013) has claimed that the reason 
non-Western countries ratify international human rights treaties that are evolved from 
Western tradition is because such tradition has been transferred to these states during the 
colonial period, through post-independence relationship development, or through both. 
From another point of view, Cole (2009) and Landman (2002) have indicated that 
democratic states are empirically more likely to ratify human rights treaties, especially 
those protecting civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, while others have 
emphasized the role of imitation in shaping state behavior toward international human 
rights instruments. 
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Hollyer & Rosendorff (2012) and Amiri (2013) have also suggested that another 
factor that informs state behavior toward the ratification of international human rights 
treaties is the pressure of domestic opposition groups. However, Hollyer & Rosendorff 
(2012) have also noted that this kind of international agreement enables both domestic 
and international actors and non-actors to engage in more political and legal activities 
that aim to interfere in states’ domestic human rights issues, so leaders of autocratic 
states tend to “vary in their propensity” to join international human rights instruments.  
In fact, a large number of explanations elaborating on many detailed aspects and 
specific focuses of the issue has derived from several more fundamental theoretical 
frameworks, which include the normative approach, the rationalist approach and its 
reward-based model, and the sovereignty approach. However, there is still no agreement 
among scholars using these approaches on whether a state’s ratification of international 
human rights instruments is due to the state’s calculation of material interests, the 
transfer of “normative commitments to rights” (Landman 2002), weak enforcement 
mechanisms of the treaties, or other reasons. This thesis examines each of these theories 
in detail for the literature review.   
 
2.1.2 Normative Approach 
Generally, the normative approach in international relations “refers to the moral or 
ethical dimension of activities in the international sphere” (Neethling 2004, p.3). 
According to (Dyer 1993, p.113), in comparison with other international relations 
theories, the normative theory traditionally pays attention to “what ought to be as 
distinct from what is,” as this approach is developed from “the privacy of norms and 
normative systems and structures, and thus subverts the traditional distinctions of/ought 
and fact/value by locating all foundations in value choice.” In other words, the 
normative approach “focuses on the force of ideas, beliefs, and standards of appropriate 
behavior as major influences on governments’ willingness to comply with international 
agreement” (Simmons 1998, p.88). As a result, in regard to the explanation of states’ 
decision behavior toward the ratification of international human rights treaties, 
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Finnemore (1996), Koh (1999) and Aloisi (2011) have asserted that the normative 
approach highlights the changing of states’ values and interests; states are believed to 
ratify international human rights treaties when their domestic values and interests 
conform to those relevant international ones. This is because, under the view of 
normative scholarship, state behavior is driven by fundamental ideas that are built by 
“interaction among individuals, groups, and states” (Hathaway 2005).  
The normative approach is usually found in both studies of political science and 
law. In the field of political science in particular, this concept is in fact inherited and 
developed from a more general theory called constructivism, which is used to explain 
issues of international relations. It similarly claims that state identity and interests are 
not changeless, but rather “constructed through legal rules, interaction with other states, 
and the activities of individuals and advocacy groups” (Cohen 2009, p.643). In addition, 
international law is said to be able to “change state action […] not by constraining states 
with a given set of preferences from acting, but by changing their preferences” 
(Hathaway 2005, p.481). International organizations may also be capable of influencing 
states’ national policies by “teaching states what their interests should be” (Jackson & 
Sorensen 2007, p.169). Otherwise, according to (Chayes & Chayes 1993, p.179), the 
sentiment that “states cannot be legally bound except with their own consent” is a core 
principle of international law, so normative scholars believe that a state does not 
necessarily need to enter into an international treaty when such treaty does not conform 
to its interests. 
Throughout the process of studying and developing this normative approach, 
various scholars have tried to build more sophisticated models and frameworks with the 
aim of providing a deeper understanding and clearer explanation on this theory. For 
example, in order to clarify how the normative approach works, Koh (1999) has 
employed the term “transnational legal process” for his model of a repeated cycle 
containing three elements of “interaction, interpretation, and internalization.” This 
model indicates that states will join international human rights treaties when the step of 
internalization is complete. According to (Koh 1999, p.1411), in order to “avoid 
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frictions in continuing interactions,” leaders of a nation may be pressured by its interest 
parties to “shift over time from a policy of violation into one of compliance.” Therefore, 
normative scholars have suggested that the alignment of domestic and international 
values and interests does not actually need to have fully occurred at the time of treaty 
ratification; instead, such domestic values and interests can always be adjusted by state 
leaders to meet international expectations.  
According to (Aloisi 2011, p.85), normative scholars have argued that 
international treaties should be viewed as “alternatives that influence state behavior in 
changing the content of their domestic interests” rather than as just “set[s] of 
predetermined and unchangeable options”. Thus, since normative scholars have asserted 
that values and interests of states can be changed over time, they assume that state 
ratifying behavior toward international human rights treaties is predicated on whether 
there is or would be a possible alignment of values and interests recognized by such 
states and the treaties. This is said to possibly happen for those states that have a certain 
will to alter their domestic values and interests through the abovementioned process of 
internalization in order to meet international standards and recognition. 
However, there have been various arguments against this approach, especially 
regarding its practical applicability, due to a lack of clarification of how alignment of a 
state’s values and interests can actually lead or shift to state decision behavior of 
ratifying an international human rights treaty in practice. For example, the normative 
approach arguably does not “yield much in the way of specific expectations for state 
behavior” (Hathaway 2005, p.483). Similarly, Aloisi (2011) has also been concerned 
about a “puzzling reality” when treating a state’s alignment of domestic and 
international values and interests as a “sufficient condition” to predict state action 
toward international human rights treaties, and Cole (2009) has also claimed that there 
is “weak empirical support for normative perspectives.”       
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2.1.3 Rationalist Approach and Reward-based Model 
With a different focus compared to the normative approach, the concept of the 
rationalist approach leans more on states’ material interests rather than their normative 
ones. This approach dictates that states act as “rational and unitary actors in pursuit of 
(their) self-interests” (Hathaway 2005, p.478). Therefore, according to Cohen (2009), 
states will comply with international law when it “serves their interests,” and will 
otherwise resist it. Moreover, this approach also emphasizes the role of “direct costs and 
benefits of treaty commitment” on state decision behavior toward the ratification of that 
treaty (Dutton 2012). Generally, rationalist scholars have suggested that states will 
likely join an international treaty if it requires fewer costs of commitment from them.    
Contemporary scholars have presented various explanations of the cost 
calculation of treaty commitment by states. First of all, costs of a treaty’s commitment 
are said to be low when states can easily comply with the treaty’s provisions. On the 
other hand, certain domestic benefits that states would expect to earn from obeying the 
treaty’s terms must exceed the costs of commitment. More importantly, these costs of 
commitment are not limited to state leaders’ evaluations of their potential restrictions on 
sovereignty if the treaty is ratified (Dutton 2012). Simmons (2009) has emphasized the 
political cost of a treaty’s domestic implementation after ratification as another 
important cost that states need to consider before deciding on their behavior toward 
international treaties. This is because, in practice, there are certain treaties that require 
states to alter some of their domestic legal settings in order to comply well with these 
treaties’ provisions. This process of domestic changing can sometimes be politically 
costly for states; therefore, in such cases, states will likely avoid ratifying those human 
rights treaties. 
Similarly, in focusing on international human rights treaties in particular, 
rationalist scholars have suggested that a state’s ratifying behavior is influenced by the 
“level of treaty’s cooperation,” i.e. states will ratify those international human rights 
treaties that either have weak enforcement mechanisms or require the “least efforts of 
changing their domestic settings” (Downs et al 1996; Milner 1997). Indeed, with human 
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rights treaties that have weak enforcement mechanisms, states usually have no concern 
for their non-compliant behaviors (if any) during the domestic implementation of these 
treaties because of the absence of relevant pressures or punishments. Therefore, a state 
will ratify international human rights treaties when it “incurs little if any cost from 
violating the treaties” (Goldsmith & Posner 2005, p.120).   
Thus, rationalist scholars have generally assumed that states will likely ratify 
international human rights treaties that have weak enforcement mechanisms; conversely, 
those that require deep cooperation are less likely to be ratified by states. Hence, the 
prediction for a state’s ratifying behavior toward international human rights treaties 
under this approach includes the state’s evaluation of the treaty’s ratification costs as 
well as the weakness of the treaty’s enforcement mechanism. However, besides those 
bigger arguments in the great debate with the normative approach, one weak point of 
the rationalist approach that various scholars have often exploited is its failure to 
consider potential negative effects or costs that may arise from significant groups of 
domestic actors or audiences whose interests may be impacted because of the ratifying 
behavior of their state leaders.  
Under the abovementioned view, there is always the presence of certain important 
domestic actors or audiences in both democratic and autocratic regimes who support the 
leaders in retaining power. Therefore, in practice, state leaders must always consider 
these groups’ benefits or impacts before making their decisions, especially regarding 
these kinds of treaties. This view is founded on the belief that state leaders do not fear 
enforcement mechanisms that international human rights treaties impose directly, but 
they are rather afraid of those that come “from the presence of domestic audience” 
(Aloisi 2011).  
Moreover, it is also said that such domestic audience costs appear in all nations, 
regardless of their regime types, because leaders in both democracies and autocracies 
“should pay added domestic political costs for ‘engaging the national honor’ and 
subsequently backing down” (Fearon 1994, p.581). However, according to Smith (1998) 
and Guisinger & Smith (2002), leaders in a more democratic regime generally bear 
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greater domestic audience costs compared to those in an autocratic regime because they 
would “suffer electorally” if they do not keep their commitments. On the other hand, it 
is also argued that domestic audience costs may be more dominant than international 
ones (Fearon 1994).    
Having been developed from the more general framework of the rationalist 
approach, the focus of the reward-based model’s concept is on a state’s evaluation of 
expected tangible and intangible benefits that it would receive if the international human 
rights treaty would be ratified. This view posits that international human rights 
instruments present “a structural incentive” for some states to “take positions to which 
they do not subsequently conform” (Goodman & Jinks 2003, p.172). For example, since 
some states are said to be concerned about their images and reputations in the 
international arena (Lutz & Sikkink 2000), appearing more legitimate to the 
international community is therefore highly important for these states. This can be 
achieved by the ratification of international human rights treaties, whereby states can 
confirm to both their citizens and the world that they are “actors that affirm the basic 
rights of individuals” (Nielsen & Simmons 2014, p.8). Goodman & Jink (2003) have 
argued that, by being able to do so, states can limit certain external criticism or political 
pressures on protecting and promoting domestic human rights. This is an example of 
intangible benefits under the concept of the reward-based model.             
On the other hand, since Hafner-Burton (2005) has also indicated that many states 
decide to improve their practices of ensuring domestic human rights protection in order 
to gain more tangible benefits from preferential trade agreements, reward-based 
scholars have believed that states decide to join international human rights treaties in the 
hope that they will look “more legitimate” so that they are “worthy” of “extra-treaty 
(economic) benefits such as investment, aid, and trade” (Dutton 2012; Hafner-Burton & 
Tsutsui 2005).  
In addition, Moore (2003) has recognized another benefit of human rights treaty 
ratification. He has explained in his signaling theory that this benefit is an opportunity 
for a state to send specific messages to other states via its ratifying behavior toward the 
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treaty. Trachtman (2012) has noted that there may be many intangible benefits, which 
could include “reciprocity,” “reputation.” or “the avoidance of retaliation,” in addition 
to the possible tangible economic benefits outlined above; however, states actually 
seriously consider the calculation of costs and benefits arising from human rights treaty 
ratification because states might consider costs, which may include the potential “loss of 
state’s autonomy due to treaty constraints,” to be “very great.” 
In fact, as there has thus far been an absence of convincing empirical data to 
support this reward-based concept, Nielsen & Simmons (2014) have ascertained that the 
use of this model to explain state behavior toward the ratification of international human 
rights treaties is “hardly universally accepted.” For instance, according to the two 
scholars, in relation to tangible rewards, there is a dearth of knowledge that can explain 
“who is responsible to making decisions” about rewarding the ratifying states or “when 
the ratifying states would receive the rewards.” 
 
2.1.4 Sovereignty Approach 
In contrast with all three abovementioned theories, the sovereignty approach 
particularly treats human rights issues as matters of a state’s “domestic jurisdiction” 
(Henkin 1979), as “states have a right to autonomy under international law” (Pae 2007, 
p.74). This approach assumes that leaders are strongly concerned about the 
comprehensive implementation of their exclusive power on both their sovereign 
territory and citizens (Aloisi 2011). As a consequence, international human rights 
treaties are viewed as not only “in direct contrast with” but also affecting and violating a 
state’s national sovereignty (Sikkink 1993). In other words, the sovereignty approach 
typically positions state sovereignty and international human rights treaties as 
“fundamentally opposed: the rights of states pitted against the rights of individuals” 
(Donnelly 2004, p.1).  
More specifically, sovereignty scholars have noted that international human rights 
treaties that protect civil and political rights with the purpose of regulating how 
governments can treat their citizens are determined to “work presuppose that it is 
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legitimate and necessary for states or non-state actors to be concerned about the 
treatment of the inhabitants of other states” (Sikkink 1993, p.413). As a result, such 
potential high sovereignty costs imposed by this kind of treaty would negatively affect a 
state’s willingness to ratify a treaty (Goodman & Jinks 2003).  
Nevertheless, there are also arguments that sovereignty does not play a 
determinant role in state decision behavior toward the ratification of international 
human rights treaties. For instance, Krasner (1999) has claimed that sovereignty is just 
an “organized hypocrisy,” as a state’s ratification of international human rights treaties 
would strongly depend on the extent to which the state’s leaders were concerned about 
their maintenance of domestic power. On the other hand, Goodman (2002) has asserted 
that states decide to ratify international human rights treaties because they actually have 
various ways to limit potential negative impacts of human rights treaties on their 
sovereign territory and citizens; for example, one option is the use of placing certain 
reservations and declarations when treaties are ratified.  
In fact, Henkin (1999) has affirmed this view earlier, as sovereign states accept 
international human rights treaties and their relevant monitoring and judgment “if they 
wish to, when they wish to, (and) to the extent they wish to.” Therefore, although the 
prediction of a state’s ratification behavior under the sovereignty approach depends on 
the state leaders’ consideration of potential sovereignty costs when the treaty is ratified 
as well as their domestic conditions of stability or instability, contemporary scholars 
have assumed that the actual role of sovereignty in impacting state decision behavior for 
the ratification of international human rights treaties has been overemphasized.  
Nevertheless, of the abovementioned theories, the sovereignty approach seems to 
fit particularly well with the explanation of traditional socialist state behavior toward 
the ratification of international civil and political rights (human rights) treaties, mostly 
due to certain differences that have appeared in socialist doctrine’s recognition of some 
fundamental rights and freedoms compared to those from Western democracies 
(Wieruszewski 1989) as well as in socialist understandings of the privilege of 
sovereignty and its relation to human rights issues. Indeed, socialist doctrine stresses the 
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significance of sovereignty by defining it as “a supreme power of the state within its 
own territory and an independence in relation to other states” (Przetacznik 1977, p.243); 
such an understanding usually serves as a core reason for socialist states’ objections to 
international provisions and supervision of human rights issues.  
Furthermore, because socialist states are provided with a strong concept 
instructing that sovereign states are entitled to self-determination – especially toward 
their citizens within their legitimate territory – there are certain fears among socialist 
leaders that outsiders using human rights protection to interfere state’s internal affairs 
may undermine state sovereignty: in short, sovereignty fears. Thus, together with the 
abovementioned differences in understanding and recognition of human rights issues, 
certain fears of sovereignty violation add extra constraints to socialist state behavior 
toward the ratification of international human rights treaties.  
More interestingly, shifting to focus on the region of South East Asia, several core 
international human rights treaties have recently been ratified, especially by the socialist 
states in the region. These include Vietnam’s ratifications of CAT (signed in 2013; 
ratified in 2015) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (signed 
in 2007; ratified in 2015) as well as the Lao PDR’s ratification of CAT (signed in 2000; 
ratified in 2009). However, empirical findings still indicate that the two main factors 
blocking ASEAN member states’ ratification of international human rights treaties are 
“sovereignty” and “privacy of culture” (Jones 2014). Therefore, the role of sovereignty 
in state behavior toward this particular kind of treaty remains a debatable issue.  
 
2.1.5 State Behavior: The Debates 
First of all, there are certain agreements among scholars on the factors that help to 
predict a state’s ratifying behavior toward international human rights treaties. Therein, 
the regime type of the state and those human rights treaties with weak enforcement 
mechanisms may be the two easiest ways to predict state behavior toward the 
ratification of this kind of treaty. In regard to human rights treaties with weak 
enforcement mechanisms, states can simply join them to enhance international 
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reputation without too much concern for the potential consequences of violating such 
treaties. Moreover, with many international human rights treaties that have weak 
enforcement mechanisms, states also perceive “commitment as essentially costless from 
a sovereignty standpoint” (Dutton 2012, p.5) because “unenforced treaty rules do not 
require any actual changes in state practice” (Goodman & Jinks 2003, p.172). 
On the other hand, in regard to the matter of regime type, Dutton (2012) has 
indicated that democratic states should be more likely to ratify international human 
rights treaties than autocratic ones. This is because naturally democratic regimes usually 
recognize more similar values and interests in protecting fundamental human rights than 
those autocratic ones; therefore, it would be easier for a democratic state to decide on its 
ratifying behavior toward human rights treaties.  
In contrast, for autocratic regimes, the ratification of international treaties that aim 
to universally protect human rights values and interests at an international standard may 
impose high costs on these states in many ways. They include the potential requirement 
of significant change to a state’s domestic policies and settings in order to cope with the 
treaties’ provisions, the possibility of allowing access or intervention of outsiders in 
domestic human rights issues, or empowering domestic organizations that monitor 
state’s domestic implementation of ensuring human rights protection (Aloisi 2011; 
Dutton 2012). These problems usually deter autocratic states from ratifying 
international human rights treaties. 
From another perspective, Wotipka & Tsutsui (2008) have suggested that it would 
be easier for more developed states to make decision to ratify international human rights 
treaties. This argument is constructed from a belief that wealthier countries with strong 
economic conditions tend to have stable domestic political environments and citizens 
with higher living standards, who are then interested in improving “post-materialist” 
values such as ensuring human rights protection. In contrast, it would be more difficult 
for states with less economic development to decide on their behavior toward 
international human rights treaties, as they do not have sufficient economic and social 
resources and conditions to fulfill treaty requirements.             
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Scholars have expressed disagreement over several elements that can predict state 
behavior toward the ratification of international human rights treaties. In fact, such 
disagreements mostly arise from scholarly debates on the practical applicability of the 
abovementioned theoretical frameworks, which explain state behavior in this context. 
For example, Wotipka & Tsutsui (2008) have claimed that normative pressure is an 
important factor that can shape a state’s decision toward the ratification of international 
human rights treaties. They have also suggested that the changing of a state’s values and 
interests, as explained by the normative approach, can also help to overcome the issue 
of sovereignty fears brought by the sovereignty approach when a state considers its 
behavior toward the treaties.  
However, the abovementioned view may not work particularly well for those 
autocratic states with poor human rights practices because it is not easy for them to 
relinquish sovereignty to an international institution or domestic organization so that 
they may be criticized or punished “for practices they may not have made punishable 
domestically” (Dutton 2012, p.21). Many scholars in this field have also criticized the 
normative approach, noting that only alignment of domestic and international values 
and interests alone would not be sufficient to explain or predict a state’s ratifying 
behavior toward human rights treaties in reality. 
Besides, there are also comparisons between the rationalist approach and the 
others. For example, Cohen (2009) has noted an argument from a rationalist scholar, 
(Guzman 2008), that the rationalist approach is “the most promising” model for the 
study of this field because it is more “testable and falsifiable” than the others, and there 
is empirical data proving that a state’s decision behavior toward this matter is 
influenced “at least in part by state’s perceptions about the strength of the treaty’s 
enforcement mechanism” (Dutton 2012, p.17). However, together with the development 
of the reward-based approach in accounting for why states still decide to ratify treaties 
that are costly to them in some cases, the two approaches rely on a state’s calculation of 
benefits and costs brought by treaty ratification in claiming that a state will ratify a 
treaty if its benefits exceed its costs. Yet, it is still recommended that less developed 
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countries overall do not “consistently receive significant payoffs” for their behavior of 
ratifying international human rights treaties (Trachtman 2012). On a different note, the 
reward-based approach is claimed to be unconvincing due to the “lack of empirical 
support” (Nielsen & Simmons 2014), while there is also the argument that states would 
“pay very little in the way of diminished national sovereignty in order to realize the 
benefits of cooperation” (Donnelly 1986, p.619). 
Moreover, there are various relevant statements in regard to this issue with more 
focus and in greater detail. For instance, Dutton (2012) has suggested that it may be 
difficult for states with poor human rights practices to decide to join international 
human rights treaties because they do not want to be held responsible for the human 
rights protection of their citizens. Moravcsik (1994) has recommended that between 
domestic and international politics, those domestic ones are the more determinant driver 
in a state’s decision-making process when the state considers its behavior in 
international relations, including the decision to ratify international human rights 
treaties. 
Additionally, there are also important comments about the role of threats or 
pressures and their influence on a state’s decision behavior toward human rights treaties. 
For example, it is believed that in cases where a non-democratic state experiences 
“increasing forms of political opposition or international condemnation periodically” on 
its regime’s bad practices of domestic human rights, and as these pressures or threats 
become stronger, the state will focus on maintaining its domestic order and keeping it 
under control rather than worrying about international human rights instruments (Aloisi 
2011). Therefore, for autocratic states particularly, threats and domestic instability 
arguably have no actual impact on state behavior toward the ratification of international 
human rights treaties. 
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2.1.6 The Knowledge Gaps 
According to the abovementioned debates, there are some interesting knowledge 
gaps about states’ ratifying behaviors toward international human rights treaties that 
warrant further research, particularly to study the behavior of autocratic regimes with 
less developed economies. This is firstly because, in relation to the great debate between 
normative and rationalist approaches, it is still unclear whether the ratifying behaviors 
of autocratic states toward international human rights treaties are due to changes in state 
recognition of human rights values and interests to align with international ones, as the 
normative approach explains, or it is because of treaty enforcement mechanisms, the 
calculation of the costs and benefits of the ratification behavior, or both of these, as the 
rationalist and reward-based approaches dictate.    
Secondly, there is also ambiguity about the role of sovereignty when autocratic 
states decide on their ratification of international human rights treaties. For instance, 
with a socialist state that is ruled by one single communist party, human rights is treated 
as “a category under national sovereignty” (Ta 2015), and protecting national 
sovereignty is considered the state’s top priority. Therefore, as explained above, the 
ratification of international human rights treaties would allow for potential criticism and 
intervention from both international actors and non-actors as well as domestic 
organizations, whereby they may not only condemn the state’s bad practices of 
protecting domestic human rights but also undermine the socialist regime. 
Furthermore, in a one-party system such as a socialist regime, there is usually an 
absence of actual domestic civil society; therefore, domestic politics only include those 
dynamics mainly among the state’s communist party, national assembly, government 
agencies, and the citizens, with relevant guidelines, policies, and decisions made by the 
communist party. In view of this, it is speculated that in normal conditions, such a 
regime is usually more concerned about contending with political opposition from 
external players rather than those who are domestic.  
Thus, it is necessary for these particular cases to re-examine, in comparison with 
external dynamics, whether or not those domestic ones still work as the determinant 
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driver for a state’s decision behavior toward international human rights treaties. Finally, 
as some autocratic states now also have certain demands for enhancing their 
international integration and cooperation at various levels (bilateral, multilateral, 
regional, and international) and in many areas (political, economic, security, and 
socio-cultural) during the recent globalization context, it is believed that there is also a 
need to learn more about the actual role of external pressures, threats, or both on a 
state’s decision behavior in these specific cases.   
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SECTION 2: SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES  
(EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW) 
 
2.2.1 One-party Socialist States as Autocracy? – Democracy Indicators 
First of all, a political regime is defined by the Polity IV data – a well-known 
project that measures a country’s level of democracy – as “a period in which authority 
characteristics of a country stay the same” (Besley & Kudamatsu 2007, p.2). Such 
authority characteristics that are organized to govern the country and its citizens can be 
classified into various types, such as democracy, autocracy, anocracy (a hybrid system 
between democracy and autocracy), and oligarchy. In this categorization, autocracy is 
seen as the direct opposition of democracy. 
A system that is called a democracy usually has the following elements and 
characteristics. First, it promotes free and fair elections in which all citizens of voting 
age have the right to choose their desired leaders at all governmental levels. Such 
processes of voting are organized apparently and transparently and the majority rule is 
strictly followed. Second, a democratic system also recognizes and promotes individual 
human rights, which include freedom of speech, freedom of religion, etc. Together with 
such promotion and protection of individual human rights, a democracy also welcomes 
citizen participation in nearly all areas and aspects of state activities and ensures rights 
for having multiple political parties, legal forums, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and associations to evaluate and examine the work of leaders and their state 
organs. 
The abovementioned characteristics of a political system are usually deemed 
“absent” or “very weak” in autocratic regimes, according to Lundell (2011). Indeed, in 
contrast with democratic regimes, it is essential for autocratic states to ensure that there 
is no political opposition within the state; accordingly, autocratic leaders tend to 
“restrict or suppress political participation” in their states (Aloisi 2011), and leaders and 
representatives of state and government organs are chosen by the regime’s political 
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elites instead of by the citizens. In view of this, many scholars have noted that autocratic 
states usually do not have multiple political parties and citizen activities involving the 
freedom of speech and the establishment of public groups, organizations and 
associations mandated to judge or criticize state’s leadership or policies are totally 
banned or strictly limited. Similarly, in regard to outsiders, autocratic states also 
strongly restrict and criticize international actors and non-actors’ negative comments 
and intervention activities, particularly on the issue of how they should operate their 
systems and treat their citizens. 
To date, political science scholars and research organizations around the world 
have developed various ways to measure the democracy level in each country with an 
aim to distinguish which countries are under democratic regimes and which are under 
autocratic ones. Although there have been debates over certain advantages and 
disadvantages of employing the following measurement methods, it is commonly 
recognized that the methods of Freedom House and Polity IV are currently the two most 
appropriate options, as they are accepted and used widely. 
For the scope of this thesis, the current socialist countries that have a single 
political party include those adhering to a communist doctrine with Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, namely China, Cuba, Lao PDR, North Korea, and Vietnam. In order to 
determine whether these countries are democracies or autocracies, it is first necessary to 
observe the democracy level of each of them as measured by Freedom House and Polity 
IV. In this regard, Table 1 displays the results from Freedom House for the year 2016:       
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Table 1: Socialist States’ Freedom Level – Freedom House (as of October 2016) 
(Scores: 1 = most free; 7 = least free) 
List of current 
Socialist Countries 
Political Rights Civil Liberties 
Freedom 
Rating 
Result 
China 7 6 6.5 Not Free 
Cuba 7 6 6.5 Not Free 
Lao PDR 7 6 6.5 Not Free 
North Korea 7 7 7 Not Free 
Vietnam 7 5 6 Not Free 
Source: Freedom in the World 2016 – Freedom Houses 
 
According to Table 1, Freedom House has ascertained that China, Cuba, Lao 
PDR (Laos), North Korea, and Vietnam are all classified as “Not Free” countries; thus, 
it can be assumed that these countries are under autocratic regimes. Similarly, with the 
measurement from Polity IV according to the data from the ‘Individual Country Regime 
Trends 1946-2013’ of the ‘Polity IV 2010 Country Reports’, China, Cuba, Laos, North 
Korean, and Vietnam are straightforward autocracies.  
Besides, in various research papers, many scholars have also treated 
communism, fascism, and military dictatorships as autocracies. For example, Hunt & 
Colander (2016) have claimed that people “often think of communism” when they talk 
about autocracy because communism also employs a similar propaganda system with 
the purpose of guiding society toward a direction of thinking and opinion, compared to 
those under totalitarian autocracy. Moreover, it has been argued that totalitarian 
dictatorship is a type of autocracy (Friedrich & Brzezinski 1965) and that it would 
appear in some of these socialist countries at a certain period in time. Thus, according to 
all of the above, and for the scope of this thesis, these single-party socialist states can be 
assumed to be autocracies.    
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2.2.2 Socialist Law Tradition 
Socialist law is a type of legal system that rules in both former and recent 
communist states that follow the philosophy of state socialism, such as the Soviet Union, 
China, and Vietnam. The development of socialist law is grounded in the civil law 
system, but has been strongly influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology has featured 
outstanding additions and modifications. As a result, socialist law has become a legal 
system that represents state socialism’s perceptions, demonstrated by its drastically 
different political and economic perspectives and objectives, and such a system is 
claimed to cause “a distinctly different vision of state, law, and society” (Merryman & 
Perez-Perdomo 2007, p.2). 
According to Lissitzyn (1980) and Uzelac (2010), the law in the socialist legal 
tradition generally works as an instrumental element upon which it is built to serve 
political, economic, and social policies of the state. In other words, with those 
communist single-party states that follow the philosophy of state socialism, the 
domestic legal system is seen as a tool for the ruling elites to implement their perceived 
political ideology on the domestic field, where both the law and the state’s legal 
institutions function mainly to protect the regime and its political ideology. This means 
that in these states, the law would rather “bend to politics” if there has to be a choice 
between the law and significant political goals or interests of the party (Uzelac 2010), as 
the law in socialist states “emanates from the state” rather than being “above the state” 
(Gillespie 2005).  
As a result, law in socialist states usually becomes merely a “mean of producing 
desired results” that is not always “obeyed regardless of consequences” (Lissitzyn 1980). 
Similarly, a state’s legal and other institutions are simply considered mechanisms to 
enact policy in practice rather than to “challenge” or “ameliorate” it (Lovell 2003). 
Interestingly, many scholars have also claimed that even the constitution of a socialist 
state can only be used for propagandist purposes, believing that the content of the 
constitution in socialist state is not permitted to negatively affect the will of the 
communist party.       
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The reason for such a conception of the legal system is the strong connection of 
law and social class recognized in the main socialist legal doctrine, commonly known as 
socialist legality. Under this doctrine, domestic law is believed to represent the will of 
the ruling social class in each country, so there would be “no space customary rules or 
natural rights” (Gillespie 2005, p.49). Therefore, with socialist countries, the communist 
party, as the executive representative of the ruling class, has rights for the contents of 
the domestic law. In this case, such a legal system would consequently work as a 
mechanism to help the state manage its social relationships because the function of 
policy alone is not sufficient to do so. 
 
2.2.3 Socialist State Characteristics 
For one-party socialist states in particular, it is usually claimed that the central 
developments of the state are strongly motivated by its leading communist party. 
Although increasing modernization and industrialization are taking place in these 
countries together with a certain level of openness, it is still evident that the behavior of 
these states cannot be easily changed (Lovell 2003). It is generally known that the 
communist party is the sole decision-maker in this type of state, where the 
decision-making process is primarily conducted within the party itself, and that such 
process is kept out of public reach. On the other hand, a state’s economy is also said to 
be run by state entities. However, although it is claimed that all current socialist states 
are mainly influenced by the system of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) and its strong Marxist-Leninist ideology, each of those states differs 
significantly from the others as a result of the influence of some particular perceptions 
inherited from their great leaders. For example, China has Maoism, while Vietnam 
follows Ho Chi Minh ideology. 
Still, there are certain fundamental frameworks that both current and former 
socialist states have in common. According to many scholars, the socialist political-legal 
model comprises three core doctrines: socialist legality, democratic centralism, and 
collective mastery. First, socialist legality explains the socialist views on the role of law 
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and its strong connection with the ruling social class in each state where law is said to 
represent the will of such ruling class. This doctrine has been explained in more details 
above in part 2.2.2 for socialist law tradition. 
Second, democratic centralism can be described as one of the core “organizational 
principles” in all communist party and state’s decision-making processes (Gillespie 
2005; Wischermann 2013). This principle was first mentioned by Lenin in 1906 where 
the term represents the idea of “freedom of discussion – unity of action.” In fact, this 
slogan is an illustration for how hierarchical order should be organized and followed 
within the communist party, state agencies, and governmental organizations, when 
seeking a decision toward a major matter. 
Within the scope of a communist system, this concept of democratic centralism 
can be generally explained as follows: Communist leaders in the party, state, and 
governmental organizations at all levels are elected directly or indirectly by individual 
party members via party congresses at various levels accordingly (i.e. municipal, district, 
provincial, and national levels) where such elections are organized in a bottom-up 
process, allowing each individual communist party member to choose his or her desired 
leaders through the method of voting. Then, these elected leaders discuss all major 
matters until they can issue a resolution representing a collective decision among them.  
Reaching such decision also needs to follow the principle of voting in which the choice 
that receives the majority vote is chosen as the final decision, and those minority ones 
need to obey this majority choice.  
After such resolution is released, each party member regardless of his or her rank 
within the party, state, or governmental organizations must strictly comply with it even 
though he or she may have a different point of view compared to the one from the 
party’s resolution. In addition, each party member is required to speak in accordance 
with the resolution content in public, instead of expressing his or her own opinion on 
the subject matter.  
Similarly, the concept of democratic centralism for a decision-making process is 
also strictly implemented in the daily work of all hierarchical structures of the 
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communist system. This can be demonstrated, for example, by an individual party 
member’s obedience to a collective decision made by his or her direct party 
organization, or by the lower party organizations’ compliance with the decisions made 
by those that are higher. In the highest party organization of the communist system, 
known as the party’s Central Committee, all subordinate party organizations and all 
party members must comply with its decisions. Nevertheless, the party’s Central 
Committee still needs to obey the resolution issued from periodic communist party’s 
national congress.                
Finally, according to many scholars, the doctrine of collective mastery suggests 
that both the social community and collective working people, with its core being the 
worker-peasant alliance, are considered the supreme owners and masters of the socialist 
state. Socialist doctrine argues first of all that democratic rights in socialist states can 
only be guaranteed under the “proletarian dictatorship” whereby the worker class, which 
is known as the ruling class of socialist state, is empowered to supervise state and 
governmental organizations’ power via its representative: the communist party 
(Gillespie 2005). Second, it is believed that this framework also provides the people 
(citizens) of the state with rights and responsibilities for which they can vote for their 
desired representatives in national assembly and other levels of the People’s Council, 
which monitors the work of state and governmental organs on behalf of the people in 
what is called “socialist democracy.” As a result, the unified relationships among the 
communist party, the state, and its people (citizens) represent the meaning of collective 
mastery, which is usually evident in the slogan “party leads, state manages, people owns” 
of socialist states (Dao 2003). At the end, civil society and individual space are not 
usually recognized in socialist countries because individual legal rights need to yield to 
collective ones; similarly, collective values are more significant than those that are 
individual. 
The implementation of the three abovementioned socialist doctrines creates some 
specific characteristics of socialist states in practice. First of all, according to Lovell 
(2003), because policy-making is a privilege of the communist party, party members are 
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delegated to work in state and government positions throughout the country, and at 
almost all hierarchy levels of the whole system. Second, the structures of the party, state, 
and government also all follow a top-down approach whereby the people at the highest 
levels make decisions and those in the lower levels then strictly obey and implement 
them.  
Although those periodic party congresses are said to be the highest 
decision-making level in socialist states, it is observed that policy discussion is not 
included in the activities of party congresses, but is rather discussed by members of the 
party’s Central Committee and its smaller belonging committee, which contains top 
political elites and is commonly known as the Politburo Committee. Therefore, scholars 
usually argue that party congress is the place where attended delegates accept and 
endorse the decisions and policies established by their top leaders, although it is known 
that a resolution of party congress is issued by the method of direct voting.  
 
2.2.4 Socialist View of Human Rights 
Generally, socialist states argue that human rights would not be ensured if they did 
not align with the interests of socialism (Szabo 1981). Many scholars believe that the 
primary concern of the collective interests of working people over those individual ones 
of socialist states strongly impacts such perspective of the issues of human rights 
protection. In practice, socialist states set up compulsory conditions to establish and 
maintain the “unity between the rights and duties of man and citizen” (Przetacznik 1977, 
p.246). This is because socialist doctrine establishes the notion of “human” as not 
actually considered different from the concept of citizen of state. The citizen of a 
socialist state on one hand is entitled to have certain rights to enjoy his or her 
participation in various political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects of the state, or to 
receive protection against governmental organs’ abuses or wrongdoings. On the other 
hand, such a citizen has the responsibility to act in accordance with the collective 
interests of the society as a whole.  
Based on the abovementioned perception of socialist states, scholars have argued 
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that socialist states actually recognize no protection for individuals whose behavior 
contradicts the state or the collective interests of society as identified by the state. 
Indeed, socialist doctrine recognizes no possible confrontation between the state and its 
individual citizen where a citizen is viewed as a member of the state who is expected to 
belong to the state and present no opposition to it. As a result, socialism acknowledges 
no natural origin or particular values of individual human rights as described by Western 
democracies.  
Instead, it simply treats human rights as those very basic and general democratic 
rights that citizens of a state are entitled to under a state’s jurisdiction, as set in the law 
that the state itself creates. For example, according to Szabo (1981), although 
professional organizations and associations can be established by citizens in a socialist 
state where the state confirms its respect of the right of freedom of association, it is 
observed that the establishment of those organizations that present interests in conflict 
with the socialist doctrine or those collective interests recognized by the state will not 
be accepted. Therefore, human rights under socialist doctrine are considered a matter 
genuinely belonging to the state itself, and citizens are considered the direct targets of a 
state’s implementation of human rights protection policies due to the socialist 
perception that the state should be the real recipient of all rights collectively, so 
individual rights can only exist to a regulated extent that does not violate or conflict 
with the state or the collective interests it has perceived. 
 
2.2.5 Socialist View of International Law 
Basically, as mentioned in the above part for the discussion of socialist law 
tradition, socialist law allows no space for customary rules to exist within the state. 
Socialist states are therefore claimed to be especially cautious when considering 
international law, as they are believed to also strictly permit no opportunity for any 
possible conflict between the norms of international law and those from their domestic 
law to occur (Lipson 1980). Hence, social states usually examine international law 
meticulously and will not accept any law that possesses principles that contradict with 
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those internal ones of the state. 
The main reason for socialist states to adopt such a perspective of international 
law is because, according to Lissitzyn (1980), it is claimed that socialism traditionally 
does not believe in the universality of international law. In fact, such a belief can be 
explained by the two core characteristics of socialism, which are the notion of interests 
of different social classes in a society and the cognition of purpose of the law. First of 
all, under socialist doctrine, the notion of social classes and their different interests 
plays a highly dominant role, making socialist states doubt the existence of a possible 
common interest, especially between the worker class and the bourgeois class within a 
society. Socialism recognizes no actual common interest between those two social 
classes and views the bourgeois class as the “exploiting class” that owns and controls all 
means of production of a society by exploiting the worker class. Even worse, the 
interests pursued by these two types of social class are rather seen by the socialist 
doctrine as “insurmountable antagonism” (Lissitzyn 1980).    
Secondly, following such a perception of the impossibility of common interests 
between the two abovementioned social classes, socialist doctrine also notices that 
society today is governed by one type of social class and that the domestic law of a state 
is actually built to suit the purpose of such ruling class, rather than being an impartial 
justice system. Therefore, socialist doctrine understands that the law in a so-called 
capitalist state, which is created to serve the interest of the bourgeois ruling class, 
cannot pursuit the same interests as the law of a socialist country that is led by the 
communist party and represents the interests of the worker class. 
Ultimately, these traditional cognitions have lead socialist states to believe that 
there could be no real international instrument that can support the policies of both 
capitalist and communist regimes in the world, knowing that the two kinds of interest 
behind those policies are always in conflict with each other. Therefore, a socialist 
perspective argues that international law cannot become an effective framework to 
sufficiently maintain the stability of international relations among states. 
Nevertheless, it has been found that socialist states do not reject all international 
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provisions as a whole. Many scholars have observed that, in practice, socialist states 
will accept international instruments if they can use them to serve the state’s interests 
(Lissitzyn 1980). For example, they include those fundamental international principles 
such as state sovereignty, non-intervention, non-interference in other states’ internal and 
external affairs, and equality of states, claiming that these principles can help socialist 
leaders to operate their own states without being interfered by outsiders – especially 
those whose aim to oppose or undermine the communist regime. On the other hand, 
with such purpose in mind, socialist states are also known to especially restrict signing 
those international provisions that allow international actors or non-actors (international 
NGOs) to monitor and make judgments on some sensitive domestic fields of the state, 
such as the state’s domestic human rights conditions or other important issues.           
 
2.2.6 Socialist Understanding & Interpretation of International Human Rights 
Law 
Based on the abovementioned socialist perceptions of the purpose of law, the role 
of social class, the collective interests of society, and its perspectives of international 
law, various scholars have noticed that socialist states actually understand and interpret 
certain aspects of international human rights law “quite differently” (Donnelly 1986), 
especially those under the category of civil and political rights. They aim to “protect 
people’s liberty” in many political activities, such as the right to form organizations and 
associations, the right to protest, or the right to participate in public segments (Nickel 
2002). Indeed, as part 2.2.4 of this chapter outlines, the explanation of socialist 
understanding of the “freedom of association” is a clear example to demonstrate this 
difference compared to the cognitions of other regimes, especially those of Western 
democracies. 
Therefore, socialist states usually interpret and implement phrases and provisions 
of international human rights instruments in such a way that they will not work against 
core perspectives and objectives of socialist ideology. (Szabo 1981, p.180) has 
ascertained this as follows: 
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If the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has stated that 
human rights cannot be invoked in the interests of a system whose 
purpose is the annihilation of human rights, then it is the 
fundamental thesis of the socialist concept of human rights that 
none of the human rights can be exercised in a manner conflicting 
with the fundamental objectives of socialism. 
 
In addition, as social states highly respect and promote those fundamental 
international principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference, and 
equality of states, they both expressly and implicitly indicate that the state is the only 
entity that has “full supremacy over its objects” (Przetacznik 1977), with these objects 
obviously including the state’s citizens and matters that relate to them. Therefore, 
socialist doctrine posits that the scope of international human rights law cannot directly 
cover the rights of individuals of a state; instead, the protection of individual rights can 
only exist via legal relationships between the state and its own individual citizens. 
International human rights instruments instead serve to help regulate relations among 
international member states in regard to the subject matter. So, under the socialist view, 
there is no direct link between international human rights law and the state’s individual 
citizens.    
 
2.2.7 Socialist State Behavior toward International Human Rights Treaties: The 
Puzzles 
Based on the above discussion, it can generally be assumed that those typical 
socialist perceptions of the purpose of the law, the understanding of democracy, the 
social class, society’s collective rights, and how to approach international law together 
would make current socialist states behave negatively toward the ratification of 
contemporary international human rights treaties compared to other regimes, especially 
those of the Western states. However, in practice, statistical data from the Indicators of 
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United Nations Human Rights – Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) has 
indicated that five current socialist states of the world have actually signed and ratified 
some of the 18 contemporary international human rights treaties. Table 2 offers further 
details: 
 
Table 2: 18 International Human Rights Treaties and  
Current Socialist States’ Ratification Status (as of October 2016) 
( R = ratified; S = signed but not yet ratified; NA = no action) 
No. List of Treaties China Cuba 
Lao 
PDR 
North 
Korea 
Vietnam 
1 
International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 1969 
R R R NA R 
2 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1976 
S S R R R 
3 
Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1976 
NA NA NA NA NA 
4 
Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, aiming at the 
abolition of the death penalty 
1991 
NA NA NA NA NA 
5 
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 1976 
R S R R R 
6 
Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on 
NA NA NA NA NA 
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Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 2013 
7 
Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women 1981 
R R R R R 
8 
Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women 2000 
NA S NA NA NA 
9 
Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1987 
R R R NA R 
10 
Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 2006 
NA NA NA NA NA 
11 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 1990 
R R R R R 
12 
Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict 2002 
R R R NA R 
13 
Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and child 
R R R R R 
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pornography 2002 
14 
Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on a communications 
procedure 2014 
NA NA NA NA NA 
15 
International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families 2003 
NA NA NA NA NA 
16 
International Convention for the 
Protection of all Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance 2010 
NA R S NA NA 
17 
Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 2008 
R R R S R 
18 
Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 2008 
NA NA NA NA NA 
Source: United Nations Human Rights – Office of the High Commissioner 
 
According to Table 2, most of the five current socialist states of the world have in 
fact already ratified or signed about half of the 18 contemporary international human 
rights treaties currently in force. Those that have received no consent (no action) from 
these socialist states are mostly those optional protocols to the related main conventions. 
According to the OHCHR, by ratifying these international human rights treaties, it is 
generally a legal obligation of the ratifying states to obey the treaties’ provisions, which 
require all state parties to implement relevant domestic measures to protect those rights 
recognized by such treaties.  
Furthermore, the ratifying states are also obliged to regularly conduct and submit 
national reports to inform the relevant monitoring committee, as set by each treaty, how 
51 
 
state members have actually domestically implemented rights protection. Such 
committee would have the rights to directly receive and deal with petitions made by 
individuals of state parties who claim the violation of relevant rights if the ratifying 
states either ratify an optional protocol to the main treaty or place a declaration under a 
specific provision confirming such authority of the monitoring committee. And although 
it is seen that socialist states tend to take no action toward these optional protocols, 
perhaps to limit the power of monitoring committees, it is noted that in many cases, the 
existing domestic measures and legislation system of some ratifying states – especially 
the abovementioned socialist ones and others that do not perceive similar human rights’ 
values and interests acknowledged by these international treaties – have to be altered to 
meet treaty requirements.  
Therefore, by comparing this ratification practice of socialist states with the 
theoretical literature review in the previous chapter, there are two interesting puzzles 
that this thesis hopes to clarify with empirical data. First, it is necessary to explain why 
socialist states have decided to join international human rights treaties, especially those 
that require them to alter their existing domestic legal settings to better cope with the 
treaty provisions. In other words, it is interesting to identify the actual cause for socialist 
states to decide upon their ratifying decision toward human rights treaties given that 
these particular states possess many factors that many scholars would rather observe as 
barriers to international human rights treaty ratification, such as being classified as an 
autocratic regime, having a less developed (or developing) economy as determined by 
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and holding poor human 
rights records. 
In order to answer this first puzzle, there are a few specific hypotheses that need 
to be verified by practical data: whether the ratifying behavior of socialist states toward 
international human rights treaties was actually caused by a change in these states’ 
cognitions of human rights values and interests, as suggested by the normative approach, 
or if the material interests were recognized by these socialist states the main reasons for 
their ratifying decision, as explained by the rationalist approach, although it is still 
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unclear whether socialist states would really want to weaken their own national 
sovereignty to receive some cooperation benefits in return. In addition to that, and also 
in response to the debatable issue of the actual role of sovereignty in Southeast Asian 
states’ decision behavior mentioned previously in the theoretical literature review 
chapter, it is necessary to re-evaluate how socialist states – especially those located in 
Southeast Asia – consider their sovereignty when making decisions toward international 
human rights treaties.            
Second, as the last section of the previous chapter suggests, the roles of domestic 
and external dynamics in shaping a state’s decision behavior toward the ratification of 
human rights treaties are other important puzzles that must be re-examined via this 
study of socialist state behavior. Therein, it is necessary to differentiate between 
domestic and international politics, with these single-party states rather viewing one as 
the more determinant driver that mainly shaped their decision to ratify this kind of treaty. 
Additionally, the influence of both external and internal pressures and threats on 
socialist states’ ratifying behavior also warrants empirical review in order to reduce the 
previously mentioned knowledge gap about the claimed non-existent relationship 
between threats and the ratifying decision behavior of autocratic states toward this issue. 
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SECTION 3: THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (CAT) 
 
2.3.1 Brief Historical Development of the CAT 
Before the ‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1987’ (CAT) was drafted, it is known that the notion of 
preventing torture was mentioned in various United Nations documents such as the 
‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1976’, the 
‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1976’, and the two optional 
protocols to these treaties. In fact, according to Lippman (1994), in 1973, Amnesty 
International established a report to support its ‘Campaign for the Abolition of Torture’. 
At the end of the same year, Amnesty International also launched its first ‘International 
Conference for the Abolition of Torture’, which urged the international community to 
consider torture as a crime against humanity that must be prohibited by international 
and national laws.  
In 1974, the issue of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments or 
punishments in relation to detention and imprisonment was on the agenda (agenda item 
No. 12) for discussion in the 29th session (1974–1975) of the United Nations General 
Assembly. Then a draft of the resolution on torture was reviewed by the Social, 
Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (also known as the Third Committee) before its 
official version, resolution No. 3218 (XXIX), was adopted by the General Assembly in 
November 1974, based on the recommendation of the committee.    
In December 1975, it was seen as a historic step when the United Nations General 
Assembly decided to adopt the ‘Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ 
(also called the ‘United Nations Declaration on Torture’, for short). This declaration is 
believed to be the foundation for the later development of the CAT.  
After the declaration was adopted, in 1977 the United Nations General Assembly 
took a further important step when it adopted resolution No. 32/62 to urge the 
international community to make more of an effort to prevent torture and to consider 
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building and implementing an international treaty for this particular issue. The task of 
drafting this convention was given to the Commission on Human Rights of the United 
Nations. In 1978, the Commission on Human Rights established a working group to 
further develop two drafts of the convention that had been proposed by the International 
Association of Penal Law (E/CN.4/NGO/213) and by Sweden (E/CN.4/1285). In the 
end, the working group chose the draft that had been prepared by Sweden to be the basis 
for the later official convention.       
Finally, on December 10, 1984, the CAT was officially adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
international member states via resolution No. 39/46. In accordance with its Article 
27(1), after being ratified or accessed by 20 states, the convention then came into force 
on June 26, 1987. The CAT also has one optional protocol, which was adopted on 
December 18, 2002, at the 57th session of the United Nations General Assembly via 
resolution A/RES/57/199; this protocol officially came into force on June 22, 2006. 
 
2.3.2 Core Contents of the CAT 
The CAT has a total of 33 articles structured into three parts. The first part 
contains Article 1 to Article 16 and provides a definition of torture and relevant legal 
obligations that regulate state parties with regard to the prohibition, punishment and 
prevention of any act of torture and to the protection of victims of torture. This part is 
viewed as “a strong elaboration of norms against torture” (Donnelly 1986, p. 631). Part 
two contains Article 17 to Article 24, describing the establishment of the Committee 
against Torture (Article 17); giving rights to state parties to monitor the implementation 
of this convention and to investigate allegations of torture occurring within their own 
territories (Article 20); and governing some other relevant issues such as the 
responsibility of state parties to report their measures for implementing this convention 
domestically to the Committee against Torture, committee members’ rights and 
activities in investigating allegations of torture, etc. Finally, provisions from Article 25 
to Article 33 represent the final part of CAT; they supervise the signature, ratification, 
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accession, entry into force and amendment of the convention. This final part also 
contains an article on optional mechanisms for settling disputes among state parties 
(Article 30).      
There are several important issues about the regulation of the CAT and its scope 
of combating torture. First of all, torture is defined by Article 1(1) of the convention as 
“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person” for the purposes of “obtaining information or confession,” or 
“punishing for an act […] or intimidating or coercing for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind” by the state’s “public officials or other person acting in an 
official capacity”. Lippman (1994) believes that acts of torture as defined above can be 
“easily identified”.  
The CAT also requires that state parties take all “effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures” to prevent all acts of torture as defined by 
Article 1(1) of the convention within the territory of their jurisdiction (Article 2). 
Particularly, for the purpose of implementing the CAT’s provisions domestically, state 
parties are obliged to “ensure that all acts of torture are offences” under their domestic 
criminal law (Article 4). In other words, member states have to ensure that all torture 
activities are considered as crimes which must be criminally prosecuted under strict 
penalty framework. Accordingly, with the large coverage of Article 1, the criminalizing 
scope does not only include those criminal procedure activities in theory, but also 
torture behaviors that can occur in all activities relating to the state’s exercise of public 
authority.  
Moreover, Article 10 of the convention indicates that state parties are also 
responsible under this convention for providing “education and information regarding 
the prohibition against torture […] in the training of their law enforcement personnel, 
civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons” who would be 
involved in the processes of “custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual 
subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment”.   
On a different note, according to Article 3, the convention also requires state 
56 
 
parties to refuse the extradition of a person “to another state where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”. In 
addition, Article 8 of the CAT requires that offenses of torture are “included as 
extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty exiting between state parties”, and the 
convention can be considered a “legal basis for extradition” with regard to the offenses 
of torture “if a state party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a 
treaty receives a request for extradition from another state party with which it has no 
extradition treaty”.    
On the other hand, in relation to enforcement issues, Article 20 of the CAT creates 
an “innovative enforcement procedure” (Lippman 1994). Specifically, when the 
Committee against Torture’s competence is recognized by state parties, Article 20 of the 
convention allows the committee to request state parties’ cooperation to examine 
allegations of torture occurring within the territory of the state party. Alternatively, the 
committee can also proceed with confidential field investigations of such allegations if 
committee members “receive reliable information containing well-founded indications” 
about the practice of systematic torture in state parties’ territories. Finally, Article 21 of 
the CAT works as an optional provision that recognizes the competence of the 
Committee against Torture in handling complaints among state parties in cases where “a 
state party claims that another state party is not fulfilling its obligations under this 
Convention”.   
  
2.3.3 Commentary on the CAT 
There have been several comments made about the content of the CAT, both 
positive and negative. With regard to the positive commentary, first, many scholars 
recognize that the provisions of the CAT do not only include a broad range of torture 
behaviors that must be prohibited, punished and prevented, but also cover a large 
number of subjects of state who would be found responsible for acts of torture that 
violate international obligations. In other words, according to Aloisi (2011), within the 
territory of a state party in which torture is found to occur for the purposes identified by 
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the CAT, subjects that can be accused for violating the convention not only include state 
leaders and relevant government officials, but also related “supporting governmental 
groups” if they are found to have acted as agents receiving directives from leaders to 
perform torture behaviors.  
Second, another positive comment about the CAT is that alongside governing 
legal obligations regarding torture, the convention also requires state parties to pursue 
domestic justice against people found to be or suspected of carrying out torture 
activities. Finally, various scholars acknowledge that the enforcement procedures built 
by the CAT have a “far-reaching scope” with the potential to be a strong monitoring 
mechanism (Lippman 1994; Donnelly 1986). 
However, criticisms also arise when scholars discuss the content of the CAT. For 
example, it is observed that despite requiring state parties to implement domestic 
jurisdiction on acts of torture, the CAT does not actually classify torture as a crime 
against humanity, which would rather be placed under the jurisdiction of an 
international penal tribunal (Lippman 1994). In addition, many scholars also argue that 
it is difficult to clarify the issue of domestic “lawful sanctions” that cause “pain or 
suffering” to a person, as mentioned in Article 1(1) in the definition of torture; it is 
suggested that the lawfulness of such domestic sanctions should be examined and 
justified under international instead of domestic law. Similarly, it is noted that the CAT 
does not specify penalties for high-level officials of state parties who are involved in 
committing torture or for the systematic practice of torture in a state party territory and 
other relevant issues. 
In addition, the effectiveness of enforcement, particularly of the provision under 
Article 20, is usually questioned by scholars due to the fact that state parties indeed 
have various ways to defeat the function of this provision. For example, state parties can 
reject cooperation with the Committee against Torture, claiming that its findings are 
incorrect or biased, or meet with the committee but deny its allegations. In the end, 
because the committee is limited to only making comments about a state’s annual report, 
it is believed that the committee’s criticisms on a report alone cannot be considered a 
58 
 
strong and effective sanction on state parties. Moreover, it is recommended that in order 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the convention, the number of state parties (and their 
regime types) should be determined that recognize the competence of the Committee 
against Torture to monitor the domestic implementation of the convention or to handle 
the communication of interstate complaints (Donnelly 1986).          
In summary, scholars generally believe that the CAT sill cannot solve the 
traditional tension between a state’s fear of sovereignty violation and the need to 
recognize and respect fundamental human rights issues, of which freedom from torture 
is one. Therefore, Lippman (1994) suggests that ratifying the CAT would be less likely 
to happen in states that practice torture; on the other hand, states that have already 
decided to ratify the CAT can choose to just report their compliance with the prohibition, 
punishment and prevention of torture as required by the convention, rather than raise 
questions about “restrictive judicial interpretations” of the CAT’s provisions and 
violations of the convention.       
 
2.3.4 The Ratification of the CAT by International Member States 
According to the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 
as of October 2016, 159 state parties have fully signed and ratified the CAT; there are 
also 10 states that have signed but not yet ratified it. The 28 remaining states of the 
world are found to have currently taken no action toward this convention. Lists of states 
with signatures only and of those who have taken no action are shown in Table 3 and 
Table 4, respectively. 
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Table 3: List of 10 States that have signed but not yet ratified the CAT  
(as of October 2016)  
No. Country Name Date of Signature 
1 Angola September 24, 2013 
2 Bahamas December 16, 2008 
3 Brunei Darussalam September 22, 2015 
4 Comoros September 22, 2000 
5 Gambia October 23, 1985 
6 Haiti August 16, 2013 
7 India October 14, 1997 
8 Palau September 20, 2011 
9 Sao Tome and Principe September 6, 2000 
10 Sudan June 4, 1986 
Source: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
 
Table 4: List of 28 States that have taken no action toward the CAT 
(as of October 2016) 
1 Barbados 
2 Bhutan 
3 Central African Republic 
4 Cook Islands 
5 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
6 Dominica 
7 Ethiopia 
8 Grenada 
9 Iran 
10 Jamaica 
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11 Kiribati 
12 Malaysia 
13 Marshall Islands 
14 Micronesia 
15 Myanmar 
16 Niue 
17 Oman 
18 Papua New Guinea 
19 Saint Kitts and Nevis 
20 Saint Lucia 
21 Samoa 
22 Singapore 
23 Solomon Islands 
24 Suriname 
25 Tonga 
26 Trinidad and Tobago 
27 Tuvalu 
28 United Republic of Tanzania 
Source: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
 
Scholars have made various arguments about the reasons or factors that shape a 
state’s ratifying behavior toward this convention, especially the behavior of so-called 
autocratic states. Hollyer and Rosendorff (2012) note that 74 of 129 autocratic states in 
their sample between 1985 and 1996 did not join the CAT. First of all, it is argued that 
autocratic states are less likely to ratify the CAT than democratic ones. According to 
Aloisi (2011), this is because autocratic leaders are well aware that they will be held 
accountable for any violation that occurs by both international and domestic actors and 
non-actors when committing to international human rights agreements. More 
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importantly, the ratification of the CAT by autocratic regimes also allows those 
mentioned players to monitor states’ domestic human rights conditions and perhaps 
criticize states’ activities on this issue; autocratic states usually consider such actions to 
be interference in sovereign states’ internal affairs, which they strongly restrict. 
Therefore, it is not easy for an autocratic regime to make a decision to ratify the CAT, 
compared to democratic ones. 
However, for autocratic states that have decided to ratify the CAT, Hollyer and 
Rosendorff (2012) believe that ratification of this convention can be considered a 
“costly signal” that helps them send a strong message to their domestic political 
opposition groups confirming the state’s willingness and determination to bear even 
greater costs for maintaining domestic power. Similarly, Trachtman (2012) adds that 
such actions by autocratic states can make a domestic political opposition group “reduce 
its activities,” which is seen as an “increased benefit” for the autocratic regimes, after 
reaffirming to the international community that different states face different kinds of 
domestic political opposition. On a different note, Vreeland (2008) notices that 
autocratic states with a single political party face no real domestic political opposition, 
so they are less likely to join the CAT than autocracies that allow the existence of 
multiple parties.   
On the other hand, various scholars argue that although reactions to threats may 
vary across autocratic regime types, threats actually create no actual impact on 
autocratic states’ decision-making behavior toward the ratification of CAT, because 
autocratic leaders are generally seen to face fewer threats than those of democratic 
regimes. Similarly, scholars have found no statistical data to indicate any significant 
influence of instability potentially caused by such threats on the behavior of autocratic 
states in this matter. Therefore, it is believed that threats cannot act as a determining 
factor shaping state behavior toward the ratification of the CAT.  
Last but not least, due to the fact that there are no sufficient empirical data 
proving that states ratify the CAT to receive external rewards from international actors, 
scholars suggest that ratification by both autocratic and democratic states is not done for 
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the purpose of signaling cooperation to the international community (Aloisi 2011; 
Nielsen & Simmons 2014). For example, according to a study by Nielsen and Simmons 
(2014), qualitative research indicates that the ratification of the CAT in fact has no 
relation to European aid policies and programs in the states that are most likely to be 
rewarded for such behavior.  
 
2.3.5 The CAT and the Current Socialist States’ Ratification Status 
 
Table 5: Socialist States and the Ratification Status toward the CAT  
(as of October 2016) 
Country Name Signature Ratification 
China 12/12/1986 04/10/1988 
Cuba 27/01/1986 17/05/1995 
Lao PDR (Laos) 21/09/2010 26/09/2012 
North Korea - - 
Vietnam 07/11/2013 05/02/2015 
Source: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
 
According to Table 5, four of the five current socialist states—China, Cuba, Laos 
and Vietnam—have signed and ratified the CAT. Of these, China was the first socialist 
state to ratify the convention and Vietnam the most recent. More importantly, it can also 
be observed that all four socialist states that have ratified the CAT have placed very 
similar reservations on it. First, upon ratification of the convention, these states all 
placed reservations on the provisions under Article 20 in which they refuse to recognize 
the competence of the Committee against Torture. Likewise, they do not consider 
themselves bound by the provisions in the first paragraph of Article 30, which is about 
optional mechanisms for settling disputes among state parties with regard to the 
interpretation and application of the CAT.       
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2.3.6 The CAT and the ASEAN Member States’ Ratification Status 
The region of Southeast Asia contains 11 states: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Thailand 
and Vietnam. All of these states but Timor-Leste have become members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). More than 500 million people live in 
this region and belong to countries that possess not only different cultures and histories 
but also different political systems and forms of government (Hofmann 2009).  
More importantly, Donnelly (1986) indicates that the ASEAN is the “most 
promising sub-regional organization”, but when it comes to the field of human rights, 
domestic human rights records of its member states do not show promising results. 
Similarly, as the membership of ASEAN contains states that are considered 
authoritarian regimes, such as absolute monarchies and single-party states, Schaffer, 
Follesdal & Ulfstein (2013) comment that the ASEAN looks like a “club of dictators”, 
where some of its member states are the “most notorious Human Rights violators”. 
Similarly, Ramcharan (2010) indicates that the newer ASEAN member states (i.e. 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) are especially concerned about external 
criticisms of their domestic human rights issues, as they believe outsiders would exploit 
the condemnations in this field to interfere in a state’s internal affairs and violate its 
sovereignty to pursue their own interests. 
Based on the data provided by the United Nations Human Rights Office of the 
High Commissioner, Table 6 shows the ratification status of all ASEAN member states 
toward the CAT. 
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Table 6: ASEAN Countries & the Ratification Status toward the CAT 
(as at October 2016) 
No. Country Name Signature Ratification 
1 Brunei Darussalam September 22, 2015 - 
2 Cambodia - October 15, 1992 
3 Indonesia October 23, 1985 October 28, 1998 
4 Lao PDR (Laos) September 21, 2010 September 26, 2012 
5 Malaysia - - 
6 Myanmar - - 
7 Philippines - June 18, 1986 
8 Singapore - - 
9 Thailand - October 02, 2007 
10 Vietnam November 07, 2013 February 05, 2015 
Source: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
 
According to Table 6, it is shown that six ASEAN member states have already 
accessed or ratified the CAT: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam. Brunei Darussalam signed it in 2015 but has not yet ratified it, while Malaysia, 
Myanmar and Singapore have not taken any action toward this Convention. In general, 
Ramcharan (2010) determines that the ASEAN member states have shown a low level 
of acceding to international human rights treaties, especially the CAT, which is said to 
be the “most avoided” one. 
Nevertheless, of the six ASEAN countries that have already ratified or accessed 
this convention, only Laos and Vietnam, the two socialist states of the region, have 
placed reservations on provisions of Article 20 of the convention to refuse recognizing 
the competence of the Committee against Torture; Indonesia did not place a reservation 
on this article but instead declared that the implementation of its provisions must strictly 
comply with the principles of the state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. With 
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regard to the first provision of Article 30 regulating optional mechanisms to settle 
disputes among state parties in relation to the interpretation and application of the CAT, 
besides Laos and Vietnam, which have been discussed in section 2.3.3, Indonesia and 
Thailand placed similar reservations to confirm that they do not consider themselves 
bound by this provision. Finally, Cambodia and the Philippines have placed no 
reservations on the convention.         
       
2.3.7 Conclusion 
Although the CAT receives some criticism about its inability to regulate detailed 
penalties for involved high-level officials of the violating state parties or its ineffective 
optional provisions that need the recognition of the Committee against Torture to 
enforce, it is acknowledged by the international community that the CAT still has a 
far-reaching scope of enforcement procedures with a strong monitoring mechanism in 
addition to its ability to require state parties to improve their domestic justice systems to 
properly address a broad range of torture behaviors and all possible violating subjects, 
not limited to state leaders, government officials and their supporting groups. As a result, 
there is an assumption that the CAT is less likely to be ratified by states that implement 
torture.  
To date, although a large number of international member states have already 
accessed or ratified the CAT, there are still some countries that have not taken any 
action toward the CAT, including three ASEAN member states. Interestingly, it is 
observed that four of the five current socialist states of the world have ratified the CAT, 
and two of them are located in the region of South East Asia.   
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SECTION 4: THE CONTEXT OF VIETNAM 
 
2.4.1 General Background of Vietnam 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is located in Southeast Asia, bordering China, 
Laos and Cambodia and the Gulf of Thailand, Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea. 
Since the unification of North and South Vietnam in 1975, Vietnam has been commonly 
known as a one-party Communist state where the Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh 
ideologies are strictly followed. An important economic reform during the Renovation 
Period (“Doi Moi”) in the late 1980s made Vietnam cease its centrally planned economy 
and remove many restrictions on private enterprises, domestic and foreign trades and 
Western investments in the country. However, both international scholars and human 
rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) believe that this reform should be 
recognized as a rare solution for that particular time to revive a “near-collapsed 
economy” and a society with “poverty and exhaustion” after many years at war, rather 
than an indication of a turn toward democracy (Freedom House 2012). Therefore, to 
date the Vietnamese polity is still seen as an “authoritarian system” (Wischermann 
2013; United States Department of State 2011). 
With regard to the state’s external relations after the country’s unification in 1975, 
briefly, Vietnam has had significant foreign relations with the United States (U.S.) and 
China; other key international players closely related to the state include the countries of 
the European Union (EU), Japan, ASEAN member states and Australia (Human Rights 
Watch 2016). The U.S. is said to keep pressuring Vietnam to improve its domestic 
human rights conditions; while on one hand Vietnam wants to protect its sovereignty 
from external interference by the U.S., on the other hand, it also needs to cooperate with 
the US in many other areas. The relationship between the China and Vietnam is 
complicated; Vietnam wants to maintain a close relationship with China, as the two 
countries share a similar ideology and political system, but this relationship has recently 
been “severely strained” due to current maritime territorial disputes between the two 
countries (Evers 2003; Freedom House 2015). Finally, the EU made some efforts in 
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promoting human rights protection in Vietnam. Although Australia continues to hold 
human rights bilateral dialogues with Vietnam, not much attention has been paid to 
them.            
Based on various sources, a brief timeline of Vietnam’s major internal and 
external events since its unification in 1975 is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Timeline of Vietnam’s Major Events between 1975 and 2016 
Year Details 
1975 - Unification of the country 
1976 
- The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is officially proclaimed 
- The Vietnamese Workers Party is officially renamed the Vietnamese 
Communist Party (or the Communist Party of Vietnam, or CPV) 
1977 - Vietnam becomes a member of the United Nations 
1979 
- Vietnam intervenes in the Cambodian genocide and expels the Khmer 
Rouge regime of Pol Pot 
- Sino-Vietnamese war (also known as the Third Indochina War), 1979–
1990 
1986 
- Nguyen Van Linh becomes the general secretary of the CPV and 
introduces a more liberal economic policy 
- Renovation Period is initiated after the Sixth National Congress of the 
CPV 
1991 - Vietnam normalizes diplomatic relationship with China 
1992 
- Vietnam adopts new state constitution allowing more space for 
economic freedoms 
1994 - United States lifts the 30-year trade embargo on Vietnam 
1995 
- Vietnam and the United States fully normalize their diplomatic 
relationship 
- Vietnam becomes an official member of the ASEAN 
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2000 - United States president Bill Clinton’s official visit to Vietnam 
2001 
- Vietnam and United States implement a trade agreement that normalizes 
the trade status between them 
2005 
- Vietnam’s prime minister Phan Van Khai becomes the first Vietnamese 
leader to visit the United States after the end of the Vietnam War 
2007 
- After 12 years of negotiation, Vietnam becomes the 150th member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) 
- Vietnam’s president Nguyen Minh Triet is the first Vietnamese head of 
state to visit the United States since 1975 
2008 
- Vietnam becomes a non-permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council for a 2-year term 
- After nearly 30 years since the war in 1979, Vietnam and China resolve 
their border disputes  
2009 
- More than 15,000 prisoners are released before the end of their prison 
terms in the Lunar New Year amnesty 
- Tensions grow between Vietnam and China over fishing grounds; 
Vietnam calls on China to stop preventing Vietnamese fishing boats 
from fishing on its claimed territorial waters 
2011 
- China and Vietnam sign a bilateral agreement to manage the South 
China Sea dispute, including a hotline for emergencies and a provision 
for the two countries to meet twice a year 
2013 
- Vietnam is elected to be a member of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council for the 2014–2016 term 
- Vietnam adopts a new state constitution (amended from the 1992 
version) 
2014 
- Tensions grow between Vietnam and China over territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea; for the first time, Vietnam’s state media marks the 
anniversary of South Vietnam’s clash with China over the Paracel 
Islands in 1974; protests erupt in many Vietnamese cities and provinces 
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against the operation of Chinese oil drilling rig HD 981 in the South 
China Sea waters also claimed by Vietnam 
- Martin Dempsey, chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
holds discussions with Vietnamese leaders during the highest-level visit 
from an American military officer since 1975; United States indicates it 
will partially lift its arms embargo on Vietnam, applying to weapons 
used for maritime purposes only  
2016 
- The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is signed by 12 member nations, 
including Vietnam 
- United States president Barack Obama’s visit to Vietnam; United States 
fully lifts arms embargo on Vietnam 
Source: Adapted from various sources, modified by author 
 
This timeline shows that Vietnam’s decision to remove economic barriers since 
1986 has allowed the country to enjoy strong economic growth by becoming deeper and 
more broadly integrated into the global economy. It has also brought to the state more 
international political and security benefits and challenges and given the domestic 
society and citizens many chances to exchange information and connect with the outside 
world.  
  
2.4.2 Vietnam’s Political-Legal System 
With regard to its domestic legal system, it is known that Vietnam used to apply 
the common economic model of socialism called the “dictatorship of proletariat” before 
the country’s Renovation Period initiated in 1986. Because of the collapse of the 
socialist bloc in the late 1990s and the extreme weakness of the domestic economy at 
that time, Vietnam decided to abandon the socialist economic model, redirect itself 
toward a more market-oriented economy and try to align its political reform with 
economic reform. This became a main reason for the state to re-study its rule of law, 
hoping to develop a theoretical framework to help the state better organize its political 
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regime and govern the society (Truong 2000); indeed, it is believed that the current 
political-legal system of Vietnam was strongly shaped by this event (Dao 2003).  
After this study, the concept of the “socialist rule-of-law state” (also known as the 
“socialist law-based state”) aiming to regulate both the state’s internal relations 
(between the state and its citizens, between citizens and within state organs) and 
external relations was introduced. In short, such a term represents a notion that suggests 
that a state needs to both “embody the law” and “abide by the law” at the same time. 
This important concept has been treated as a foundation for the development of 
Vietnam’s political-legal system to date.  
The “socialist rule-of-law state” of Vietnam has attributes common to and typical 
of the Western rule-of-law state (Nguyen 2009). As far as similarities go, first, it 
ascertains that all state power belongs to citizens, where citizens of the state use such 
power directly or indirectly via their elected state organs. Second, the doctrine also 
places citizens’ democratic rights and freedoms under the law and imposes 
responsibility on the state to guarantee and protect such rights and freedoms. Finally, the 
state must organize and operate according to its constitution. The doctrine’s most typical 
attributes reaffirm that the “socialist rule-of-law state” of Vietnam is a state led by only 
one political party, i.e. the communist party of Vietnam, and that it is a state where the 
implementation of legislative, executive and judicial rights is “unified,” “assigned” and 
“coordinated” tightly among state organs. In other words, state power under the 
“socialist rule-of-law state” is rather united in the state’s legislative branch, which is the 
highest authority for making laws, and in the government and court, which supervises 
the administration and maintains the judicial system, respectively (Truong 2000).   
In practice, many broad legislative and public administration reforms have 
actually taken place in the country since 1991, aiming to create a “better alignment” 
between the state and “a market economy” and to create “international norms” 
(Freedom House 2012; Dao 2003). Therein, the adoption of the ‘1992 Constitution’ is 
considered one of the most important features in this period, when this core document 
of the state’s highest legal jurisdiction for the first time institutionalized the communist 
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party’s fundamental viewpoints on the state’s “economic and political reforms,” 
“socialist goals,” “socialist democracy” and “citizens’ freedom rights” (Embassy of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the United States of America, n.d.).  
Following the adoption of the ‘1992 Constitution’, many important law sets have 
been enacted and amended, contributing strongly to today’s legal system in Vietnam; 
for example, the ‘Civil Code’ of 1995 is recognized as Vietnam’s “first ever codified 
Civil Law” covering broad and diversified regulations on civil relations and activities 
(Truong 2000). To date, Vietnam’s legal system has been made up of a total of 225 laws. 
And according to the Amnesty International (2016), law-making reform in Vietnam still 
continues, with various key laws recently reviewed, amended and adopted, including 
the ‘Civil Code’, ‘Penal Code’, ‘Criminal Procedure Code’ and the ‘Law on Custody 
and Detention’. On the other hand, some other laws have currently been placed under 
discussion, including the ‘Law on Belief and Religion’, ‘Law on Association’ and ‘Law 
on Demonstration’.  
With regard to the domestic political system, first, the communist party of 
Vietnam is recognized as “the core of the state” (Freedom House 2012). Therein, 
members of the Party are seen in most positions, and at almost all levels, of state organs, 
including positions from the local (communal, district, provincial and city) governments 
(People’s Committee) to the central government, from local (communal, district, 
provincial and city) People’s Councils to the National Assembly, in all ministries 
(including the armed forces) and in state-owned enterprises. The only absolute power of 
the communist party in Vietnam’s political system is in fact expressed in Article 4(1) of 
the constitution, as: 
 
The communist party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the Vietnamese 
working class, simultaneously the vanguard of the toiling people 
and of the Vietnamese nation, the faithful representative of the 
interests of the working class, the toiling people, and the whole 
nation, acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi 
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Minh’s thought, is the leading force of the State and society. 
  
More specifically, the communist party is organized as a centralized and top-down 
hierarchy. 19 members of the Politburo Committee (as at the 12th national congress of 
the communist party of Vietnam in 2016), who have been elected from the 200 
members of the party’s Central Committee, are Vietnam’s top leaders. These Politburo 
members hold the highest positions in the state, such as general secretary of the 
communist party, chairman of the National Assembly, state president, prime minister, 
minister of public security, minister of defense and minister of foreign affairs. Members 
of the party’s Central Committee consist of all ministers of the government, all 
provincial and city Party secretaries and some top position holders from other important 
state organs, including the National Assembly. Official meetings at this level are held 
twice a year, during which important policy and personnel issues are discussed. The 
national party congress is organized once every five years to elect new members for the 
party’s Central Committee.  
On the other hand, the National Assembly of Vietnam is seen as another key 
player of the socialist state’s political system. In brief, the National Assembly has about 
500 members (496 members as of the 14th National Assembly for the 2016–2021 term) 
who are elected “with universal and equal suffrage” every five years (Freedom House 
2012). For a National Assembly election in Vietnam, the voter turnout rate usually 
reaches over 99% (99.35% for the most recent National Assembly election, in early 
2016), as voting is a responsibility regulated by the constitution for all citizens of voting 
age. In addition, it is important to note that the structure of candidates running for 
National Assembly in Vietnam is designed in a way that different socio-political groups 
of the country can be represented (i.e. youth, women, ethnic minorities, military, 
non-party members, self-nominated individuals, etc.). For example, according to data 
provided by the People’s Army Newspaper (2016), for the 14th National Assembly 
election in 2016, 86 National Assembly deputies were ethnic minorities (accounting for 
17.3%), 133 were women (26.8%), 21 were non-party members (4.2%), and two were 
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self-nominated (0.4%).              
There are nine subordinate committees of the National Assembly that are 
responsible for reviewing draft laws submitted by the government. These committees 
are the (1) Committee on Laws, (2) Committee on Judicial Affairs, (3) Committee on 
Economic Affairs, (4) Committee on National Defense and Security, (5) Committee on 
Social Affairs, (6) Committee on Culture, Education, Adolescents and Children, (7) 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, (8) Committee on Financial and Budgetary Affairs and 
(9) Committee on Science, Technology and Environment. The heads of these 
committees are concurrently a member of the Standing Committee, a permanent body of 
the National Assembly that has the executive power to decide policies and major issues 
of the whole National Assembly.  
The National Assembly is also responsible for making decisions to pass laws and 
approve the country’s budgets and significant investment projects proposed by the 
government. Notably, the Freedom House (2012) claims that although there may be 
“intense debates” prior the official voting sessions, a government proposal is rarely 
turned down by the National Assembly. This is because more than 90% of the National 
Assembly deputies are members of the communist party who must first obey party’s 
constitution and resolutions; hence, policies that have been approved by the communist 
party via its resolutions and directives and are related to the work of the National 
Assembly are unlikely to be rejected by the party’s members participating in the 
National Assembly. As a result, the National Assembly of Vietnam monitors all state 
organs and their work but not the communist party’s power; instead it institutionalizes 
the party’s orientations and policies.   
 
2.4.3 Civil and Political Rights in Vietnam 
With regard to domestic civil and political rights, the openness of the Renovation 
Period is believed to have actually created a new situation for the country’s communist 
party, whose monopoly of state power is usually accused by various international actors 
and non-actors, especially Western states and international organizations on human 
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rights, of causing a lack of basic freedoms within the country (Human Rights Watch 
2016; Missio 2003). Most recently, in 2014, in a periodic review of Vietnam’s human 
rights records, despite the state’s acceptance of 182 of 227 recommendations made by 
the United Nations Human Rights Council, Vietnam was still criticized for rejecting 
some important recommendations from the inter-governmental body, including requests 
for releasing political prisoners, establishing an independent national human rights 
institution and promoting public political participation. 
From the United States’ perspective, for example, the communist regime’s strong 
“restrictions on citizens’ political rights” and “increased measures” aiming to “limit 
citizens’ civil liberties” are seen as the “most significant Human Rights problems” in 
Vietnam (United States Department of State 2011). Specifically, common civil and 
political rights in Vietnam that attract concern from relevant outsiders include the 
freedoms of speech, opinion, press, religion, association and assembly as well as 
citizens’ right to due process, of which the “protection against arbitrary detention” is 
one important part (Kinley & Nguyen 2008; United States Department of State 2015; 
Amnesty International 2015/16; Freedom House 2015).  
In fact, the Amnesty International (2015/16) claims that although there has been a 
decreasing number of arrests and prosecutions of domestic political activists in recent 
years, the number of “physical attacks” and “restrictions on movement” toward these 
people has actually increased; “surveillance” and “arbitrary short-term detention” are 
said to be some of the regular harassment activities implemented by Vietnamese 
security forces. Additionally, Vietnamese police forces are usually condemned for their 
abuse and brutality, as “mistreatment of suspects during arrests and detention” including 
“custodial torture” continues to take place around the country, even though domestic 
law “prohibits physical abuse of detainees” (United States Department of State 2015; 
Human Rights Watch 2014).  
Outsiders have also observed that, in general, the work of civil society in Vietnam 
is rather done only for apolitical purposes such as community development, poverty 
reduction and protection of the environment, and it is hard for such non-profit 
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organizations to influence state policy due to the fact that their involvements in 
policy-making process are usually limited to the communal level (Freedom House 
2012). Therefore, there is no political organization or association in Vietnam that is not 
created by the communist party, as support for the establishment of multi-political 
parties in Vietnam is considered by law to be a crime against the state.  
However, Vietnam emphasizes that human rights protection and promotion is 
“primarily the responsibility of the state” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam 2005). In this regard, Article 14(1) of the state’s latest ‘2013 
Constitution’ affirms that in Vietnam, political, civic, economic, cultural and social 
rights “are recognized, respected, protected and guaranteed in concordance with the 
Constitution and the law”; Article 14(2) of the constitution adds that such rights can be 
“restricted when prescribed by law” for reasons of “national defense, national security, 
social order and security, social morality, and community well-being”. More importantly, 
due to the fact that Vietnam attaches human rights to citizens’ rights, which are said to 
be inseparable from citizens’ duties (Article 15), Article 15(4) of the constitution 
specifically indicates that human rights and citizens’ rights must not “infringe national 
interests” and the “legitimate rights and interests of others.”  
Moreover, the freedoms of speech, opinion, press, association and demonstration 
are also specifically outlined by Article 25 of the constitution, which confirms that all 
citizens have such rights in Vietnam but also ascertains that the law can regulate the 
practice of these rights. In addition, while Vietnam is usually accused of using its ‘Penal 
Code’ provisions on damaging national unity to infringe these freedoms of its citizens, 
the state’s criminal justice system continues to be reformed. Its most recently amended 
‘2015 Penal Code’ and ‘2015 Criminal Procedure Code’ are said to be surprisingly 
promising (Ciment 2016), although they have not come into force yet. In addition, in 
2015, for the first time, public hearings on matters of torture and forced confessions 
were held by the National Assembly’s Committee on Judicial Affairs to address the 
increasing abuses in detention and prison.  
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2.4.4 Vietnam’s Previous Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties 
 
Table 8: Timeline of Vietnam’s Ratification  
of International Human Rights Treaties (as of October 2016) 
Year International Human Rights Treaty 
1982 
1. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1969 
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976 
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1976 
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 1981 
1990 5. Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990 
2001 
6. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict 2002 
7. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography 2002 
2015 
8. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1987 
9. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2008 
Source: author 
 
According to Table 8, since the unification of the country in 1975, Vietnam has 
already ratified nine international human rights treaties. More specifically, according to 
the data of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, most reservations 
made by Vietnam toward these human rights treaties are about the state’s rejection of 
the provisions that allow disputes with regard to the interpretation or application of 
these treaties to be brought before the International Court of Justice without consent 
from all involved parties, or the provisions allowing the use of arbitration. Such 
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reservations are believed to come from the state’s viewpoint that the principles of 
sovereign equality and non-interference in other states’ internal affairs need to be 
respected (Dang 2009).  
Although it is generally believed that Vietnam usually considers human rights to 
be an issue for addressing external relations (i.e. fighting with external criticisms about 
the state’s domestic human rights issues), there has not been any specific research 
focusing on Vietnam’s behavior via its decision to ratify these treaties. It is still a 
mystery whether it is a coincidence that the ratification times of these treaties have a 
link with the major events of the country listed in Table 7 (e.g., the ratification of the 
two ‘Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ in 2001 with the 
official visit of U.S. president Bill Clinton to Vietnam in 2000 and the following 
implementation of a trade agreement between the two countries that normalized their 
trade status in 2001).   
 
2.4.5 The CAT and Vietnam’s Domestic Legal Settings: Compatibility and 
Difficulty 
According to Bo Cong an (2015), the current Vietnamese legal system generally 
recognizes that while people who are arrested, detained or imprisoned may be denied 
some rights, they are still entitled to some basic citizens’ rights that are protected by the 
law, such as the right to live; to be protected with regard to personal health, honor and 
dignity; to access information; and to not be tortured. The ministry further claims that 
some provisions (e.g. Articles 298 and 299 of the current domestic ‘Penal Code’ of 1999 
- amended and supplemented in 2009) can be fully applied to address acts of torture, 
forced confessions or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments or punishments. To 
date, however, the domestic legal system of Vietnam has not had torturing behavior as a 
separate crime. 
Second, in relation to the responsibility of using all legislative, administrative and 
judicial measures to prohibit acts of torture, when it comes to legislative measures, the 
prohibition against torture is specifically set out by Article 20(1) of the ‘2013 
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Constitution’, where everyone has “legal protection for his or her life, health, honor, and 
dignity and is protected against torture […] (and) corporal punishment”. It is further 
known that principles for protecting rights of people who are arrested, detained or 
imprisoned are available in Article 20(2) and Article 31 of the constitution. Moreover, 
“causing death to people in the performance of official duties” is considered a “crime of 
infringing upon human life, health, dignity and honor” by the state’s ‘Penal Code’ 
(Article 97), and the relevant “organizers,” “executors,” “instigators” and “helpers” of 
the crime are criminally charged for complicity (Article 20). Furthermore, Article 6 of 
the ‘2003 Criminal Procedure Code’ indicates that all forms of corporal punishment are 
strictly forbidden. In addition, other related provisions on preventing and eliminating 
torture are also provided in some other domestic legal documents such as the ‘2005 
Civil Code’ and the ‘Law on Execution of Criminal Judgments’. 
On the other hand, for administrative and judicial measures, it is found that the 
prohibition of torture has been implicitly or indirectly mentioned by various legal 
documents that regulate the work of relevant law enforcement agencies (i.e. the police, 
procuracy and court), including the five honor oaths and 10 disciplines of the People’s 
Public Security, and the directive No.44-CT/TW 2014 from the party’s Central 
Committee Secretariat about human rights tasks in the new situation. Relevant 
regulations on the competence, mandates and power of investigating agencies and 
officers as well as on an investigation’s duration, interrogation, etc. are expressed by 
Chapter IX of the ‘2003 Criminal Procedure Code’, in which the principles of 
respecting and ensuring human rights, including the prohibition of torture and other 
inhumane or cruel acts, are required to be strictly followed.  
As a result, it is believed that the CAT is generally compatible with the existing 
domestic legislative, administrative and judicial measures of Vietnam in prohibiting, 
punishing and preventing acts of torture (Bo Cong an 2015). However, it is also claimed 
that there is certain difficulty in the current domestic economic and social conditions 
that affect the tasks of detention and execution of imprisonment. Moreover, although the 
prohibition against torture is mentioned in various legal documents, another difficulty 
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with regard to penalization and punishment for acts of torture is that the current 
domestic ‘Penal Code’ of 1999 only has specific regulations for the crimes of forced 
confession and corporal punishment. Vietnam acknowledges that the regulation of these 
two crimes is not sufficient to cover the very broad definition of acts of torture in the 
CAT (Communist Party of Vietnam Online Newspaper 2014).  
Additionally, the current internal law of Vietnam on deportation has not had 
provisions that stop deporting a person in cases where there is sufficient evidence to 
believe that he or she would be tortured when deported, as required by the CAT. As a 
result, such provisions need to be added into the domestic law when this convention is 
implemented in Vietnam. On the other hand, the current ratification and implementation 
of international treaties on extradition by Vietnam also have some certain limitations, as 
Vietnam still reserve some provisions in these treaties. Furthermore, except for the eight 
judicial assistance agreements that have been recently signed by Vietnam, most of other 
agreements on this subject that the state signed in the past have provisions that are too 
general or are no longer relevant to the new situation of the country. Hence, it is seen 
that Vietnam belongs to those states where internal law requires the extradition must be 
based on international treaties that the state has already been a party or on the very 
limited principle of reciprocity. Finally, Vietnam also recognizes that in order to prevent 
torture, education for law enforcement officers on the prohibition of torture and the 
rights of detainees and prisoners must be enhanced. This is true because torture keeps 
occurring as law enforcement officers either have low cognition about law compliance 
or lack knowledge about the relevant subject matter.  
 
2.4.6 Conclusion 
It can be assumed that the Renovation Period brought both advantages and 
difficulties to Vietnam. On one hand, the socialist state can enjoy economic, political 
and social benefits from broader international integration and cooperation, but on the 
other hand, it also faces many challenges, particularly with regard to its domestic human 
rights issues. Specifically, the state is often criticized by outsiders, especially Western 
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states and international human rights organizations, for restricting citizens’ political 
rights and civil liberties. As an implementer of the socialist doctrine, Vietnam sees no 
difference between human rights and citizens’ rights and further ascertains that the two 
cannot be separated from citizens’ duties, of which the practice of such rights must not 
violate national interests of the state or the legitimate rights and interests of the society 
as a whole.         
Moreover, it is also important to note that, as a socialist state, Vietnam applies the 
“socialist rule-of-law” doctrine, in which there is a unification in the execution of all 
legislative, executive and judicial rights in the domestic field of which they are said to 
be assigned and coordinated tightly among state organs, and the communist party is the 
core of this whole political system of the state. In addition, with regard to the field of 
human rights and international law, the state always affirms that the protection and 
promotion of human rights are primarily the tasks and responsibilities of the state itself, 
and outsiders should respect the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of others. 
However, to date Vietnam has already ratified nine international human rights 
conventions.    
Finally, when comparing the CAT’s provisions with the current relevant domestic 
legal settings, Vietnam recognizes that, although the prohibition against torture has been 
instructed by all legislative, administrative and judicial documents of the state, torture is 
not in fact considered a separate crime under the current domestic legal system. Hence, 
the present ‘Penal Code’ is considered insufficient to cope with the very broad definition 
of torture in the CAT. Similarly, there is also strong demand for training domestic law 
enforcement officers on this issue.        
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CHAPTER III: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This chapter has three sections. The first section determines the research 
objectives that this study aims to achieve in order to answer the two puzzles that have 
been outlined above. It also helps fill the previously mentioned knowledge gaps and 
contributes to relevant current scholarly debates in this field.  
The second section of the chapter outlines the necessary research questions that 
the study needs to answer. It also explains why and how answering these research 
questions can help fulfill the research objectives and respond to the identified puzzles 
and knowledge gaps in order to contribute to the contemporary literature about human 
rights treaties and state ratification behavior.  
The final section of the chapter is about the methodology used to collect and 
analyze relevant data required to answer the research questions.        
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SECTION 1: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
In order to solve the two problems identified in the previous chapter, there are two 
research objectives this study needs to fulfill. The first aims to solve the first puzzle, 
which is about why socialist states decide to accede to international human rights 
treaties. In other words, via the case of Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT, it is essential 
for the study to determine the factors that caused the socialist state to decide to sign and 
ratify this core human rights convention.  
Specifically, as briefly outlined via the hypotheses mentioned in the literature 
review chapter, it is necessary and important for the thesis to clarify whether Vietnam 
decided to accede to the CAT because the state changed its understanding of human 
rights values and interests, to which there had been an alignment of domestic and 
international values and interest on human rights that caused the state to sign and ratify 
this convention. Alternatively, the state may have acceded to the CAT because of 
material interests it expected to receive after the ratification of the CAT. In clarifying 
this reason, it is further necessary to know whether Vietnam decided to weaken its own 
national sovereignty in exchange for some benefits. In other words, identifying the role 
of sovereignty in this socialist state’s consideration to ratify is an important requirement 
for fulfilling this thesis’s first research objective.          
The second objective of the study aims to solve the second puzzle which is about 
the roles of internal and external dynamics in shaping Vietnam’s ratification behavior 
toward the CAT. In this regard, it is essential to find out whether external dynamics 
played a more determinant role in the shaping of the socialist state’s behavior toward 
the human rights convention than internal ones. Relatedly, it is also necessary for the 
thesis to clarify the actual role and impact of external threats and pressures in the state’s 
consideration of its behavior in this matter.  
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SECTION 2: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In order to fulfill the abovementioned research objectives, there are two main 
research questions that need to be answered by analyzing the relevant empirical data 
from Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT. The first research question is designed to 
directly reflect the first objective: What were the core factors that led Vietnam to 
develop behaviors to join the CAT during the period of 2013–2014? This thesis 
determines that understanding these factors helps explain why socialist states decide to 
accede to international human rights treaties that require them to alter their domestic 
legal settings to better cope with these treaties’ provisions. These factors also clarify the 
applicability of the previously mentioned theoretical frameworks on state behavior 
toward international human rights treaties (i.e. normative approach, rationalist approach 
and reward-based model, and sovereignty approach) for socialist states.  
Therefore, in order to answer this research question, three sub-questions must be 
answered. The first sub-question is: Was there an alignment of domestic and 
international human rights values and interests that led Vietnam to sign and ratify the 
CAT? Why or why not? This question is necessary to respond to the normative approach, 
as it is crucial to know whether the socialist state changed its socialist understanding of 
human rights values and protection framework. Moreover, it’s important to determine 
whether such changes created an alignment of domestic and international values and 
interests in the field of human rights, which then caused the state to decide to accede to 
an important human rights convention such as the CAT and alter its domestic legal 
settings to meet requirements in the convention’s provisions. 
The second sub-question of the first research question focuses on testing the 
applicability of the rationalist approach and the reward-based model via Vietnam’s 
decision to accede to the CAT during the period of 2013–2014. Therein, it is necessary 
for the thesis to answer: Did Vietnam make the decision to sign and ratify the CAT in 
that particular period of time so that the state would be able to obtain relevant, 
important external tangible and intangible benefits from its ratification behavior? Why 
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or why not? This question is important for understanding the role of external benefits (if 
any) when a socialist state considers ratifying international human rights treaties, 
helping to clarify how socialist states calculate costs and benefits from human rights 
treaty ratification.  
The final sub-question of the first research question is: Did state sovereignty play 
a crucial role in Vietnam’s consideration to join the CAT? Why or why not? This 
sub-question is required to confirm whether socialist states actually agree to weaken 
their sovereignty in exchange for the expected benefits from treaty ratification. It also 
helps answer why sovereignty fears from human rights treaty ratification (i.e. a concern 
over ratification of international human rights treaties allowing outsiders, especially 
those in political opposition, to criticize, intervene in a state’s internal affairs, violate 
state sovereignty or even undermine the socialist regime) do not hinder socialist states’ 
ratification behaviors. 
The second research question is designed to serve the second research objective of 
the study. Therein, it is essential for the thesis to answer: Did external dynamics play a 
more determinant role than internal dynamics in shaping Vietnam’s behavior toward the 
ratifying decision? Why or why not? This question helps clarify the roles of domestic 
and international politics in shaping socialist state behavior toward the ratification of 
international human rights treaties.   
In this regard, the role of threats and pressures from outsiders is an important 
aspect of the second research objective. It also needs to be determined and analyzed in 
order to confirm whether and how external threats and pressures significantly 
influenced the socialist state to decide to sign and ratify the CAT at that particular time. 
Therefore, it is necessary and important to answer a sub-question for the second 
research question: Did Vietnam decide to accede to the CAT in the period of 2013–2014 
to respond to increasing external threats and pressures? Why or why not? This question 
helps identify the threats and pressures (if any) that had to be responded to by the 
socialist state at that time and explains why and how these external pressures related to 
the ratifying decision. All the research questions for this study are presented in the 
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following Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Research Questions 
 
RQ1: What were the core factors that 
led Vietnam to develop behaviors to 
join the CAT during the period of 
2013–2014? 
RQ2: Did external dynamics play a more 
determinant role than internal dynamics 
in shaping Vietnam’s behavior toward 
the ratifying decision? Why or why not? 
Sub-question 1.1: Was there an 
alignment of domestic and international 
human rights values and interests that led 
Vietnam to sign and ratify the CAT? 
Why or why not? 
Sub-question 2.1: Did Vietnam decide to 
accede to the CAT in the period of 2013–
2014 to respond to increasing external 
threats and pressures? Why or why not? 
Sub-question 1.2: Did Vietnam make 
the decision to sign and ratify the CAT in 
that particular period of time so that the 
state would be able to obtain relevant, 
important external tangible and 
intangible benefits from its ratification 
behavior? Why or why not? 
 
Sub-question 1.3: Did state sovereignty 
play a crucial role in Vietnam’s 
consideration to join the CAT? Why or 
why not? 
 
Source: author  
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SECTION 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.3.1 Collection of Secondary Data 
In this study, secondary data provided by the CPV, the state and the government of 
Vietnam are essential, given that the central developments of the socialist state are 
significantly motivated, influenced and directed by the leading communist party and 
that, in this type of regime, the party is the sole decision maker for all important issues. 
Moreover, in the context where the decision-making process is primarily conducted 
within the party itself and generally kept out of reach of the public, contents of 
resolutions and directives from the periodic national congresses, the Politburo 
Committee, the party’s Central Committee and its Secretariat, and the government are 
considered to be the top guidelines, orientations, policies and instructions that must be 
implemented by all party members at all levels (i.e. leaders and officials in all state and 
government agencies).     
More specifically, in relation to the particular orientations and policies on 
contemporary human rights issues, it was crucial to look at the contents of all 
documents and resolutions from the 9th, 10th and 11th CPV national congresses. These 
are where the field of human rights and the issue of outsider interference, especially of 
political opposition (i.e. threats of peaceful revolution), started to appear as a result of 
the state’s decision to open up the country and pursue international economic 
integration and cooperation. Four major threats were identified by the party in this 
period of time to be tackled: the weakness of the country’s economy compared to other 
states in the region and the international community, the deviation from the socialism 
route, corruption and peaceful revolution caused by external political opposition.  
Along with these general orientations and guidelines for tackling human rights 
issues and dealing with outsiders, it was also essential to collect and analyze the 
contents of more specific resolutions and directives in this field from the party’s Central 
Committee and its Secretariat and from the Politburo Committee. These are considered 
to be more direct solutions and instructions that all state and government agencies must 
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follow and implement to effectively tackle the identified problems. Further discussions 
on these topics could be found in various CPV research papers, other state academic 
journals and in CPV newspapers that were established and operated as the official voice 
of the party and the state. These were the relevant sources for collecting secondary data 
that helped answer questions involving the party and its understanding and perspectives, 
especially in the field of human rights and related issues.     
To answer sub-question 1.1 about the CPV’s understandings of human rights 
values and interests, relevant data were found in the Communist Review, the theoretical 
and political agency of the communist party of Vietnam; the Ho Chi Minh Law City 
Law Newspaper; the Public Security News; the Propaganda Journal; the Ho Chi Minh 
Academy of Politics and Public Administration; etc. Secondary data to answer this 
question were also found in specific government agencies that directly relate to the field 
of human rights, such as the Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for 
Human Rights, and in studies of important CPV scholars who are or used to be heads of 
party’s research agencies. More specifically, some relevant documents that needed to be 
reviewed to obtain data for this sub-question included the contents of the 10th party 
national congress (2006), resolution No. 1-NQ/TW (1992) of the Politburo Committee 
about the “Philosophical tasks for the new period,” directive No. 12/CT-TW (1992) of 
the party’s Central Committee Secretariat on “Human rights and perspectives, policies 
of the Party” and the directive No. 44/CT-TW (2010) of the party’s Central Comittiee 
Secretariat on the “Tasks on human rights in the new situation.” 
In order to obtain relevant data to answer sub-question 1.2 about the state’s 
consideration of costs and benefits for its ratification behavior, it was essential for the 
study examine the driving forces that shaped the state in opening up the country to 
enhance international cooperation and integration since its Renovation Period in 1986. 
Other relevant data were found in the objectives and implications that Vietnam expected 
from its ratification of the CAT in the specific period of 2013–2014. More specifically, 
there were various documents this thesis considered, including the resolution of the 
Sixth national congress of the CPV (1986), the resolution of the Seventh CPV national 
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congress (1991), resolution No. 07-NQ/TW (2001) of the Politburo Committee titled 
“About International Economic Integration” and resolution No. 22-NQ/TW (2013) of 
the Politburo Committee titled “About International Integration.” Again, further 
analysis and discussions on these documents and their related issues can be found in 
various studies of those research agencies and official voices of the CPV, state and 
government of Vietnam, as outlined above.      
In order to collect data for sub-question 1.3 about the role of sovereignty on the 
socialist state’s decision to ratify the CAT, it was especially important to look at 
directive No. 12-CT/TW (1992) of the party’s Central Committee Secretariat on 
“Human rights and perspectives, policies of the Party,” the political report of the CPV’s 
10th Central Committee to the 11th national congress of the CPV (2011), and the Report 
No. 4527/BC-UBDN13 of the National Assembly’s Committee for Foreign Relations on 
the verification of the ratification of the CAT in 2014. Further analysis and discussion of 
these contents can be found in research papers and existing interviews with former and 
current leaders of the party, state and government, especially those at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, National Assembly and other relevant agencies, and in articles in 
official newspapers of the state and government, such as the People’s Army Newpaper, 
Public Security News and Lao Dong News, etc. 
Secondary data for sub-question 2.1 were necessary to determine the role of 
external threats and pressures and the impact of external dynamics on the socialist 
state’s ratification behavior toward international human rights treaties, and especially 
the CAT. To obtain these data, it was necessary to first review the content of 
international conferences held in Vietnam that related to the CAT and its surrounding 
issues; the country’s national reports for its two Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
circles in 2009 and 2014; and some other related documents on these events. It was also 
important to evaluate relevant external pressures and threats caused by outsiders to 
Vietnam’s field of human rights, via activities of important international partners such 
as the United States, the EU and its member states and the United Nations and its 
organizations during that period of time.  
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Such secondary data were obtained from both domestic and international sources. 
Domestic sources included articles from state and government agencies and scholars 
who study external impacts on Vietnam’s human rights, such as Vietnam’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public Security, Permanent Office of the Government 
Steering Board for Human Rights and the Vietnamese Research Centre for Human 
Rights (Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy). International sources included the 
U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam, the European Delegation to Vietnam, the 
European Parliament and the United Nations and its organizations.  
Moreover, detailed information about relevant activities and processes for the 
preparation, consideration, signing and ratification of the CAT by Vietnam was also 
necessary. This information was found in both published and unpublished documents of 
the Public Security Ministry, in official statements by the government and the Office of 
the State President to relevant state agencies in regard to this matter and in the 
objectives and implications identified by the state on its decision to accede to the CAT 
in this period of time.  
 
3.3.2 The Need for Primary Data and Sources for Data Collection 
Primary data were also essential for some important parts of the study. For 
instance, primary data were needed to determine how and what actually caused the 
Ministry of Public Security to propose joining the CAT to the government in 2012–2013. 
Second, alongside secondary data, primary data were also necessary to help confirming 
the decision maker of Vietnam and the role of related agencies (Ministry of Public 
Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, National Assembly, etc.) in 
this matter and during the process. All of the above are particularly crucial for 
understanding the internal dynamics in the socialist state for acceding to this 
convention.  
Primary data were also required to help analyze the whole process of the socialist 
state’s consideration and preparation to join this convention in detail in order to allow 
the thesis to determine and compare the actual role and influence of domestic and 
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international politics in shaping the socialist state’s decision in this matter. Last but not 
least, primary data were also essential to understand more about the core reasons and 
factors that caused Vietnam to establish its ratification behavior toward this convention 
in the period of 2013–2014 and its expectations and desired objectives from such 
behavior. This thesis maintains that primary data help support and clarify the secondary 
data more deeply and comprehensively in order to answer the research questions in as 
detailed and accurate a way as possible or to provide answers that cannot be given by 
secondary data.    
In this regard, primary data were obtained via in-depth interviews. Six groups 
separately participated in the interviews and included representatives from the 
departments that were involved in Vietnam’s process of considering and joining the 
CAT. These included the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Justice, the National Assembly, relevant domestic scholars and associations, 
and external parties (i.e. regional and international member states and organizations) 
related to Vietnam’s process of acceding to this convention. Interview questions were 
designed to make state and government officials and scholars explain in detail the 
matters that secondary data could not make clear or provide.  
The contents and objectives of interview questions for all groups were similar, but 
the details of the questions for each group were slightly different in order to help the 
thesis collect more detailed data based on the actual relevant work and tasks of each 
group. For example, the Ministry of Public Security was the recommending agency that 
proposed the ratification of the CAT; therefore, it was particularly necessary to find out 
what prompted the Ministry of Public Security to propose joining the convention in 
2013–2014, when the ministry started to consider and prepare for such a proposal and 
whether there were any difficulties with or instructions from the party and/or the 
government on this matter.  
With the National Assembly, it was important that primary data help determine 
whether the National Assembly’s decision to ratify the CAT in late 2014 was made for 
any particular objectives or implications. With relevant domestic scholars and 
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associations, it was essential to reaffirm the role of the CPV in the state in this field, 
including its understanding of human rights issues, its internal dynamics and influence 
on the socialist state’s decision behavior, what drove the state to make such a decision 
and the relevant impacts, and the role of external dynamics during that time that relate 
to the decision behavior of the socialist state.            
 
3.3.3 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
The contents of the interviews and the abovementioned secondary data were 
aggregated, interpreted, analyzed, summarized and compared with each other to answer 
the research questions. For example, for sub-question 1.1 about the CPV’s 
understanding of human rights issues, it was necessary to compare its understanding 
with that of the international community in the field of human rights in order to 
determine whether there was an alignment of domestic (i.e. socialist) and international 
values and interests that caused the socialist state to decide to accede to the CAT at that 
time.  
For sub-question 1.2, it was essential to determine whether there is any strong 
evidence from secondary and primary sources to indicate what tangible and intangible 
benefits the state had expected to achieve via its ratification behavior. Second, the 
sources were used to confirm the significant roles of such benefits and how they related 
to the state’s decision behavior. For sub-question 1.3, it was important to understand 
how the socialist state would consider sovereignty impacts on its domestic field if the 
convention would or would have not been ratified. This could be analyzed via the 
state’s consideration of relevant external pressures and threats that were seen as 
sovereignty violations and significant interferences in its internal affairs by exploiting 
the issues of human rights (i.e. peaceful revolution), as well as in the objectives and 
implications that relate to the matter of sovereignty as when the CAT is acceded by the 
state. 
As a result, in order to answer the first research question about core factors that 
shaped the socialist state to determine its ratification behavior toward the CAT in 2013–
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2014, it was essential for this thesis to compare the findings of sub-questions 1.1, 1.2 
and 1.3, as each of them represents an influencing factor, in accordance with the 
relevant theoretical approaches mentioned in the literature review chapter (i.e. the 
alignment of human rights values and interests, the calculation of costs and benefits and 
the impacts of sovereignty). This was done to determine which factor(s) are crucial in 
shaping Vietnam’s decision in this matter and why. These can be seen as predicting 
factor(s) for socialist states’ ratification behaviors toward international human rights 
treaties.    
Moreover, in order to answer the second research question, it was first necessary 
to analyze the data obtained for sub-question 2.1 about the role of relevant external 
pressures and threats on Vietnam and whether they influenced the state’s ratification 
behavior. Second, it was also essential to analyze and compare the internal driving 
forces of the socialist state’s ratification of international human rights treaties and the 
objectives and implications that Vietnam aimed to achieve via the ratification of the 
CAT. These together helped clarify the actual roles of internal and external dynamics as 
well as ascertain whether international politics are more determinant than domestic 
politics in shaping the socialist state’s behavior on this issue.    
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CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section introduces Vietnam’s 
domestic legal procedures required for the state to sign and ratify an international 
human rights treaty such as the CAT. It also briefly outlines the timeline of the process 
from when Vietnam first started to research and consider its ratification of the CAT until 
the convention was actually ratified by Vietnam’s National Assembly in late 2014. 
The second section of the chapter focuses on the role and impacts of internal 
dynamics in Vietnam that influenced the state’s ratification of the CAT. This identifies 
the decision maker and the involved parties in this matter, with the CPV found to be the 
sole decision maker for all activities of the state, including on this matter. As all policies 
and perspectives of the Party must be implemented by all state and government agencies, 
it is then important to determine and evaluate its views on human rights in the 
contemporary global context as well as its perspectives on, understanding of and 
policies for this field. Moreover, in order to understand the actual impacts of internal 
dynamics on shaping the state’s behavior toward the CAT, it is also essential to look at 
internal driving forces that led to the state’s understanding of the need to join 
international human rights treaties. 
The third section of the chapter identifies and analyzes the role and impacts of 
relevant external dynamics, including direct and indirect pressures and threats, on 
Vietnam’s domestic human rights field and its decision to sign and ratify the CAT in 
2013–2014. The fourth section determines obstacles that were considered by the state to 
hinder CAT ratification and the implications and objectives that Vietnam hoped to 
achieve via ratification. Finally, the fifth section concludes with important findings and 
analyses about relevant internal and external dynamics’ impact on Vietnam’s domestic 
human rights field and the CAT and how they led to the state’s decision to accede to this 
convention in the particular period.     
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SECTION 1: VIETNAM’S DOMESTIC PROCEDURES FOR 
SIGNING AND RATIFYING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATIES AND THE CAT 
 
In general, all of Vietnam’s activities related to international treaties (e.g. signing, 
ratifying and implementing treaties) must comply with legal procedures outlined by its 
‘2005 Law on the conclusion, accession to and implementation of treaties’. First, Article 
3 of this law points out several important principles that such activities must comply 
with, including respect for territorial integrity, national sovereignty, equality, mutual 
benefits and non-interference in internal affairs of member states. Moreover, clauses of 
these treaties must also be compatible with the provisions set out by the state 
constitution of Vietnam and the state’s national interests and foreign policy. Article 5 of 
the law indicates that the government is in charge of the state management of these 
activities; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is further said to be responsible to 
government for performing such management tasks, while other relevant ministries or 
ministerial-level agencies of the state are required to coordinate with the MOFA within 
the scope of their work and authority to carry out these duties. 
 
4.1.1 The Signing Procedure 
Regulations for signing international treaties are outlined from Article 9 to Article 
29 of the law. The procedure is briefly shown in the following Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Treaty Signing Procedure of Vietnam 
 
Source: author 
 
There are several steps required for this procedure. First, the signing of 
international treaties such as the CAT is initiated upon the recommendation of relevant 
ministries of the government or ministerial-level agencies of the state. In this regard, 
Article 9 of the law expresses that, depending on the delegated tasks and the need for 
international cooperation, ministries or ministerial-level agencies of the state are 
expected to actively recommend the negotiation and signing of relevant international 
treaties to the government. By doing so, they are considered, according to the ‘2005 
Law on the conclusion, accession to and implementation of treaties’, the 
“recommending agency.”  
In short, the recommending agency is responsible for studying the treaty content 
and must also seek a written examination opinion from the MOFA (Article 10) and 
evaluation opinion from the Ministry of Justice (Article 17; Article 19) before the 
recommendation for signing can be submitted to the government. In detail, according to 
Article 10 of the law, the MOFA is responsible for examining the recommendation made 
by the recommending agency. In particular, the MOFA should pay attention to the 
necessity and purpose of signing, the relationship between Vietnam and other parties to 
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the treaty, whether such a treaty conforms to the state’s foreign policy and national 
interests and other relevant technical issues required for the signing. Article 18 of the 
law requires that the recommending agency also seek a written evaluation opinion from 
the Ministry of Justice, where the treaty needs to be evaluated to see whether it 
conforms to the state constitution, is compatible with the current domestic legal settings 
of the state and can be applied in whole or part.  
According to Article 11(3) of the law, after receiving the recommendation from a 
recommending agency for signing an international treaty, the government is required to 
seek advice and consideration from the National Assembly’s Standing Committee for 
the signing if such a treaty has contradicting provisions or provisions that are not 
regulated by the current domestic law promulgated by the National Assembly or its 
Standing Committee. Finally, according to Article 11(4), the official decision to sign the 
treaty is made by the government in written form. 
 
4.1.2 The Ratifying Procedure 
Article 70(14) of the ‘2013 Constitution’ of Vietnam specifies that international 
treaties, especially international human rights treaties such as the CAT, must be ratified 
by the state’s National Assembly. According to Article 25 of the CAT itself, the 
signatories are required to ratify it to become full parties to the convention. In this 
regard, legal provisions regulating Vietnam’s ratifying procedure are outlined from 
Article 30 to Article 41 of the ‘2005 law on the conclusion, accession to and 
implementation of treaties’. This procedure is briefly demonstrated in the following 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Treaty Ratification Procedure of Vietnam 
 
Source: author 
 
For international treaties that require ratification after signing, such as the CAT 
(Article 31), the recommending agency first needs to prepare a ratifying 
recommendation and seek written opinions from the MOFA and other related agencies 
about the treaty ratification before submitting a recommendation to the government, 
which then submits it to the president (Article 30). Article 32(1) of the law then 
provides that the National Assembly decides to ratify a treaty based on the proposal 
made by the president. Before the state president can submit such a proposal to the 
National Assembly, the treaty must be verified by the Committee for Foreign Relations 
of the National Assembly (Article 30(2); Article 33; Article 35). According to Article 34 
of the law, the purpose of the verification is to confirm the necessity of the ratification, 
the compliance of signing and ratifying procedures, the compatibility level between 
treaty provisions and the current domestic legal documents issued by the National 
Assembly and its Standing Committee, the possibility of applying the whole or part of 
the treaty in the domestic field and the determination of whether implementing the 
treaty in Vietnam would require any amendment, supplementation or cancellation of 
relevant legal documents promulgated by the National Assembly and its Standing 
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Committee.  
Finally, according to Article 39 of the law, after all of these steps are fulfilled, 
deputies of the National Assembly are instructed to discuss the core contents of the 
treaty within their groups/delegations separately before such contents are debated by the 
whole National Assembly at plenary sessions. Then the National Assembly decides on 
the ratification of treaty by voting. It is specifically indicated by Clause 5 of the article 
that a treaty is ratified if more than half of all National Assembly deputies of Vietnam 
vote to do so. 
 
4.1.3 Vietnam’s Process of Signing and Ratifying the CAT 
According to various sources, Vietnam first started researching the possibility of 
joining the CAT in late 2004 via an international conference co-organized by the 
Vietnamese Research Centre for Human Rights (Ho Chi Minh Political Academy), the 
Royal Danish Embassy in Vietnam that represented both the Delegation of the European 
Commission (EC) to Vietnam and member states of the EU, and the Danish Institute for 
Human Rights. This conference was held in Hanoi and sponsored by the EC Delegation 
to Vietnam as well as various embassies of EU’s member states in Vietnam, such as 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Italy. This conference caught the attention and 
participation of many high level officials of Vietnam from various state organs, 
including the National Assembly, Office of State President, Ministry of Public Security, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Supreme People’s Procuracy and 
Supreme People’s Court. Moreover, it was also attended by representatives of several 
international actors and non-state actors, such as Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF).    
Then, in 2009, after the first cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR I) - the 
most important mechanisms of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) - 
in order to implement recommendations for the continuance of acceding to international 
human rights treaties, the Ministry of Public Security was assigned by the Vietnamese 
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government to continue studying the possibility of signing and ratifying the CAT in 
Vietnam. In 2012, led by the Ministry of Public Security, a committee of 14 members 
from relevant ministries and other state agencies was established to accelerate the 
progress of this work; this committee was in charge of studying the compatibility 
between Vietnam’s current domestic legal system and the convention provisions, 
gathering experiences and lessons learned from other parties of the convention and 
collecting opinions of relevant scholars and state officers at both central and local 
levels. 
After the research process, in accordance with the guidelines provided by the 
‘2005 Law on the conclusion, accession to and implementation of treaties’, the Ministry 
of Public Security, as the recommending agency, submitted the recommendation for 
signing the CAT to the government on July 12, 2013. On July 18, 2013, the government 
submitted a proposal to the National Assembly’s Standing Committee to seek advice on 
joining this convention, as the CAT had provisions that had not yet been regulated by 
the current domestic law promulgated by the National Assembly or the National 
Assembly’s Standing Committee. The government also reported to the state president 
on the progress of this task. Agreed to by the National Assembly Standing Committee, 
on November 7, 2013, the government authorized Ambassador Le Hoai Trung, 
permanent representative of Vietnam to the UN, to sign the CAT on behalf of the 
Vietnamese government.   
After the signing in 2013, the Ministry of Public Security prepared and submitted 
a recommendation for ratification to the government on August 6, 2014. Based on the 
recommendation, the government then issued statement No. 318/TTr-CP proposing the 
state president to submit a recommendation to the National Assembly to make a 
decision. On September 18, 2014, the state president issued statement No. 03/TTr-CTN 
recommending the National Assembly to consider ratifying this convention; via this 
statement, the government was also asked to report to the National Assembly about the 
ratification recommendation. On September 24, 2014, the minister of public security 
was authorized by the prime minister to report on this issue to the National Assembly on 
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behalf of the government. 
The proposal to ratify the CAT was then verified by the National Assembly’s 
Committee for Foreign Relations via the verification report No. 4527/BC-UBDN13 on 
October 21, 2014. Finally, on November 28, 2014, after the proposal was presented by 
the state president, deputies of the 13th National Assembly agreed to ratify the CAT with 
100% of votes. 
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SECTION 2: INTERNAL DYNAMICS  
AND STATE’S RATIFICATION BEHAVIOR 
 
4.2.1 The Decision-maker and Involved Parties 
As discussed in part 2.2.3 on ‘Socialist State Characteristics’, it is the case that, 
for a socialist state like Vietnam, the communist party is the sole decision maker for all 
important issues and policies of the state, and that the decision-making process is 
primarily conducted within the party itself and kept out of reach of the public; this 
makes the party the main actor of the state – its resolutions, policies and directives are 
always considered the determinant factors shaping the behavior of all state and 
government agencies. Indeed, according to the Deputy Head of the Legal Research, 
Legislation and Access Department of the Vietnam Lawyers Association, Dr. Nguyen 
Van Tuan (personal communication, January 11, 2016), the party’s perspectives and 
policies are institutionalized by the state which turns them into law; furthermore, the 
communist party adopts resolutions which are implemented in practice by all state and 
government agencies. This structure represents the socialist law tradition which has 
been discussed in detail in part 2.2.2 of the Literature Review chapter. According to Dr. 
Hoang Thi Tue Phuong of the University of Law – Ho Chi Minh City (personal 
communication, January 7, 2016), the CPV played an almost absolute role in the state’s 
decision to join the CAT. 
On the other hand, within the communist party, the principle of democratic 
centralism is strictly applied: party members may discuss matters freely but action must 
be unified. In other words, there may be “spoilers” and “supporters” during CPV’s 
discussions before a collective decision is adopted; however, subsequently, all members 
are required to fully support and abide by the content of such resolution. This can be 
demonstrated by the obedience of an individual party member to the collective decisions 
made by his or her party cell, and the obedience of the lower party organizations to the 
decisions and resolutions adopted by the higher ones. In this regard, the supreme party 
organization of the communist system is the party’s Central Committee; though it is still 
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required to obey the resolutions adopted by the party national congress that is held 
every five years.  
As outlined in the Literature Review chapter, due to the fact that more than 90% 
of National Assembly deputies are members of the CPV who must first obey the Party’s 
constitutions and resolutions, government proposals submitted to this body in particular 
are rarely rejected by its members. Indeed, for the National Assembly’s work that 
relates to policies or guidelines approved by the CPV by means of its resolutions and 
directives, it is unlikely that such work would be opposed by Party’s members in the 
National Assembly. 
Similarly, due to the fact that communist party members are also assigned to work 
in various state and government positions throughout the country and in the hierarchy of 
the political system as a whole, the decision-making structure follows a top-down 
approach. For example, according to Mr. Nguyen Thanh Tu, Acting Director General of 
the Department of Civil-Economic Law (Ministry of Justice) (personal communication, 
January 14, 2016), and a manager of the Department of Legal and 
Administrative-Judicial Procedure Reform (Ministry of Public Security) (personal 
communication, January 13, 2016), the process of preparing and recommending the 
signing and ratification of the CAT was a joint program initiated and assigned by the 
government. In addition, according to a representative the Department of International 
Law (MOFA) (personal communication, January 20, 2016), the Government Office also 
requested the MOFA by to collaborate with the Ministry of Public Security on this issue.  
In sum, it is found that the internal dynamics of Vietnam’s decision to join the 
CAT were primarily determined by the CPV and several relevant state and government 
organs, including the Ministry of Public Security, the MOFA, the Ministry of Justice, as 
well as the National Assembly and its Committee for Foreign Relations. The need to 
implement the relevant core CPV perspectives and policies is seen to be the determining 
internal driving force behind the state’s behavior. This is discussed further in the 
following part.  
Furthermore, another unique feature of socialist states like Vietnam is that civil 
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society and individual space are not typically recognized by the regime, as the 
implementation of legislative, executive and judicial rights in Vietnam is said to be 
“unified,” “assigned,” and “coordinated” tightly among state organs under the 
leadership of the communist party. As a result, it may be observed that there is no actual 
influence or involvement of domestic civil society groups in the decision-making 
process of the state. 
 
4.2.2 The CPV’s Views of Human Rights in the Contemporary Global Context 
According to the official document prepared in 2014 by the Permanent Office of 
the Government Steering Board for Human Rights for the training conference for work 
in the field of human rights, the CPV recognizes that, in general, the field of human 
rights today has not only become one of the three main pillars of the UN but is also a 
significant concern for various regions, nations, and international organizations. In fact, 
Vietnam believes that the final purpose of the other two pillars of the UN, which are the 
maintenance of peace and security, and the promotion of development in all areas, are 
also pertinent to ensuring the basic rights and liberties of all people in the world. As a 
result, ensuring human rights protection is becoming an important topic in all 
international relations, where it is increasingly treated as a standard for considering 
many issues, especially development ones. On the other hand, domestically, it is also a 
key topic which opposing political parties use to compete for power and election 
(Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for Human Rights 2014).   
The CPV further observes that, since 1990s, many human rights reporting systems, 
including those initiated by a number of international NGOs working with human rights, 
have been highly valued and promoted by the UN; and that, in addition to the 
continuous establishment of new international instruments that aim to improve its global 
human rights protection mechanisms, the UN has also emphasized the need to have 
national mechanisms for human rights protection. In relation to this issue particularly, 
the CPV believes that the characteristics of such mechanisms in a capitalist state are 
different to those of a socialist state. The national human rights protection mechanisms 
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of capitalist countries are said to represent a separation and curbing of state power in 
state organs, together with the participation of civil society. On the other hand, the 
mechanisms of a socialist state are determined by the appropriate efforts of the state’s 
National Assembly and related organizations in the political system in order to ensure 
domestic human rights protection (Communist Review 2015; Nguyen 2016).    
In addition, the CPV indicates that the development of a regional mechanism for 
human rights protection and that the participation of international human rights 
organizations has contributed strongly and significantly to the international human 
rights protection mechanisms of the UN. More specifically, regional human rights 
mechanisms are believed to have a strong advantage where they better fit with the 
region’s typical attributes and characteristics, compared to global ones (Hoang 2014). 
Moreover, it is recognized that there are an increasing number of global human rights 
NGOs which have roles in promoting human rights protection that are highly 
appreciated by the international community. However, as asserted by the “Nhan Dan 
Online” (“People Online”), an official newspaper of the CPV that occupies a 
hierarchical level equivalent to a central organ of the Party, instead of being impartial 
and independent, some international human rights NGOs, particularly Human Rights 
Watch, work for political purposes that may create greater complexity for some 
countries’ implementation of human rights protection (Nhan Dan Online 2016).  
The CPV further suggests that, as there are still certain important disagreements 
on some major human rights issues that mostly result from different understandings of 
human rights protection by states in the international community, the matter of human 
rights always has a strong possibility of causing conflicts among nations (Cao 2015). In 
order to resolve this problem, Vietnam realizes that, on the one hand, the UN and its 
mechanisms play a leading role in promoting international human rights protection; and, 
on the other, by encouraging dialogues and cooperation in this field, they also help 
member states to enhance the sharing of knowledge, and the development of trust and 
friendship among themselves in order to reduce the differences in this area (Communist 
Review 2016).    
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On a different note, according to various relevant sources, the CPV recognizes 
that the issue of its domestic human rights conditions has become a top concern when 
certain Western states consider their foreign policies towards Vietnam. It is observed by 
the Party that the topic of human rights protection has always been politicized by 
Western powers. In this regard, Vietnam criticizes the fact that, since 1970s, and based 
on a general understanding of the universal values of human rights, the issue of 
protecting and promoting these rights has been used by the United States and its 
Western allies as a tool against states that follow socialism, with the aim of imposing 
Western standards and frameworks on these socialist states’ domestic practice of human 
rights protection (Vu 2000; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007; Le 2015).  
It is further believed by the socialist state that, in order to achieve this, some 
international human rights organizations are manipulated by the United States and 
several other Western states to develop human rights instruments and monitoring 
systems that support their own political intentions, with the aim of undermining the 
socialist regime. In addition, Western states are also condemned for affecting the 
development of a regional human rights system; while individual states are criticized by 
the CPV for not only attempting to influence socialist state’s legislation, but also for 
promoting the establishment of a domestic civil society that subscribes to Western 
models and forces others to accept Western understandings of human rights and 
democratic values. More importantly, it is observed by the CPV that when necessary, 
Western states’ policies for promoting cooperation with and development in Vietnam 
and ASEAN member states can be used by Western states as a tool that can be 
exchanged for the state’s fulfillment of their demands regarding certain domestic human 
rights issues (Ton 1999; Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for 
Human Rights 2014; Le 2015).     
The topic of human rights has been increasingly mentioned in both bilateral and 
multilateral political and economic relationships in which Vietnam is currently involved. 
As a result, the CPV realizes that the field of human rights is becoming an area that 
would require both cooperation and resistance efforts by Vietnam, especially in relation 
106 
 
to those Western democracies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007; Vu 2009). This 
important orientation of the CPV is based on the perception that, in the present context 
of globalization, where there is increasing international integration, it is imperative for 
the socialist state to fully recognize and understand the issue of human rights which is 
now endorsed by the international community as a common value of humanity, while at 
the same time protecting and maintaining its socialist trajectory.            
 
4.2.3 CPV’s Understanding and Perspectives on Contemporary Human Rights 
In general, the CPV perceives that, instead of only being a legal matter, as 
previously recognized by socialist states, the field of human rights today is the cause of 
various moral and political issues that all nations in the world, regardless of their regime 
types, must confront. Specifically, as asserted by Associate Professor Dr. Nguyen Nhu 
Phat, head of the Institute of State and Law (Vietnam Academy of Science and 
Technology), and relevant state organs, the CPV observes that, by not paying 
comprehensive attention to the study of the concept of human rights earlier, this issue 
has developed into a weak spot of the socialist regime and is usually exploited by the 
political opposition which aims at undermining the socialist state. In the view of the 
CPV, this occurs because, since the period of ideological confrontation between 
capitalism and communism (the Cold War), socialist states’ countermeasures against 
Western criticisms of the socialist approach to human rights have been limited to basic 
and passive administrative measures which are said to only suit preventive purposes. 
Therefore, the CPV now recognizes that socialist states today need to implement more 
active and positive approaches that can assist them in better protecting their socialist 
ideology and their own implementation of human rights protection against Western 
states’ condemnation (Phap Luat Thanh pho Ho Chi Minh 2013; Public Security News 
2013; Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for Human Rights 2014).   
Vietnam’s Renovation Period, which included practical reforms and innovations 
in theoretical thinking helped the country to become more aware of the issue of human 
rights in the contemporary world. The development of the CPV’s perspectives and 
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understanding of this issue can be found in certain official documents of the Party’s 
national congresses, the Politburo Committee of the party’s Central Committee, and its 
Secretariat, among others. Resolution No. 1-NQ/TW (1992) of the Politburo Committee 
on the ‘Philosophical tasks for the new period’, and directive No. 12/CT-TW (1992) on 
‘Human rights and perspectives, policies of the Party’ of the party’s Central Committee 
Secretariat, together with the directive No. 44/CT-TW (2010) of the party’s Central 
Committee Secretariat, on the ‘Tasks on human rights in the new situation’, among 
others, are the basis for a number of the core orientations for the implementation of 
contemporary human rights protection in Vietnam that all state organs must follow. 
Drawing on various articles from relevant CPV scholars and state organs, the 
paragraphs below detail the core perspectives on the field of human rights that to date 
have been recognized by the CPV in those official documents.   
 
Human rights: the common values of humanity 
First, the CPV acknowledges that human rights are common values of humanity 
(Nguyen 2007; Communist Review 2007; Tuyen giao 2013). In terms of the CPV’s 
view, although the notion of human rights is usually seen to be attached to bourgeois 
revolutions, its content concerning the protection of these rights is believed to appear 
earlier; in fact, the CPV claims that they can be found in all cultures and nations. The 
CPV further perceives that the shaping of the understanding of the protection of human 
rights is strongly influenced not only by human civilization but also by different models 
of socio-economic development; and that the compilation of ideas and the legal 
instruments that follow that aim to ensure and protect human rights are indeed a joint 
contribution of all nations throughout history of the world. As a result, the CPV rejects 
the argument that human rights values were discovered or are privately owned by 
Western states. Consequently, the criteria for implementing human rights protection 
cannot be imposed on others by Western countries.   
Nonetheless, it is recognized by Vietnam that the field of human rights is 
significantly affected by the current globalization process in the course of which the 
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objectives, principles and regulations set out by international human rights law are 
considered by many states as the benchmarks for achieving the best practices of human 
rights protection. In this regard, the CPV acknowledges that most states in the 
international community have already incorporated various international human rights 
instruments into their national laws and have taken steps to implement them 
domestically (Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for Human Rights 
2014).   
 
Human rights are connected with social class 
The second perspective of the CPV regarding the field of human rights is that the 
nature and understanding of these rights are linked with social class. This perception is 
based on the belief that human rights represent a form of needs which is created by 
human dignity; and that, in order for these needs to become rights, they must be 
recognized and protected by law. The CPV further observes that, in practice, the 
domestic legal system of a state is shaped by that state’s particular political regime, as 
formed by the state’s ruling class, where the ruling class’s first mandate is to promote 
and protect the interests of that class, and to restrict certain rights of opposing classes. 
Within the global framework, the confrontation between the ideologies of capitalism 
and socialism is recognized by the CPV as a typical example that indicates such a 
relation between human rights and social class. Therefore, human rights and their 
provisions are believed by the CPV to belong to the superstructure of each individual 
state, where they are strongly influenced by the characteristics of the ruling class and 
the socio-economic status of that state (Communist Review 2007; Ta 2015; Nguyen 
2016). 
 
Protecting and ensuring human rights: each nation has different approaches 
Third, although the CPV acknowledges that the notion of ensuring human rights 
protection is popular, it believes that each nation has its own specificity in implementing 
such a task. In particular, according to the Research Journal and Scientific Voice of the 
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Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and the Permanent Office of the 
Government Steering Board for Human Rights, and various scholars of the CPV, the 
CPV claims that, as the standards and criteria for ensuring and protecting human rights 
are believed to depend strongly on the level of economic, social and cultural 
development of each state, a nation has the right to choose the most appropriate 
measures to assist the state to both ensure domestic human rights protection and ensure 
social stability. Again, this understanding of the specificity of human rights protection is 
treated by the CPV as a fundamental ground for the state to resist any imposition of 
human rights protection frameworks by one country on another (Permanent Office of 
the Government Steering Board for Human Rights 2014; Tran 2008; Nguyen 2016).        
 
Human rights are attached with human (citizen’s) duties  
On the other hand, another typical socialist understanding of human rights by the 
CPV is that human rights must be attached to citizens’ duties. Western states are often 
criticized by socialist states for emphasizing the responsibility of the state to protect and 
ensure the rights of its citizens without mentioning the individual’s duties towards 
society and the state. In other words, based on the basic principle that rights always 
come with responsibilities, the CPV rejects the view that the notion of human rights 
relates to the responsibility of a state to ensure the rights of an individual citizen, but not 
to the responsibility of each individual to respect the collective rights of the whole 
society that he or she belongs to (Communist Review 2007; Phap Luat Thanh pho Ho 
Chi Minh 2013). Indeed, the CPV recognizes that it is a necessity for an individual of a 
state to also respect the rights and freedom of others, as well as the social order and 
relevant collective interests of the society. This has been clearly outlined in the most 
recent ‘2013 State Constitution’ Vietnam has adopted1.  
 
 
 
                                                   
1 Article 15 – 2013 State Constitution 
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State sovereignty: a prerequisite to achieve best practice of ensuring human rights 
More importantly, the CPV ascertains that a prerequisite for achieving the best 
practice of ensuring and protecting human rights is to have national sovereignty fully 
respected (Cao, 2011). The communist party claims that human rights within a nation 
cannot be guaranteed if the state sovereignty is violated or if the nation does not have a 
right to self-determination on the issue. According to the Permanent Office of the 
Government Steering Board for Human Rights, the reason is that, in terms of the CPV’s 
perception, although many aspects of human rights can be internationalized, the actual 
task of ensuring domestic human rights conditions remains the state’s jurisdiction. 
Therefore, despite acknowledging that enhancing international cooperation in the field 
of human rights is necessary and important, the CPV determines that practical 
implementation to ensure and promote human rights protection is rather an internal 
affair of the state, and that international human rights mechanisms would only work as a 
supplement to the experiences and resources of the current national mechanisms of the 
state (Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for Human Rights 2014; 
Nguyen 2016). It is further determined by the CPV that human rights cannot be more 
important than sovereignty (Communist Review 2007).           
 
Human rights are not natural rights 
Next, the CPV also rejects the view that human rights are considered natural 
rights; instead, the Party argues that, in order to become rights, the relevant demands 
need to be acknowledged and regulated by law (Nguyen & Vu 2013). In terms of this 
perspective, human rights become rights only when they are recognized by the law. The 
CPV indicates that such view actually assists it in affirming the role of law with regard 
to human rights protection; in fact, as asserted by Dr. Cao Duc Thai, the former Head of 
the Human Rights Research Institute (Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and 
Public Administration), the relevant content for this relationship between human rights 
and the state’s domestic law can be found in the ‘2013 State Constitution’ (Cao 2015); it 
can also be observed in various credos of the CPV during the Renovation Period, as 
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well as in many of the party’s different socio-economic development strategies. The 
party further determines that, at the global level, the protection of human rights is set 
out by international human rights law where it is considered a matter of cooperation in 
the international community in the building of the relevant principles and mechanisms 
that aim to ensure human rights protection in various countries; however, at the national 
level, ensuring these rights is primarily assigned to the domestic legal system of each 
state (Tuyen giao 2013). 
 
Socialist regime: the most appropriate regime for guaranteeing human rights 
Finally, according to the Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for 
Human Rights, the CPV believes that human rights are best ensured under a socialist 
regime. It is the view of the party that although human rights are seen as significant 
values of humanity, in practice they actually belong to a range of values that humanity 
has recognized after numerous revolutions against national and social class oppressions. 
Furthermore, it is claimed by the CPV that human rights can assist in promoting all 
development processes and create equality in society (i.e. these rights provide everyone 
with an equal chance to attain freedom), but they have not been able to overcome the 
inequality in private ownership of the means of production and the distribution of social 
wealth (Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for Human Rights 2014).  
Furthermore, in order to resolve this issue, the socialist regime is said to always 
aim at building a society that can identify the expression and sources of inequality and 
find ways and measures to eliminate this in order to create a suitable environment and 
conditions for the full enjoyment of all human rights. As a result, it is claimed by 
various state organs and CPV scholars that one of the main objectives of the 
communists is to eliminate the root of all human rights violations, where these are 
believed to originate in national and social class oppressions created by the private 
possession of the means of production, and that protecting human rights is in fact an 
essential aspect of the socialist state of Vietnam (Tuyen giao 2012; Public Security 
News 2013; Nguyen 2016). 
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4.2.4 CPV’s Contemporary Policies in the Human Rights Field 
Based on the abovementioned perspectives and the actual implementation of the 
directive No. 12 of the party’s Central Committee Secretariat, several important policies 
in the field of human rights have been issued by the CPV, by means of directive No. 
44/CT-TW (2010) of the party’s Central Committee Secretariat, on the ‘Tasks on human 
rights in the new situation’. In particular, first, according to the party, maintaining state 
sovereignty is the primary prioritized mandate for ensuring and protecting human rights 
in Vietnam. The CPV further determines that human rights protection cannot be fully 
implemented if there is political or social instability that may cause internal conflict, or 
if there exists economic dependence on great powers and global institutions. In order to 
create a stable domestic environment in the course of the recent globalization process, 
the CPV directs that the state is required to avoid being dominated or influenced by 
large nations or military alliances. 
In this regard, more particularly, socialist states perceive that state sovereignty 
comprises two core contents: the first is the supremacy of a nation within its territory; 
and the second, that nation’s right to be independent in its foreign relations (Public 
Security News 2014). As a result, in terms of socialist doctrine, the protection of the 
national sovereignty of a socialist state entails the protection of such a state’s national 
independence attached with socialism (Tran 2015). In other words, the task of 
protecting the sovereignty of a socialist state like Vietnam does not only include the 
protection of its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also includes the 
protection of the CPV, the state and its citizens, as well as the current socialist regime. 
Second, the CPV also requires that in order for individuals of the state to fully 
understand and enjoy their rights, the economic, social and cultural conditions of the 
country must be improved. In this regard, it is claimed by the party that such 
developments in the state would aid citizens in enhancing their own personal capacity 
and knowledge, where these matters are said to allow them not only to adopt 
multicultural values as a result of globalization, but also to understand and maintain 
those typical of Vietnam. This is believed to contribute significantly to citizens’ more 
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comprehensive understanding of human rights values. Alongside this policy, the CPV 
also promotes further education on the issues of human rights in accordance with its 
abovementioned perspectives for both citizens and state officials at all levels. In the 
view of the CPV, this is necessary in order to tackle the increasing impact of Western 
perspectives on human rights in Vietnam (Permanent Office of the Government Steering 
Board for Human Rights 2014).   
As for the third policy in the field of human rights, the communist party of 
Vietnam requests the building of the “socialist rule-of-law state”, and the completion of 
the relevant mechanisms and institutions that aim at ensuring domestic human rights 
conditions (Communist Review 2007; Nguyen 2016). As outlined in part 2.4.2 of 
Chapter II on Vietnam’s political-legal system, the socialist rule-of-law state is a state 
where state power is said to be unified due to the fact that the implementation of 
legislative, administrative and judicial rights is well assigned, coordinated and 
supervised among state organs. The CPV holds that such a rule-of-law state will not 
only make the public administration system more responsible and serve citizens better, 
but also create a more transparent and impartial judicial system. It is further claimed by 
the CPV that these achievements will then assist in improving those measures applied 
by the state to ensure domestic human rights conditions, including the relevant laws, 
implementing institutions and monitoring mechanisms. 
Finally, the last policy issued by the party on this matter is the requirement to 
maintain domestic political and social stability, and to positively and actively expand 
international cooperation in the field of human rights. The CPV acknowledges that 
democracy in society is required for the promotion and ensuring of human rights; 
however, the party requires that the process of democratization and the establishment of 
the relevant mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing domestic human rights protection must 
be made appropriate to the Vietnamese context so that the country’s political and social 
stability can be maintained. On the other hand, the CPV also indicates that, in the course 
of contemporary globalization, international cooperation in the development of all areas, 
including the field of human rights, is an exceedingly important task that the state is 
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required to carry out, especially as regards those activities that can aid in enhancing 
dialogues with other states and international organizations with regard to the issues of 
human rights as per the CPV’s resolution of the 10th national congress in 2006 
(Communist Review 2007). In the view of the communist party, this task is currently 
significant as it would not only allow the state to receive valuable international support 
in the form of relevant resources and experiences to improve its mandate of ensuring 
domestic human rights conditions; but also provide it with better opportunities to argue 
for the socialist approach of guaranteeing human rights protection, where this is 
believed to help the state to more effectively resist the imposition of Western criteria for 
democracy and human rights.  
 
4.2.5 Internal Driving Forces and the State’s Ratification of International Human 
Rights Treaties  
First, the general notion of respecting and guaranteeing fundamental human rights 
in Vietnam can be grasped in the very first legal documents of the state. For instance, as 
indicated by the national report of Vietnam for the UPR I in 2009, subject matter on the 
rights and obligations of citizens appeared in the first Constitution (i.e. the 1946 
Constitution) when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was established; this had been 
treated as one of the three core institutions of that Constitution (Pham 2011; Human 
Rights Council – Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review 2009). Similarly, 
the later Constitutions adopted in 1959, 1980 and 1992 also had provisions for 
acknowledging and protecting human rights and citizen rights, as well as confirming 
that Vietnam is a socialist rule-of-law state of the people, by the people, and for the 
people. Following the country’s unification in 1975, although the state began to sign 
and ratify several important international human rights treaties in 1982, as outlined in 
part 2.4.4 for the “Vietnam’s previous Ratification of International HR treaties,” it may 
be observed that the state’s actual understanding of the need to accede to international 
human rights treaties as well as to comply with international standards for protecting 
and ensuring human rights were in fact foregrounded by issues arising from the 
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country’s Renovation Period, which was initiated in 1986. 
 
The policies of multilateral diplomacy & international economic integration 
According to a scholar at the Vietnam’s Academy of Journalism and 
Communication (Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Public 
Administration), during the period of 1975-1986, Vietnam faced many critical 
difficulties and challenges which strongly impacted on the state’s survival. Indeed, at 
that time, Vietnam, with an economy in severe crisis, was under a trade embargo and 
isolated by the international community; its national security was also threatened by the 
situation where there existed “half peace and half war” within the country (Pham 2012). 
The Renovation Period was initiated due to the urgent demand in the country for the 
state to find ways to solve its economic problems and also to break free from isolation 
in order to survive and develop the country. As a solution, the CPV emphasized the 
necessity and importance of making “more friends” and “fewer enemies,” and the Party 
instructed the state to expand its international relations to seek cooperation and attract 
international support and investment2 (Hoang 2010). 
Cooperation with the UN in the period of 1977-1986 not only assisted Vietnam in 
increasing its development ability but also created opportunities for the state to seek 
Western aid during the trade embargo of the time (The Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
Online Newspaper of the Government 2017). The state’s later decision to join the 
ASEAN in 1995 represented a significant achievement of the state in implementing the 
abovementioned policy of the communist party; this event aided Vietnam in further 
resolving its concerns regarding foreign relations. In other words, it had been 
determined by the state that, had it not been a member of the ASEAN, it would have 
been difficult for Vietnam to improve or develop its foreign relations with dominant 
global actors and non-state actors (Pham 2012); indeed, it has also been believed by 
Vietnam that the normalization of the United States-Vietnam diplomatic relationship at 
                                                   
2 Resolution of the 6th national congress of the CPV (1986); resolution of the 7th national congress 
of the CPV (1991) 
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that time would not have been occurred if the state had not decided to join the ASEAN.  
In this regard, Vietnam realized that normalizing diplomatic relationship with the 
U.S. was also an important step for the state in implementing the CPV’s 
abovementioned foreign policy, due to the fact that the state’s relation with U.S. was 
considered to have strategic implications for many issues of national security and 
development in Vietnam. For example, the relation has been said to contribute not only 
to consolidating Vietnam’s reputation and political position in the international arena, 
but also positively and strongly effect the development of Vietnam’s foreign relations 
with other states, especially Western ones, as well as with important international 
financial and monetary organizations, such the World Bank (WB), Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and especially the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) (Pham 2015).     
As a result, the resolution of the Eighth national congress of the CPV (1996) 
clearly indicated that the regional and international contexts showed significant effects 
on various economic, political and social fields of the state (Hoang 2010), and 
instructed that Vietnam must therefore actively and positively expand into more 
international markets, as well as accelerate the processes of negotiating a trade 
agreement with the U.S., and prepare to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
forum and the WTO. With regard to the WTO particularly, it had been determined by 
Vietnam that being a member of the organization would provide the state with the 
necessary motivation and pressures to promote its renovation work more 
comprehensively.  
According to Mr. Vu Khoan, former Secretariat Member of the Party’s Central 
Committee and Deputy Prime Minister, subsequent international economic integration 
and the later international integration in all other fields became a major policy of the 
CPV and appeared in many important documents of the communist party (Vu 2015). In 
particular, the state was requested by the 9th national congress of the CPV to actively 
integrate into the international economy3. This policy was then developed by the 10th 
                                                   
3 Resolution No. 07-NQ/TW (2001) of the Politburo Committee on ‘About International Economic 
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national congress of the CPV in 2006, when the state was further requested to be more 
active and positive in the process of international economic integration, as well as to 
expand international cooperation in other fields. Finally, in order to pursue more 
comprehensive development, the term “international economic integration” was 
changed to “international integration” by the 11th national congress of the CPV to show 
the will of the CPV and the state in this matter (Pham 2017). In this regard, it is 
noteworthy that the CPV instructed that international economic integration should be 
the primary focus, while integration in other fields should support such economic 
integration and cooperation of the state, and that conducting international integration 
must aim at attracting maximum international conditions to assist in developing the 
state rapidly and sustainably, as well as protecting and maintaining the socialist state 
and its national sovereignty and independence4. 
 
Benefits and challenges brought by the process of international integration 
It is believed by Vietnam that by implementing such policies of multilateral 
diplomacy and international integration, it overcame the slump in trading markets 
caused by the declining number of traditional socialist partners after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. In addition, Vietnam was able to limit the negative impacts 
resulting from the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and to attract a large amount of 
investment into the country from outsiders. Based on various sources of information, 
Vietnam has now established trading relations with more than 220 states and territories, 
and attracted more than 8,000 foreign direct investment projects from 80 countries and 
territories with the overall investment capital totaling more than US$100 billion, as well 
as a large number of official development assistance projects from many governments.  
On a different note, the improvement of domestic economic and social conditions 
has allowed Vietnam to enhance its national ability to better maintain its national 
sovereignty and independence, political security and order, as well as to improve the 
                                                                                                                                                     
Integration’ 
4  Resolution No. 22-NQ/TW (2013) of the Politburo Committee on ‘About International 
Integration’ 
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living standards of its citizens, and consolidate their trust on the renovation work of the 
state. Moreover, in term of foreign relations, such abovementioned policies and 
achievements are claimed to have contributed to enhance the image, reputation and the 
role of Vietnam in the international arena. For instance, it is indicated by the state that 
being a WTO member has assisted Vietnam in fully integrating into the international 
economy; while being a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 
2008-2009 term allowed it to fully integrate into the international political context. Such 
an opportunity to have an important voice at the UN is believed to have provided 
Vietnam with a greater ability to participate in solving those international political, 
social and security issues that are directly or indirectly related to the state. 
This has been considered necessary and important for Vietnam because, according 
to the CPV’s viewpoint, the process of international integration would result in states 
increasingly depending on one another; and it is essential that small states find ways to 
eliminate larger nations’ intentions of creating a one-way relationship that aims at 
imposing on and dominating others, and promote an international order with fairer and 
more equal international mechanisms. It has been determined that, during thirty years of 
opening up the country and implementing the policies of international integration and 
multilateral diplomacy, Vietnam has faced various challenges, including threats to its 
national independence and sovereignty, to its chosen political orientation, and to the role 
of the state in the domestic field, among others.  
 
Problems with the field of HR and solutions from the socialist state 
In the field of human rights especially, it has been perceived by the state that there 
has been the imposition of Western democratic and human rights values in international 
relations by means of the doctrine that indicates that human rights are superior to 
national sovereignty, while external political opposition has attempted to intervene in 
Vietnam’s internal affairs through foreign relation activities that relate to the issues of 
human rights (Communist Review 2007). According to Mr. Ha Kim Ngoc, Deputy 
Minister of the MOFA, it has been determined by the state that the responsibility to 
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ensure domestic human rights conditions first belongs to each individual state and its 
citizens, such that the state decides the solutions appropriate to its current economic, 
historical, and socio-cultural conditions (Hau Giang Province Online Newspaper 2016).    
During the process of international integration, the Party came to understand that 
many states in the world, especially in the Southeast Asia region – such as China, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, among others – faced numerous pressures 
with regard to issues of human rights. These states have initiated various measures to 
effectively deal with these pressures and compel others to reduce their criticisms on this 
matter. These measures include the needs to actively and positively join regional and 
international human rights treaties and forums; to continue to perfect their domestic 
legal systems; to increase cooperation internationally and open dialogues on human 
rights issues; to resist unreasonable claims and demands from outsiders; and, finally, to 
integrate positively into the international economy as this would be a sustainable basis 
to improve domestic human rights conditions (Vu 2014).   
As a result, it has been perceived by the party that the field of human rights is 
becoming an important consideration for the “peaceful revolution” strategies of the 
political opposition, as this situation imposes a great demand for the state to ensure 
domestic human rights conditions and to fight against condemnation from outsiders, in 
order to maintain political and social stability to serve the process of integration and 
development of the country5; and that international integration (including the field of 
human rights) is a process of both cooperating and resisting6. It has been further 
requested by the CPV that Vietnam enhance and deepen its relationship with the state’s 
partners, especially those that are considered strategically important for the 
development and security of the state. In addition, Vietnam needs to improve the role of 
the state in those international organizations, forums and cooperating mechanisms that it 
is currently a member of, as well as to construct and implement plans to join other 
                                                   
5 Directive No. 44/CT-TW (2010) of the party’s Central Committee Secretariat on ‘Tasks on human 
rights in the new situation’ 
6  Resolution No. 22-NQ/TW (2013) of the Politburo Committee on ‘About International 
Integration’ 
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relevant organizations and forums that can help to develop and protect the country. 
Moreover, the state must also seek consensus and attract more support from the 
international community while fighting against the activities of the external political 
opposition that exploits the international integration process of the state to violate 
Vietnam’s national security (i.e. “peaceful revolution”).  
In this regard, it is acknowledged by Mr. Ha Kim Ngoc, Deputy Minister of the 
MOFA that becoming a member of the UNHRC for the 2014-2016 tenure was a 
historical event that represented an immense achievement for the state in the 
implementation of the abovementioned Party policies on international integration. In the 
view of Vietnam, at this international level, it can participate more proactively 
especially in the fight against the trend of politicizing human rights as well as against 
the viewpoint of a “double standard” on human rights; and in supporting those 
approaches that value dialogue, cooperation and mutual understanding. It is believed by 
the CPV and the state that dialogue would create opportunities for other states to better 
understand the human rights situation in Vietnam, as well as for Vietnam to reject 
incorrect and biased viewpoints and information that aim at imposing on, and 
interfering in, a sovereign state’s internal affairs (Ha 2015). It is further determined by 
the Party that results achieved from dialogues and international cooperation in the field 
of human rights has contributed to assisting Vietnam in maintaining its political and 
social stability, protecting the socialist regime, developing relationships with 
international partners, especially the dominant ones, and ensuring the necessary 
environment and conditions for the developing process of the country. 
In an interview with the People’s Army Newspaper, which is known as the official 
voice of the Vietnam’s armed forces and an organ of the Vietnam’s military central 
commission and Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense, Ambassador Nguyen Trung 
Thanh, Head of Vietnam’s Permanent Mission to the UN, the WTO and other 
international organizations in Geneva, expressly confirmed that the abovementioned 
approach of Vietnam in the field of human rights has been welcomed and supported by 
the international community because it is commensurate with the common desire of the 
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international community which aims to respect international law and equality in 
international relations among all states, as well as oppose any unilateral approach that 
seeks to threaten and impose on others in order to serve the interests of one or a group 
of particular states (People’s Army Newspaper 2014). For example, the Minister of the 
MOFA, Mr. Pham Binh Minh, asserts that complex dynamics among the large 
international actors in recent years have impacted significantly on the security and 
development environment of Vietnam; indeed, there have been various challenges that 
Vietnam must face, such as when Vietnam’s legitimate rights and interests in the South 
China Sea were violated; while in the area of national security there has also been 
increasing interference in Vietnam’s internal affairs as a result of the political 
opposition’s exploitation of the issues of human rights, democracy, and peaceful 
revolution (Pham 2015). 
Therefore, the CPV believes that the abovementioned polices on human rights and 
international integration would help the state to increase the consensus needed to attract 
more international support and limit outsiders’ pressure and criticisms of the issue of its 
domestic human rights conditions. Moreover, it was also suggested by the Minister of 
the MOFA that the state would seek further support for its viewpoint in the matter of the 
South China Sea by being a responsible member of the international community. Hence, 
the state’s priority task for foreign relations in 2014 particularly was to obtain maximum 
advantage as well as all opportunities to overcome these challenges, in order to maintain 
a stable and peaceful environment, attract more external resources to serve the 
development targets of the state, and to improve the state’s political position in the 
international community (Pham 2015). It is in fact noticeable that the 2014-2015 period 
was considered important for Vietnam as many free trade agreements between the state 
and its important partners had been expected to be successfully negotiated, such as 
those between Vietnam and the EU, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the ASEAN Economic Community, 
among others. 
At the same time, the communist party realized a fundamental demand that the 
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state’s internal strength (i.e. the domestic legal system) also needed to be improved. In 
this regard, it was suggested by the former Chairman of the CPV’s Central Commission 
of Organization, Mr. To Huy Rua, that the state organize effective implementation of 
human rights and citizen rights protection in order to build a socialist law-based state of 
the people, by the people and for the people, as democracy in a socialist regime is 
primarily and directly represented and implemented by the state (To 2006). Therefore, 
the CPV has instructed that any legal reform of the state must be undertaken based on 
the actual demands of social and economic development, and must be able to promote 
and support such development. Importantly, the state has also been asked to selectively 
adopt experiences of outsiders that are appropriate to the current situation of Vietnam 
and to the country’s demand for active international integration7. 
                                                   
7 Resolution No. 49-NQ/TW (2005) of the Politburo Committee on ‘Strategy for Legal Reform to 
2020’ 
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SECTION 3: EXTERNAL DYNAMICS ON VIETNAM’S BEHAVIOR 
 
4.3.1 The Role and Impact of External Dynamics on Vietnam’s Human Rights 
Field 
It is generally found that, from the view of many relevant state organs and CPV 
scholars, the matter of ensuring and protecting human rights in Vietnam has been mostly 
criticized by the U.S., the EU and its member states, and some other Western states such 
as the G4 (Norway, Switzerland, Canada, New Zealand), and Australia, among others. 
The Party further determines that, on the one hand, these international players continue 
to promote cooperation with Vietnam in many areas but, on the other, they increasingly 
impose pressures on the state’s democratic and human rights conditions. In this regard, 
the activities are said to be complex and focus particularly on several civil and political 
rights issues, including freedom of speech and of the media, the use of the internet, 
freedom of association and religion, civil society, as well as the state’s processes of 
investigation, prosecution, judgment, and the execution of judgments.  
More importantly, these Western states are also claimed by the CPV to increase 
cooperation and coordination with each other not only to support the domestic political 
opposition of the state, but also to attach the matters of improving democracy and 
human rights to their discussion and negotiation of cooperation with Vietnam. 
According to the Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for Human 
Rights, such activities increased substantially, especially during 2012-2013 (Permanent 
Office of the Government Steering Board for Human Rights 2014), when Vietnam and 
the EU were signing their framework agreement on comprehensive partnership and 
cooperation (PCA), in which human rights issues were also involved in such PCA, as 
well as negotiating for an ambitious and comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) 
between the two parties. 
According to Mr. Pham Binh Minh, Vietnam’s Minister of the MOFA, the EU has 
been considered by Vietnam as one of the most important partners of the state on many 
issues, including cooperative development, and trade and investment, and has strongly 
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supported Vietnam’s process of development and international integration (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Vietnam and the EU delegation to Viet Nam 2012). Furthermore, 
while the U.S. is now Vietnam’s biggest exporting market of, the EU has become the 
second largest one, and has promised to increase non-humanitarian aid for Vietnam to 
€400 million for the period 2014-2020 (Pham 2015). Therefore, as previously 
determined by the CPV (see above part), Vietnam’s relations with the US, the EU and 
its member states, as well as their Western allies have would had strategic implications 
for many development and national security issues of the state; however, it had also 
been recognized by the CPV and the state that human rights issues are integrated into 
these Western states’ foreign policies when they discuss cooperation in other economic, 
political, cultural and legal fields (Le 2015). The following part covers in detail the 
activities of the relevant external and non-state actors during the period of 2012-2013 
that Vietnam considered to be threats to its domestic stability, state sovereignty, regime, 
as well as to the development of the country.   
 
The U.S. 
With regard to the U.S., the CPV indicates that, due to its different political 
ideology, the U.S.’s objective of transforming Vietnam’s politics to follow the U.S.’s 
direction remains unchanged, and that issues of human rights are considered to be a 
significant tool to assist in achieving that goal. As a result, the communist party of 
Vietnam claims that the US continues to interfere deeply in the domestic human rights 
field of Vietnam, and that the interferences are said to come from both the U.S.’s 
legislative and administrative organs, although the ones from U.S.’s legislative organs 
are claimed to be more aggressive. Noticeably, they include the previous ratification of 
resolution ‘H.Res. 484’ in 2012 and the bill ‘H.R. 1897 – Vietnam Human Rights Act of 
2013’ in 2013 by the U.S.’s House of Representatives when Vietnam was not only 
condemned in these legal documents for violating some civil and political rights 
domestically, but also asked to alter a number of its current penal code provisions. More 
importantly, bill ‘H.R. 1897’ in 2013 particularly requested the US to stop providing 
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“non-humanitarian assistance” to Vietnam if the state is unable to show improvement in 
respecting domestic civil and political rights. Such activities from the U.S.’s legislative 
organs were believed by the CPV to indirectly impose difficulties for the local 
governments in Vietnam, especially in places where there are many ethical groups, as 
well as to create a bad image of Vietnam in the international community (Vu 2014).   
According to the Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for Human 
Rights, the CPV indicated that the abovementioned actions by the U.S.’s legislative 
organs at that time strongly affected the U.S.’s planning of foreign policy towards 
Vietnam and this then created negative effects for Vietnam. For example, there were a 
total of seventy-four delegations from the U.S.’s Congress, government, and State 
Department that visited Vietnam in 2013 to promote bilateral cooperation between the 
two countries in many areas. The communist party found that all of these groups 
attempted to interfere in the state’s internal affairs during their visits by imposing 
pressure with regard to the state’s improvement of domestic human rights conditions, 
and the inserting of matters of freedom of speech, press, internet, association, religion, 
as well as the processes of investigation, prosecution, adjudication and enforcement of 
judgment in Vietnam, into the discussion concerning the enhancing of bilateral foreign 
relations between the two states.  
Furthermore, these delegations further reaffirmed that the state of human rights in 
Vietnam had become a crucial consideration especially when the U.S.’s Congress 
discussed developing a deeper relationship with Vietnam, or decided the allocation of 
the U.S.’s budget to assist Vietnam in certain areas (Permanent Office of the 
Government Steering Board for Human Rights 2014). Indeed, it found that the U.S.’s 
Congress was asked by a member of the U.S.’s House of Representative to require the 
government to have “explicit” and “enforceable” terms that can ensure that its partners 
respect their citizen’s rights when negotiating cooperation before the Congress could 
agree on “any future deal” (Sanchez 2015). 
As a further example, it is observed that before and during the official state visit 
of Vietnamese State President Truong Tan Sang to the U.S. in 2013, the U.S. sent a total 
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of ten requests regarding human rights situations in Vietnam. Similarly, before each 
bilateral dialogue between the two states during that time, Vietnam was frequently 
asked by the U.S. to release political prisoners, sign and ratify the CAT, and stop 
applying provisions of the current ‘Penal Code’ to prosecute and effect judgments on 
individuals and groups of the domestic political opposition, and so on. It further found 
that the US also often threatened to cancel such bilateral dialogues with Vietnam when 
the socialist state did not respond to those requests from the U.S. In addition, during 
such dialogues, it is claimed that the U.S. kept pressuring Vietnam to alter its domestic 
legal provisions that were believed by the U.S. to violate particularly freedom of speech, 
such as the Articles 79, 88, and 258 of the current ‘Penal Code’ of Vietnam, and the 
government’s enactment of the decree No. 72/2013/ND-CP on ‘The management of 
information and internet’, among other things. 
Other pressures from the U.S. noticed by Vietnam during the period specified 
include eight declarations and press releases from the U.S. Embassy in Vietnam, and the 
U.S.’s Department of State’s issuing of an annual report on Vietnam’s human rights 
situation in 2012, where these documents all commented negatively about human rights 
conditions in Vietnam. Moreover, it also found that the U.S.’s Ambassador to Vietnam, 
as well as the U.S.’s Secretary of State, on various occasions, publically expressed that 
the U.S. would consider lifting its arms embargo on Vietnam only when the state could 
demonstrate an improvement in its field of human rights8. Finally, it is observed that, at 
the same time, the U.S. also continued to promote and support the activities of 
individuals and groups of the domestic political opposition in Vietnam as well as 
relevant international human rights NGOs, although these subjects are criticized by the 
communist party as not only interfering in Vietnam’s internal affairs and causing 
domestic social and political instability to the state, but also aimed at exploiting the 
issues of human rights to slowly change the current political regime of Vietnam. 
                                                   
8 United States Embassy & Consulate in Vietnam (2015), Remarks by Secretary John Kerry with 
Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh: 
https://vn.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-secretary-john-kerry-with-vietnamese-deputy-prime-ministerfo
reign-minister-pham-binh-minh/ 
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The EU, its member states and other Western states 
It was found that, during 2012-2013, the EU, its member states and certain other 
Western states such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, increasingly interfered in 
Vietnam’s human rights and democracy issues and considered Vietnam’s improvement 
of its domestic human rights conditions as a prerequisite for the decision to enhance 
their investments into the country’s economic, social and cultural fields. Specifically, it 
is said that these Western states actually sent delegations to different regions of Vietnam 
to compile a list of domestic individuals and groups of the political opposition whose 
concerns were then used to create pressure in relation to the Vietnamese government 
during the discussions and negotiations for cooperation between Vietnam and the EU 
(Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for Human Rights 2014).  
On the other hand, it has been emphasized by Vietnam that the EU and its member 
states did not only provide funds for various legal and judicial reform projects in 
Vietnam, but also promoted the alteration of the current domestic legal system of the 
state with the aim of making it similar to Western models. Noticeably, between 2012 
and 2013, EU member states and their allies were seen to attempt to impact the state’s 
building and amendment of certain important legal documents, especially the process of 
amending the ‘1992 Constitution’. In addition, the Swedish Embassy in Vietnam was 
found particularly to be promoting the establishment of an independent national human 
rights organization by means of cooperation projects between the Raoul Wallenberg 
Human Rights Institute and some domestic research institutes in Vietnam; while 
England and Sweden also coordinated with various Vietnamese communication 
agencies to implement projects to enhance the operational capacity of the press and the 
understanding of the rights of the press. The EU itself was seen to continue 
implementing its Judicial Partnership Program that was established in 2010 with the aim 
of supporting judicial reform programs in Vietnam9.     
In relation to the support of the domestic political opposition of Vietnam, in 2013, 
                                                   
9  European Commission (2009), Vietnam – Justice Partnership Programme: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2009/af_aap_2009_vnm.pdf 
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the EU and its Western allies increasingly criticized Vietnam for applying its legal 
provisions on national security to deal with the domestic political opposition of the 
state; in this regard, representatives of EU countries in Hanoi expressed concerns about 
the state’s handling of some cases and requested that Vietnam release the people 
involved. According to data provided by the Permanent Office of the Government 
Steering Board for Human Rights in 2014, there were twenty official and unofficial 
meetings between the staff of some embassies of the EU’s member states in Vietnam 
and Vietnam’s domestic political opposition in 2013. The CPV observed that such 
individuals and groups of the state’s domestic political opposition were encouraged by 
these embassies to continue their objection activities against Vietnam (Permanent Office 
of the Government Steering Board for Human Rights 2014).  
Furthermore, it also found that, in 2013, the EU Delegation to Vietnam issued five 
messages, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France three statements, all of which 
concerned individuals in the domestic political opposition who had been put on trial by 
Vietnam. Similarly, the German Federal Government’s Commissioner for Human 
Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid, Mr. Markus Loning, issued three statements 
opposing Vietnam’s decision to bring these individuals to trial. In addition, EU and 
some other countries issued a joint letter that was sent to the MOFA of Vietnam 
expressing concerns about human rights situations in the country. The Vietnamese 
MOFA also received a letter from the EU Ambassador to Vietnam in March 2013 
expressing an objection to the state’s implementation of the death penalty. Details of 
these matters can be found in the human rights dialogue between the EU and Vietnam in 
the same year10. More significantly, on April 18, 2013, the European Parliament, for the 
first time after two consecutive years (2011-2012), adopted a resolution11 on Vietnam’s 
human rights situation, claiming that Vietnam systematically suppressed the rights to 
express opinions and form associations, and the freedom of religion, as well as arguing 
                                                   
10 European Commission Press Release (2013), EU and Vietnam hold Human Rights Dialogue: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-832_en.htm 
11  European Parliament (2013), Resolution No. 2013/2599(RSP): 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2013-1
89 
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that Vietnam violated Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
rights.  
Based on these activities of the EU and its member states, the CPV recognized 
many similarities in the ways that EU and U.S. interfered in Vietnam’s field of human 
rights and therefore believed that EU, its member states and some other Western states 
are actually allies of the U.S. in this matter (i.e. exploiting the issues of human rights to 
interfere in Vietnam’s internal affairs). More significantly, it was then determined by the 
party and the state that these international actors did not only want to alter the current 
domestic legal environment in Vietnam, but also aimed at changing the political regime 
of Vietnam. 
 
The UN, regional mechanisms and international human rights NGOs  
From 2012 to 2013 particularly, it was also noted by Vietnam that there was 
negative feedback from various UN human rights mechanisms on the human rights 
situation of Vietnam. For example, for the first time, Rupert Colville, spokesperson for 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed concerns about several 
human rights cases in the country12. Moreover, the number of protest letters against 
Vietnam had increased from eight to twelve letters between 2012 and 2013; noticeably, 
there were even cases that attracted the attention of the UNHRC, the Council of which 
was believed to be planning discussing and issuing a resolution on Vietnam’s human 
rights situation. Similarly, it is also found that, during this period, the UN Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention adopted two decisions about certain human rights cases in 
Vietnam that were believed to involve arbitrary detention13; while the UN Women sent 
collective letters of protest to the Commission on the Status of Women that is part of the 
Economic and Social Council, condemning Vietnam for violating women’s rights in 
various ways, including torture in prison and restriction of freedom of the press, and the 
like. Moreover, the state was pressured by some UN human rights organizations to 
                                                   
12 UN News Centre (2013), UN human rights office concerned over convictions of 14 activists in 
Vietnam: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43906#.WTgzfuuGP4Y 
13 Opinion No.23/2013 (Vietnam) & Opinion No.33/2013 (Vietnam) 
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allow their special rapporteurs on human rights to enter into Vietnam for investigative 
purposes. 
Other than that, a number international human rights organizations, such as 
Human Rights Watch, International Amnesty, Freedom House, Reporters Without 
Borders, and others continued to not only criticize Vietnam’s human rights conditions 
but also urged international actors and the UN to intervene in human rights in Vietnam; 
more importantly, these international human rights organizations also protested against 
Vietnam’s self-nomination to become a member of the UNHRC for 2014-2016 (Nguyen 
2014). Moreover, some organizations requested entry into Vietnam in order to discover 
and further discuss human rights issues of the country; they initiated campaigns to 
collect petitions and then sent them to the UN and governments of the international 
community calling for Vietnam to release prisoners of conscience, especially those who 
were believed to have been arbitrarily detained.  
On that the other hand, there is no evidence from secondary data of Vietnam 
showing relevant activities from the ASEAN and its member states that had been 
considered by the socialist state as interferences in its domestic human rights field 
during the period of 2012-2013. Similarly, based on the primary data that has been 
collected for this study, it has been determined by both manager of the Department of 
Legal and Administrative-Judicial Procedure Reform (Ministry of Public Security) 
(personal communication, January 13, 2016) and Dr. Hoang Thi Tue Phuong of the 
University of Law – Ho Chi Minh City (personal communication, January 7, 2016) that 
the effects of the activities of the ASEAN and its member states on Vietnam’s human 
rights issues and conditions were not as significant as those caused by the U.S., the EU 
and its member states, those organizations belonging to the UN, and certain 
international human rights NGOs; this is perhaps because the understanding of human 
rights in ASEAN countries appears to be relatively similar. 
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4.3.2 External Dynamics and the State’s Ratification of the CAT 
Before the CAT was signed in November 2013 and ratified in November 2014, 
various international conferences were held in Vietnam to discuss the relevant issues. 
For example, as outlined in part 4.2.3 for ‘The Vietnam’s process of signing and 
ratifying the CAT’, in 2004, a conference, the ‘International Seminar on the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ was 
held in Hanoi and co-organized by the Vietnamese Research Centre for Human Rights 
(Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy), the Department of International 
Organizations (MOFA), and embassies of some of the EU’s members states in Vietnam, 
such as Denmark, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands, as well as the EC Delegation to 
Vietnam. Importantly, this was the first international conference about the CAT that was 
co-organized and included participation by high-level state agencies from Vietnam, as 
well as international and non-state actors.  
According to the Vietnamese Research Center for Human Rights, Royal Danish 
Embassy Vietnam, & Danish Institute for Human Rights (2004), following the 
presentations, all Vietnamese participants were divided into five groups for discussion. 
Following the two-day discussion, it was recommended by all five groups that Vietnam 
sign and ratify the CAT. Noticeably, among the participants, Mr. Le Hoai Trung, then 
Deputy Director-General of the Vietnamese MOFA, emphasized that it was essential for 
Vietnam to implement the principles set out by the convention, and that all government 
agencies needed to be consulted and supported in order for this to occur. Moreover, he 
also determined that the international responsibility of Vietnam was especially 
important and that the state’s future ratification of the CAT would need further 
discussions and contributions from both domestic and international experts in the field. 
It was also emphasized by Mr. Livingstone Sewanyana, Executive Director of the 
Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (Uganda) and Deputy Secretary-General of 
Penal Reform International (United Kingdom) that the will of the Vietnamese 
Government on this matter was of importance. 
Based on data collected by the Ministry of Public Security, in 2008, there was 
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then another international conference relating to the CAT which concerned 
‘International human rights law and police activity’; this conference was a collaboration 
between the Academy of People’s Police (Ministry of Public Security) and the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights, and included participation from representatives of various 
international and non-state actors, including the Swiss ambassador, an expert from the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and a number of other international human 
rights experts.  
In May 2009, Vietnam participated in the first Universal Periodic Review cycle 
(UPR I) which ran from 2008 to 2012. This event impacted significantly on the 
behavior of the state as concerned joining international human rights treaties, especially 
the process of signing and ratifying the CAT. During this first cycle, Vietnam received a 
total of 146 recommendations from 58 states; the socialist state accepted 94 of them. 
Those that were accepted covered both general and specific issues, such as requests that 
Vietnam should continue with its legal reforms (Finland, Japan, Turkey, Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan); continue to accede to international human rights 
instruments (Belarus, Indonesia, and others); ensure consistency between key domestic 
legal provisions of the state (i.e. the ‘1999 Penal Code’, and the ‘2003 Criminal 
Procedure Code’) and its international human rights treaty commitments (Australia, the 
United Kingdom) as well as accede to the CAT in a timely manner (Australia, Sweden, 
Algeria, Chile, Nigeria)14.  
In order to implement the accepted UPR recommendations, the Ministry of Public 
Security was assigned by the Government to continue researching the state’s possibility 
of signing and ratifying the CAT. Since then, further international conferences and 
workshops on matters related to this issue have been convened by various departments 
and agencies of the Ministry of Public Security, as well as by other relevant state 
agencies in Vietnam, or by collaboration between these agencies and other international 
                                                   
14  UPR Info, Database of Recommendations: 
https://www.upr-info.org/database/index.php?limit=0&f_SUR=191&f_SMR=All&order=&orderDir
=ASC&orderP=true&f_Issue=All&searchReco=&resultMax=300&response=&action_type=&sessio
n=&SuRRgrp=&SuROrg=&SMRRgrp=&SMROrg=&pledges=RecoOnly 
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and non-state actors. These events include the conference on ‘Completing the criminal 
procedure law to ensure human rights issues – Vietnam and International Experience’ 
(2010), the workshop on ‘Ensuring Human Rights in the activities of criminal 
investigation – Vietnam and International Experience’ (2011), the conference on 
‘Prevention and control of crimes and violations against women and children’ (2011), 
and the ‘Training course to share technical experience in taking statements based on the 
assumption of innocence’ (2012). It is noteworthy that the majority of these 
international conferences and workshops were co-organized by, or included the 
participation of, various external entities such as the UNDP, the MOFA of Norway, 
embassies of some EU member states in Vietnam, as well as international experts in the 
field.  
According to the manager of the Department of Legal and Administrative-Judicial 
Procedure Reform (Ministry of Public Security), in 2012, in order to speed up the 
process, the study of the possibility that Vietnam would accede to the CAT was 
allocated to the Department of Legal and Administrative-Judicial Procedure Reform 
(personal communication, January 13, 2016). In 2014, at the 18th session of the working 
group of the second UPR cycle (UPR II) for the period 2012-2016, it was confirmed by 
Mr. Ha Kim Ngoc, Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam, that the state’s signing of the 
CAT in November 2013 was undertaken in order to implement the previous UPR 
cycle’s recommendations regarding the continuing accession to international human 
rights treaties, and that Vietnam was planning to ratify it in 2014, together with the 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (National Defence Journal 2014). 
According to Dr. Pratibha Mehta, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident 
Representative in Vietnam, at the ‘Workshop on the CAT’ held by the UNDP in Vietnam 
and the Vietnamese MOFA in 2014, the state committed to signing and ratifying the 
CAT when it nominated itself to become a member of the UNHRC (UNDP in Vietnam 
2014).  
Similarly, the recommendations of the second UPR cycle (UPR II) for the period 
2012-2016, in which Vietnam participated in 2014, were also strongly related to issues 
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of the CAT. According to Document No. 2455/BTP-PLQT (2014) of the Ministry of 
Justice, the state received many recommendations with regard to the ratification of the 
CAT. Specifically, in this second cycle, Vietnam decided to accept 182 of 227 
recommendations made by the international community. Many of these contained 
specific requests in which Vietnam was asked by the international community to ratify 
the CAT (Kazakhstan, Denmark, Belgium, Gabon, Mali, Slovakia, Togo, Poland, 
Switzerland, the US., Burkina Faso, among others), as well as to progress towards 
joining other international human rights treaties that it had not yet signed (Nicaragua, 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Niger, Romania, and others). Norway also recommended that 
Vietnam continue its legal reforms, particularly those of the ‘1999 Penal Code’ and 
‘2003 Criminal Procedures Code’, to help promote and ensure human rights 
protection15. 
According to Mr. Ha Kim Ngoc, Deputy Minister of the Vietnamese MOFA, after 
accepting 182 recommendations, a master plan for implementing these accepted 
recommendations was adopted by the Vietnamese Prime Minister with the aim of 
ensuring smooth collaboration among the state agencies involved in implementing the 
commitments (The Socialist Republic of Vietnam Online Newspaper of the Government 
2016). In relation to the CAT, after the conference on the ‘Announcement of the results 
of the 2nd Universal Periodic Review (UPR) cycle to ensure human rights in Vietnam’ 
was organized by the MOFA of Vietnam and supported by the UNDP in Vietnam in 
April 2014 where the request of ratifying the CAT was expressed, there were an 
increasing number of international conferences and workshops particularly about this 
convention in 2014 before it was ratified by the Vietnam’s National Assembly later the 
same year. These included the ‘International Workshop on the UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ in June 
2014; the conference on ‘UN Convention against Torture and Implementation of State’s 
                                                   
15  UPR Info, Database of Recommendations: 
https://www.upr-info.org/database/index.php?limit=0&f_SUR=191&f_SMR=All&order=&orderDir
=ASC&orderP=true&f_Issue=All&searchReco=&resultMax=300&response=&action_type=&sessio
n=&SuRRgrp=&SuROrg=&SMRRgrp=&SMROrg=&pledges=RecoOnly 
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Obligation – Experiences for Vietnam’ in November 2014; and the international 
workshop on the ‘UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ in early December 2014.  
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SECTION 4: VIETNAM’S DECISION TO JOIN THE CAT  
DURING THE PERIOD 2013-2014 
 
4.4.1 Obstacles Hindering the State’s Decision to Join 
At the very first event where Vietnam began to consider the CAT, participants at 
the ‘International Seminar on the CAT’ in 2004 expressed concerns about outsiders’ 
potential interference in Vietnam’s internal affairs through the medium of the content of 
some of the provisions in the Convention (Vietnamese Research Center for Human 
Rights, Royal Danish Embassy Vietnam, & Danish Institute for Human Rights 2004). 
Dr. Nguyen Van Tuan, Deputy Head of Legal Research, Legislation and Access 
Department of the Vietnam Lawyers Association, also believed that there was no high 
consensus due to different perspectives on the ratification of the convention at that time 
(personal communication, January 11, 2016). 
According to Mr. Ha Kim Ngoc, Deputy Minister of MOFA, at present, Vietnam 
is still a developing country with limited resources. With a territory that stretches over 
2000 kilometers from north to south and a diversity of ethnicity, language, and religion, 
it had been a challenge for Vietnam to protect and promote all fundamental human 
rights and freedoms for every citizen. Moreover, although the domestic legal system of 
the state has been reviewed and improved, it still shows some certain problems, such as 
“lack of uniformity,” “overlapping,” and being unable to “keep abreast with the reality,” 
among other things, while enforcement of the law is sometimes ineffective (National 
Defence Journal 2014). Together, these matters together have created difficulties for the 
state to implement the protection and promotion of fundamental rights and freedom for 
its citizens. 
In this regard, Lieutenant-General Nguyen Ngoc Anh, Director General of the 
Department of Legal and Administrative-Judicial Procedure Reform (Ministry of Public 
Security), confirmed that there had been some difficulties in researching and 
recommending to the state that it join the CAT. One of the core problems is the 
“synchronous level” of the state’s current domestic legal system in which the crime of 
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torture and the relevant investigation and prosecuting procedures for this crime, have 
not yet been regulated in separate and detailed legal provisions of the current domestic 
law of Vietnam; such regulations are considered important issues by the CAT. Second, 
the current limited economic, social and cultural conditions of Vietnam were also said to 
be another substantial obstacle that hindered the process of signing and ratifying this 
convention. For example, as regards human resources, Vietnam does not yet have a 
team of experts in international law who would be able to directly conduct the relevant 
tasks of international cooperation, especially in the field of criminal judicial assistance 
or the implementation of the CAT (People’s Army Newspaper 2014). 
 
4.4.2 Implications and Objectives of the Ratification Behavior  
In general, it is found that the Vietnam’s decision to sign and ratify the CAT 
during in the 2013-2014 period had a number of political, security, diplomatic, legal, as 
well as socio-economic implications. These are outlined and discussed below.  
 
The political and security aspects: 
First, with regard to political and security aspects, Vietnam’s decision to sign and 
ratify the CAT was undertaken in order to meet the domestic and international political 
and security demands of the state. In relation to external politics, an based on Report No. 
4527/BC-UBDN13 of the National Assembly’s Committee for Foreign Relations on the 
verification of the ratification of the CAT, it was suggested that Vietnam’s joining of the 
CAT in 2013 would help the state to effectively fight slanderous and distorted comments 
by the political opposition about the state’s torture of detainees or persons held in 
custody which aim to undermine the state (Committee for Foreign Relations – 
Vietnam’s National Assembly 2014). Such state behavior was also believed to provide 
the state with better legal ground to deal with those criticisms and negative comments 
about Vietnam’s human rights conditions, especially from the U.S., the EU and their 
Western allies, as well as those international human rights organizations that protested 
against Vietnam’s self-nomination to the UNHRC for the period 2014-2016. 
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At the meeting to announce the establishment of the working group on the 
implementation of the CAT in Vietnam in 2015, Colonel-General To Lam, Vice-Minister 
of the Public Security Ministry (who is now the Minister) asserted that the state’s 
ratification of the CAT was a highly important legal event and that the decision 
demonstrated the humanitarian and human rights policies of the CPV and the state of 
Vietnam (Public Security News 2015). It can be seen that this behavior of the state 
resulted from its implementation of the CPV’s directive on the state’s international 
cooperation in the human rights field, which had been changed from the request to be 
“ready to show goodwill to cooperate in international relations on the field of human 
rights while fighting against plans of exploiting human rights issues to undermine the 
regime”16, to the request to be “ready for having dialogues with other states, relevant 
regional and international human rights organizations, as well as actively fight against 
all plans and activities that interfere in the state’s internal affairs, and violate the 
national sovereignty, security and political stability of Vietnam”17.  
According to the Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for Human 
Rights, in order to protect the national security in the field of human rights, the CPV and 
the state emphasized that the abovementioned tasks needed to be enhanced in order to 
make the U.S. and other Western states to acknowledge Vietnam’s achievements in the 
field of human rights, and to reduce their criticisms of the state’s human rights and 
democracy issues (Permanent Office of the Government Steering Board for Human 
Rights 2014). In this regard, the state’s decision to join the CAT was expected to assist 
the state to achieve such a result. Indeed, it is found that, when reporting to the National 
Assembly about some issues relating to the ratification of the CAT in 2014, General 
Tran Dai Quang, Minister of the Ministry of Public Security (who is now the State 
President), confirmed that the ratification of the CAT would help to limit slanderous and 
distorted comments as well as activities relating to the exploitation of human rights 
                                                   
16 Directive No. 12-CT/TW (1992) of the party’s Central Committee Secretariat on ‘Human rights 
and perspectives, policies of the Party’ 
17 Political Report of the CPV’s 10th Central Committee to the 11th national congress of the CPV 
(2011) 
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issues by the political opposition, which aimed at undermining the socialist regime 
(Public Security News 2014). 
On the other hand, in regard to domestic politics, the state’s decision to sign and 
ratify the CAT also aided the illustration of the state’s serious implementation of its 
latest amended Constitution (also known as the ‘2013 Constitution’); this Constitution 
emphasizes the importance and necessity of ensuring and protecting human rights in 
Vietnam. Dr. Le Minh Thong, Deputy Head of the National Assembly’s Legal 
Committee, asserted that the reallocation of thirty-six provisions on citizen rights in the 
‘2013 Constitution’ (i.e. from Chapter V to Chapter II) has shown a sizeable change in 
the state’s understanding of the task of assuring human rights domestically (Lao Dong 
News 2014). According to the report on certain issues relating to the ratification of the 
CAT that was presented by Minister Tran Dai Quang of the Public Security Ministry to 
the National Assembly in 2014, the implementation of the ‘2013 Constitution’ on the 
field of human rights by means of such a decision would allow the state to consolidate 
citizens’ belief in the leadership of the CPV (Public Security News 2014).  
When asked whether Vietnam’s acceptance of many human rights 
recommendations from the UPR mechanism, including the request to ratify the CAT, 
was a consequence of rising tension in the South China Sea, for which Vietnam would 
need to seek support from the international community, Ambassador Nguyen Trung 
Thanh, Head of the Vietnam’s Permanent Mission to the UN, the WTO and other 
international organizations in Geneva, indicated that Vietnam’s active, constructive and 
responsible participation in international relations, together with its efforts to promote 
dialogue, cooperation, and respect for international law, would assist the state to 
enhance its image and reputation in the international community; and that such 
attainment would then allow Vietnam to acquire more advantages during the state’s 
pursuit of a resolution to the South China Sea tension in both the short and the long term, 
through all the appropriate means set by international law to protect and maintain its 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity (People’s Army Newspaper 2014). Mr. 
Pham Binh Minh, Minister of the MOFA, also indicated that being a responsible 
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member of the international community could assist the state to seek positive support 
for its viewpoints in those matters relating to the South China Sea conflicts (Pham 
2015). 
 
The diplomatic aspect    
Second, with regard to the diplomatic aspect, according to various National 
Assembly deputies as well as state and government agencies and their officials, Vietnam 
decided to sign and ratify the CAT in order to show its commitment to the international 
community in the matter of ensuring human rights in the domestic field. For example, 
Director General of the Department of International Organizations (MOFA), Mr. Vu 
Anh Quang, claimed that the Vietnam’s rapid ratification of the CAT proved its strong 
commitment to the task of fighting against all acts of torture and cruel treatment in order 
to better ensure human rights in Vietnam (Lao Dong News 2014). According to Report 
No. 4527/BC-UBDN13 of the National Assembly’s Committee for Foreign Relations on 
the verification of the ratification of the CAT, this behavior of Vietnam would allow the 
state to demonstrate its determination and commitment to acknowledging and ensuring 
the implementation of the UN’s regulations and standards on human rights protection 
(Committee for Foreign Relations – Vietnam’s National Assembly 2014). Similarly, Dr. 
Nguyen Van Tuan, Deputy Head of Legal Research, Legislation and Access Department 
of the Vietnam Lawyers Association, emphasized that the Vietnam’s decision to join the 
CAT helped to prove to outsiders that human rights are respected by the state (personal 
communication, January 11, 2016).  
Furthermore, it was also believed by the state that by becoming a full member of 
the CAT and proving its political determination to ensuring domestic human rights, 
Vietnam would acquire better conditions to enlist more support from the international 
community. This matter has been considered important for building the necessary basis 
Vietnam would need when enhancing its dialogues in the human rights field with other 
states and international organizations, as well as for allowing the state to participate 
more effectively in the international mechanisms for human rights protection of the UN. 
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Indeed, according to a representative of the Department of International Law (MOFA) 
(personal communication, January 20, 2016), and a manager at the Department of Legal 
and Administrative-Judicial Procedure Reform (Ministry of Public Security) (personal 
communication, January 13, 2016), it was further suggested that Vietnam’s decision to 
join contributed significantly to the state’s successful election to the UNHRC, known as 
the most important organ of the UN system for human rights, for the 2014-2016 tenure. 
According to Mr. Ha Kim Ngoc, Deputy Minister of the MOFA, this event was 
considered as being of historical significance for Vietnam as it marked an important 
achievement of the state in its implementation of the CPV’s foreign policies, in 
accordance with the Resolution of the 11th party national congress (2011), and 
resolution No. 22-NQ/TW (2013) of the Politburo Committee on international 
integration. He further explained that this opportunity allowed Vietnam not only to 
integrate its national interests and priorities into activities at the UNHRC, but also to aid 
the state in attracting more supporting resource from other states for the task of ensuring 
human rights in Vietnam (Ha 2015). More importantly, such participation at the 
UNHRC also helped to improve the political position and reputation of the state from 
regional to international human rights forums (i.e. from the level of ASEAN forums to 
the Third Committee of the UN National Assembly) (Online Newspaper of the 
Government 2016). It was then suggested that all of these matters would create stronger 
grounds as well as more opportunities for the state to better protect its national interests.    
For instance, it is found that such achievements in fact would allow the state to 
enhance its dialogue at international-level forums where these dialogues are considered 
necessary for the state to defend its communist party’s perspectives on human rights and 
their values. And this task has been claimed to be crucial for Vietnam to increase 
understanding with other states to overcome or decrease their differences, to enlist 
support from other international and non-state actors, criticize distorted and slanderous 
comments about the state’s domestic human rights situation, as well as to fight against 
the exploitation of human rights and democracy issues in order to interfere in Vietnam’s 
internal affairs (Ha 2015).  
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In fact, this strategy has been based on the CPV’s belief that the issues of human 
rights are usually exploited by the U.S. and other Western states to assist in legalizing 
their military interventions in those sovereign states that they believe to have violated 
human rights in their domestic field. The party has also indicated that dialogues are also 
the solution for tackling the imposition of Western values and standards on human rights. 
Indeed, from the lessons learned from those states that have their own perspectives and 
criteria on human rights protection and do not accept imposition from Western powers, 
it has been found that they all have a desire to join international human rights forums 
where their voices will be heard during dialogues in which the differences in 
understanding would hopefully be resolved (Le 2015). General Tran Dai Quang, who 
was at the time the Minister of the Public Security Ministry, asserted that, as the state’s 
political position and reputation had been enhanced after various successes in the 
positions of non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2008-2009), Secretary 
General of the ASEAN (2013-2018), member of the UNHRC (2014-2016), among 
others, many states recognized the role and influence of Vietnam in the Southeast Asia 
region, as well as at some other international forums, and decided to increase their 
cooperation with Vietnam in all areas (Public Security News 2014).  
 
The legal aspect 
Third, with regard to the legal aspect, Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT also 
allowed the state to double check and perfect its legal and judicial reforms. For instance, 
when signing the CAT on behalf of the Vietnamese Government in New York in 2013, 
Ambassador Le Hoai Trung, the Permanent representative of Vietnam to the UN, 
asserted that this decision of the state would help to provide more conditions for the 
relevant state and government agencies of Vietnam to perfect the state’s current 
domestic legal system with the aim of better ensuring human rights in Vietnam 
(Communist Party of Vietnam Online Newspaper 2013). Similarly, according to the 
report No. 4527/BC-UBDN13 of National Assembly’s Committee for Foreign Relations 
on the verification of the ratification of the CAT, the joining of the CAT would give 
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Vietnam the opportunity to review, alter and supplement relevant domestic legal 
regulations in order to meet the common standards of international law on human rights 
(Committee for Foreign Relations – Vietnam’s National Assembly 2014). 
In fact, these tasks are found to be necessary for the implementation of resolution 
No. 48-NQ/TW of the Politburo Committee in 2005 on the ‘Strategy for the 
development and improvement of the Vietnam’s legal system to 2010 and direction for 
the period up to 2020’, as well as the resolution No. 49-NQ/TW of the Politburo 
Committee in the same year on the ‘Strategy on Judicial Reform through 2020’ where 
these collective decisions instructed the state to not only perform active international 
integration and fulfill its international commitments in civil, political, economic, and 
socio-cultural fields, but also continue signing and ratifying related ones. More 
importantly, it is also required by the CPV that the implementation of legal and judicial 
reforms of the state must be based on the actual demand of socio-economic 
development; and these reforms must contribute to such development as well as protect 
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.  
 
The socio-economic aspect 
Finally, with regard to the socio-economic aspect of the state’s decision to ratify 
the CAT, according to Minister of Public Security Tran Dai Quang, due to the fact that, 
when Vietnam decided to sign and ratify this convention, there had already been 
numerous state parties to the CAT (159 parties as at October 2016), many of them 
partners of Vietnam, the joining of the convention was believed to create positive 
impacts on the bilateral and multilateral trading relations between Vietnam and these 
partners (Public Security News 2014). According to Ambassador Le Hoai Trung, the 
Permanent representative of Vietnam to the UN who signed the CAT on behalf of the 
Vietnamese Government in New York in 2013, and Mr. Vu Anh Quang, Director 
General of the Department of International Organizations (MOFA), the joining the CAT 
represented a specific step in the Vietnam’s process of proactive and positive 
international integration (Communist Party of Vietnam Online Newspaper 2013; Lao 
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Dong News 2014).      
Indeed, this view is shared by various officials of government and state agencies. 
For example, Mr. Nguyen Thanh Tu, Acting Director-General of the Department of 
Civil-Economic Law (Ministry of Justice), indicated that the joining the CAT was a 
means to implement both internal and external policies of the state that relate to 
promoting comprehensive international integration (i.e. political and cultural fields are 
also included in the international integration process of the state) (personal 
communication, January 14, 2016). This is in fact considered as the state’s 
implementation of the CPV’s policies which require the state to actively and positively 
integrate into the international economy, and to expand its international integration in 
other areas18; in addition, it has also been instructed that international economic 
integration must be central, while international integration in other fields must support 
the economic integration19.  
Similarly, Mr. Nguyen Ngoc Bao, permanent member of the National Assembly’s 
Committee for Economics, asserted that Vietnam’s decision to join the CAT in 
2013-2014 served the situation of the country at a time when Vietnam was increasingly 
entering more regional and international economic arenas. He further explained that, 
following the current global integration trend for development, a country that wants to 
develop must integrate into international treaties deeply and broadly. It was also 
asserted that the need for ratifying international human rights treaties appeared after 
Vietnam commenced joining more regional and international economic agreements, 
which required that the state sign and ratify such treaties. Before joining these common 
economic arenas, the state had not noticed such treaties (personal communication, 
January 13, 2016). 
Finally, Dr. Nguyen Van Tuan, Deputy Head of Legal Research, Legislation and 
Access Department of the Vietnam Lawyers Association, also believed that Vietnam 
could not avoid signing the CAT at a time when it was entering many regional and 
                                                   
18 Resolution of the 10th national congress of the CPV (2006) 
19 Resolution No. 22-NQ/TW (2013) of the Politburo Committee on ‘International Integration’ 
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international economic arenas. It was also because there are only a few states in the 
international community that have not joined the CAT; and Vietnam needed to meet the 
required factors and conditions in order to join the common economic arenas (personal 
communication, January 11, 2016). Likewise, Dr. Hoang Thi Tue Phuong of the 
University of Law – Ho Chi Minh City also believed that Vietnam’s decision to sign 
and ratify the CAT was either directly or indirectly related to the state’s opportunities to 
participate in high-level UN committees, as well as to the signing of the TPP in 2015, 
because it has been observed that, whenever the U.S. allows Vietnam to participate in 
so-called “special deals,” there are requirements especially in the field of human rights 
(personal communication, January 7, 2016).  
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SECTION 5: CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, the collective decisions of the communist party, in the form of 
resolutions, directives, and the like, are the determining factor shaping the behavior of 
all state and government agencies, due to the fact that the party is the main actor as well 
as the sole decision-maker for all major issues in the country. There is no actual 
involvement of, or influence by, domestic civil society groups in the decision-making 
process of the CPV and the state, as civil society and individual space are not usually 
recognized in a socialist state like Vietnam, while the party’s decision-making process is 
kept out of the reach of the public.  
Moreover, within the party itself, there may be supporters and “spoilers” in a 
CPV’s discussion, but due to the socialism’s principle of democratic centralism, all 
members must subsequently absolutely follow and support the collective decision of the 
party after it is adopted following a vote; this also means that the lower party 
organizations must obey the decisions made by the higher ones. The highest party 
organizations include the periodic national congress of the CPV that is held once every 
five years, the Politburo Committee, the party’s Central Committee and its Secretariat. 
In the end, such an approach to the decision-making process makes the need to 
implement relevant party perspectives, policies and decisions become the determining 
internal driving forces behind Vietnam’s behavior, due to the fact that members of the 
CPV are assigned to participate in almost all positions of state agencies, central and 
local governments as well as in the National Assembly throughout the country. As a 
result, the joining of the CAT was, in fact, a joint program initiated and assigned by the 
Vietnamese Government: the Ministry of Public Security was instructed to be primarily 
in charge for the task, with the collaboration from the MOFA and Ministry of Justice. 
Focusing on the CPV’s understanding of contemporary human rights’ values and 
interests, it is found that, on the one hand, the CPV acknowledges the necessity and 
significance of ensuring and protecting human rights in the contemporary global context 
and the crucial role of the UN in promoting the task, as well as in decreasing the 
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differences perceived in some important human rights issues among nations. However, 
on the other hand, the party also claims that, together with some international human 
rights NGOs, Western states tend to politicize the issues of human rights and force 
others to accept and implement Western criteria and frameworks of human rights 
protection when they may be inappropriate, especially for socialist domestic settings. 
Alongside the affirmation that the field of human rights now creates important 
political and moral issues for all political regime types, the CPV argues that human 
rights cannot be seen as privately owned, or as the discoverable values of Western states 
only; they should rather be considered as common values of all nations. It is further 
perceived by the communist party that the state’s understanding of some issues of 
human rights is actually shaped by the characteristics of the nation’s ruling social class, 
where there are obviously major differences between capitalists and communists; for 
example, in the view of socialism particularly, human rights must be attached to human 
(citizen) duties which include the responsibility not to act against the state, the need to 
respect others’ rights and freedoms, and the collective interests of the society. 
Likewise, another typically different perspective of the CPV towards the field of 
human rights compared to the Western states is that the party does not consider human 
rights as natural rights; instead, they are seen as rights that need to be recognized and 
regulated by law. The CPV also determines that, in order for human rights to be 
guaranteed, domestic political and social stability must be maintained, while state 
sovereignty needs to be fully respected. More importantly in this regard, the matter of 
ensuring domestic human rights conditions is in fact considered by the communist party 
to be an internal affair of the state, which belongs primarily to the state’s jurisdiction 
and should not be interfered by outsiders.   
Following the these perspectives, it is found that several important policies in the 
field of human rights have been issued by the CPV, including requests to enhance the 
protection of state sovereignty, to maintain domestic political and social stability, to 
strengthen the economic, social and cultural development of the country, and to build 
the socialist rule-of-law state with enhanced human rights protection mechanisms and 
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institutions. These general policies are believed to aid in improving the current domestic 
human rights conditions of Vietnam. On the other hand, the CPV also requests the 
provision of more education and enhanced sharing of information regarding ensuring 
and protecting human rights in accordance with socialist perspectives, as well as 
expanding international cooperation in this field. Such matters are asserted to be 
necessary and important because they would not only give the communist party more 
opportunities, especially at the international levels, to demonstrate the socialist 
approach to human rights protection and to seek international support, resources and 
experiences to improve its current domestic implementation of human rights protection; 
but also help to create better grounds for the state to fight against the imposition of 
Western models of human rights protection in Vietnam. 
The state’s understandings of the need to accede to international human rights 
treaties, and implement and comply with international standards of ensuring and 
protecting human rights was brought to the fore by the issues arising from the 
Renovation Period of the country. During this time, Vietnam had to find ways to 
implement multilateral diplomacy policies in order to survive the extremely severe 
conditions in the country. By implementing such policies, the state then realized the 
necessity and importance of international economic integration due to the various major 
tangible and intangible benefits brought about by the enhancement of relationships with 
its international partners, especially those that are considered strategically important for 
the development and security of the state (i.e. the U.S., the EU, the UN, etc.). Indeed, 
those benefits were considered essential because they not only assisted in improving the 
domestic social and economic conditions of the country, but also contributed to 
maintaining and protecting its national sovereignty and integrity, and the socialist 
regime, as well as improving its reputation and political position in the international 
community. 
As the state’s process of international integration expanded into other fields, with 
the primary aim of supporting the international economic integration, Vietnam was 
confronted by various challenges, including threats to its national independence and 
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sovereignty, chosen political orientation (i.e. the socialist regime), as well as the role of 
the state in the domestic field. More importantly, alongside significant interference in 
the internal affairs of Vietnam that relate to the field of human rights, there were also 
impositions where the state was pressured to accept Western values and frameworks of 
human rights protection. These problems caused Vietnam to believe that the field of 
human rights had become the trump card for the “peaceful revolution” strategies of the 
external political opposition that aims to undermine the socialist regime.  
In order to manage this issue, the CPV and the state realized that it is necessary 
and important to actively and positively join regional and international human rights 
treaties and forums, to continue to perfect the state’s current domestic legal system, 
increase international cooperation in the field of human rights, and enhance dialogues 
with other states, including the political opposition, as well as to develop the current 
social and economic conditions of the country. In the view of the communist party, the 
aim of dialogue was to resist unreasonable claims, demands, and criticisms of Vietnam’s 
domestic human rights conditions, as well as the viewpoint of the “double standard”, 
and the trend of politicalizing human rights by outsiders; while the overall goal of this 
strategy was to promote the need to respect international law and equality in 
international relations, and to oppose any unilateral approach that threatens and imposes 
their views on others in order to make them accept a particular understanding of human 
rights values and protection frameworks. These issues were believed to be necessary for 
the state to seek consensus and more international support so that it would be able to 
effectively fight against the external political opposition’s exploitation of the human 
rights issue in order to interfere in Vietnam’s internal affairs, and violate the state’s 
sovereignty as well as that of the socialist regime.  
All of the above were asserted to be essential for the Vietnam’s maintenance of 
domestic political and social stability, and the peaceful environment required to attract 
more external resources to develop the country’s economy, and to improve the state’s 
political position in the international community. Moreover, the state behavior of 
acceding to international human rights treaties was in fact essential particularly for the 
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2014-2015 period, for of two specific reasons. The first was the belief that being a 
responsible international state, especially in a controversial field like human rights, 
would help the state to attract more international support for its view on solutions for 
the conflicts in the South China Sea (i.e. to call for the respect of international law by 
the parties involved); and second, that such behavior would also allow the state to 
achieve important socio-economic benefits arising from coming FTAs with its important 
partners. 
On the other hand, as regards determining the roles and impacts of external 
dynamics on the behavior of Vietnam, it is found that major international and non-state 
actors (i.e. the U.S.; the EU; some other Western states, such as Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand; the UN; and some large international human rights NGOs) played an important 
role that strongly affected the behavior of the state in the field of human rights, 
especially the decision to accede to international human rights treaties, and the CAT 
particularly. For example, the US not only interfered in Vietnam’s internal affairs by 
means of various traditional activities focused on the field of human rights of Vietnam, 
including support for the domestic political opposition, the adoption of resolutions on 
Vietnam’s human rights conditions, pressuring Vietnam to change some important 
provisions of its current ‘Penal Code’, and the like; but also threatened to cancel 
bilateral dialogues between the two countries or to stop providing non-humanitarian 
assistance to Vietnam (i.e. the allocation of a part of the U.S.’s budget to assist Vietnam 
in some areas), stop lifting of its arms embargo, and stop developing deeper relation 
with Vietnam, when the state did not respond to the U.S.’s requests and show 
improvement in respecting domestic civil and political rights.   
Similarly, the impact of the EU, its members and some other Western states on 
Vietnam’s behavior in the field of human rights was also significant, due to the fact that 
the issue of human rights in Vietnam had been treated as a prerequisite for the decisions 
of EU and its member states to enhance their investments into Vietnam’s economic, 
social and cultural areas. On a different note, it is observed that these international and 
non-state actors also attempted to influence the legal reform process in Vietnam. This 
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was perceived by the state to be a matter of these international players not only wanting 
to alter the state’s current domestic legal environment, but also wanting to change the 
political regime of Vietnam. Finally, the field of human rights of Vietnam also witnessed 
significant negative impacts that were caused by some international human rights NGOs, 
especially in the incident where they protested against the state’s self-nomination to 
become a member of the UNHRC for the 2014-2016 tenure. This opportunity was 
exceedingly important not only for the Vietnam’s process of development and 
international integration, but also for the maintenance of the state’s sovereignty and its 
socialist regime. 
External and non-state actors indeed contributed significantly both to Vietnam’s 
process of considering joining of the CAT as well as the state’s decision in this matter. 
In this regard, outsiders such as the EC Delegation to Vietnam, some embassies of EU 
member states in Vietnam (i.e. Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom, and others), the U.S., 
as well as the UNDP, played an important role in co-organizing or participating in 
conferences and workshops on the CAT and its related issues with Vietnam, while the 
events of UPR I and II also created determining effects for the socialist state’s decision 
to sign and ratify the CAT between 2013 and 2015. In fact, Vietnam’s signing of the 
CAT in 2013 was said to implement the first UPR recommendations on the state’s 
continuing accession to international human rights treaties, while it is also found that 
Vietnam made its commitment to sign and ratify the CAT when it nominated itself to 
become a member of the UNHRC for the period of 2014-2016.  
It has been clear that Vietnam faced various difficulties when deciding to sign and 
ratify the CAT. The initial obstacles identified by the state when it first researched the 
possibility of acceding to the CAT in 2004 were potential outside interference in its 
internal affairs by means of the content of some of the provisions of the convention. At 
the time when the state decided to sign and ratify it, Vietnam still recognized certain 
important hardships relating to acceding to the convention. These include not only the 
current limited domestic economic, social and cultural conditions of the state that have 
been believed to affect the implementation of the CAT in Vietnam, but also the state’s 
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current asynchronous domestic legal system where the crime of torture and its related 
investigation and prosecuting procedures have not yet been regulated in separate and 
detailed legal provisions. Such regulations are considered major issues in the CAT.  
Finally, Vietnam’s decision to sign and ratify the CAT fulfills both external and 
internal political-security, diplomatic, legal and economic objectives of the state, with 
the external factors seeming to be more essential. This ratification behavior was 
expected to aid the state to effectively fight against slanderous and distorted comments 
from outsiders, especially the external political opposition (i.e. those Western actors and 
non-state actors such as the U.S., the EU and its member states, international human 
rights NGOs, etc.), about the state’s torture of detainees or persons held in custody. In a 
broader perspective, it was also indicated that this ratification behavior can help 
Vietnam to create a better legal ground so that the state can tackle external negative 
criticism about its domestic human rights conditions. This was said to be necessary and 
important for implementing the CPV’s directive on the need to fight against all plans 
and activities that interfere in the state’s internal affairs, violate its national sovereignty, 
and its domestic security and stability, by making the U.S. and its Western allies 
acknowledge Vietnam’s achievement in the field of human rights and reduce their 
interference in the state’s domestic issues of human rights and democracy.  
Furthermore, such ratification behavior was determined to strongly contribute to 
Vietnam’s successful election to the UNHRC, which is known as the most important 
organ of the UN system in the field of human rights, allowing the socialist state to 
improve its political position and reputation from regional- through to 
international-level forums; this has been considered crucial for Vietnam to enhance 
dialogues to defend its communist perspectives on human rights values and protection, 
as well as to narrow down those differences with other entities. In addition, the 
improvement of the state’s image and reputation in the international community via 
efforts to promote the necessity of enhancing dialogue, cooperation and the respect of 
international law in resolving disagreements was also believed to indirectly help 
Vietnam to acquire more advantages from the support of the international community 
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for its pursuit of a resolution to the South China Sea conflicts in both the short and the 
long term. 
As there are so many state parties to the CAT, many of which have been partners 
of Vietnam, the state’s ratification of this convention would create positive impacts for 
both bilateral and multilateral trading relations between Vietnam and these international 
partners. It was said that many states have recognized the role and influence of Vietnam 
in the Southeast Asia region and have decided to increase their cooperation with the 
state due to the fact that it has achieved many successes in various regional and 
international positions that helped it to enhance its political position, image and 
reputation in the international arena. Vietnam’s signing and ratification of the CAT were 
believed to serve the situation of the country at a time when the state increasingly 
entered into more important regional and international economic arenas (i.e. the 
EU-Vietnam FTA, TPP, RCEP, etc.). It has been clear that there were requirements that 
the state must fulfill before being able to join these significant economic agreements – 
the field of human rights was definitely one of the concerns of the parties – and the state 
could not avoid signing and ratifying the CAT in this context.    
Finally, as regards domestic objectives, Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT was said 
to reflect the state’s serious implementation of its latest amended Constitution, the 
‘2013 Constitution’, in which is emphasized the importance and necessity of ensuring 
and protecting human rights in Vietnam; this, it was hoped, would consolidate citizens’ 
belief in the leadership of the CPV and the state. On the other hand, this decision of the 
state would also help to provide better conditions for the relevant state and government 
agencies in Vietnam to continue to improve and perfect the state’s current domestic 
legal system, with an aim of better ensuring and respecting human rights in the domestic 
field. Indeed, it was believed that contents of the CAT would give Vietnam the 
opportunity to review, alter, and supplement its related domestic regulations in order to 
meet the common standards of international human rights law.   
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CHAPTER V: ACADEMIC ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter contains five sections. The first four sections help to fulfill the 
study’s first objective. To this end, the first section answers sub-question 1.1 about the 
alignment of domestic and international human rights values and interests that shape 
state behavior toward the ratification of human rights treaties, which will contribute 
knowledge to the study of normative approach on state behavior. Section two then 
focuses on answering sub-question 1.2, which concerns the role of costs and benefits in 
the socialist state’s consideration of the ratification of human rights treaties; this will 
focus to fill the knowledge gaps relating specifically to the rationalist approach and 
reward-based model that have been outlined in the Literature Review chapter.  
The third section of the chapter helps to answer sub-question 1.3, which addresses 
the role and impacts of sovereignty in the socialist state’s decision to accede to a core 
international human rights treaty such as the CAT, with an aim to fulfill the identified 
knowledge gaps that relate to the sovereignty approach particularly. Section four then 
determines which core factors shaped the socialist state’s joining behavior during the 
2013–2014 period, which helps to answer the study’s first research question. The 
contents of these first four sections in overall contribute to answering the first puzzle 
identified in this thesis (part 2.2.7). In addition, they also help to fill the current 
knowledge gaps and add to relevant scholarly debates of the theoretical frameworks that 
explain state behavior in this matter (as outlined in the Literature Review chapter). 
To fulfill the study’s second objective, the final section of this chapter 
subsequently analyzes, compares, and clarifies the actual roles of internal and external 
dynamics in shaping Vietnam’s behavior in the matter of concern. It also discusses the 
role and impacts of relevant external pressures and threats that relate to the socialist 
state’s ratification behavior, with the goal of answering sub-question 2.1 of the study.  
The contents of the chapter’s final section thus provide answers to the second 
research question of the paper. In doing so, they help to solve the second puzzle 
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determined by the study and contribute to filling the previously mentioned knowledge 
gaps especially about the influence of internal and external dynamics on socialist state 
behavior in this matter. This section also adds to the current scholarly debates related to 
both the importance of international and domestic politics in shaping an autocratic 
state’s behavior toward the ratification of international human rights treaties and the 
actual impacts of pressures and threats on autocratic state behavior in this matter.     
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SECTION 1: SOCIALIST COGNITION OF HR VALUES AND 
INTERESTS & HR TREATY RATIFICATION BEHAVIOR 
 
Based on the previous findings related to Vietnam’s behavior toward ratifying the 
CAT, this section presents some arguments that can contribute to contemporary 
scholarly debates in regard to using the normative approach to understand state behavior 
toward the ratification of international human rights treaties. First, as outlined in part 
2.1.6 of this thesis’s literature review chapter, it is known that one of the disagreements 
about factors that can predict state behavior in this regard concerns the role of 
normative pressure. To this end it has been pointed out by Wotipka & Tsutsui (2001) 
that normative pressure is an important factor that can shape state behavior toward the 
ratification of such treaties and that changing a state’s cognition of human rights values 
and interests also can help to overcome the issue of sovereignty fears (as claimed by the 
sovereignty approach). Nonetheless, arguments have also indicated that the alignment of 
domestic and international human rights values and interests is not sufficient for 
explaining or predicting a state’s ratification behavior toward this kind of treaty.  
Such disagreements make it unclear how a state’s cognition of human rights 
values and interests would actually affect its ratification behavior toward human rights 
treaties. In the case of Vietnam’s ratification behavior toward the CAT, it is observed 
that socialist states may have general cognition related to ensuring and protecting 
human rights (including in the fields of civil and political rights and extending to the 
notion of preventing torture); nonetheless, there is insufficient evidence to confirm that 
the alignment of domestic and international human rights values and interests and a 
state’s ratification behavior toward an international human rights treaty (such as the 
CAT) are directly correlated.  
In fact, the findings of the previous chapter indicate that Vietnam has only 
changed its viewpoint in regard to the role of human rights in the current global context; 
there has not been any actual change in the socialist state’s cognition of human rights 
values and interests. For example, in regard to the contemporary role of human rights, 
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Vietnam has realized that ensuring and protecting human rights are important topics in 
all international relations – where they are treated as a standard consideration, especially 
in the context of cooperation and development issues. It also points out that the human 
rights protection topic is politicized by Western powers and that capitalists (i.e. Western 
states) characterize human rights protection mechanisms differently than socialist states.  
Human rights issues have therefore no longer been legal matters, as they were 
previously perceived. It is said that the human rights field today instead gives rise to 
various moral and political issues that all regimes, including socialist regimes, must face. 
Moreover, because the human rights field has been increasingly mentioned in bi- and 
multilateral political and economic relationships in which Vietnam is currently 
participating, the communist party and the state recognize that this area requires both 
cooperative and combative efforts (i.e. to simultaneously develop the country and to 
protect and maintain the state’s socialist path). 
Other than that, in a socialist state such as Vietnam, human rights have always 
been perceived as rights that are closely connected with the state’s leading social class 
(i.e. the values and interests of the bourgeois classes in capitalist states are obviously 
different from those of the worker classes in socialist states). Furthermore, each nation 
should be able to protect and ensure its domestic human rights conditions in the way it 
feels is most appropriate and effective. In other words, no state or group of states should 
impose human rights values and protection frameworks on another. Moreover, as a 
socialist state, Vietnam has always believed that human rights are not natural rights but 
created and regulated by the law of the state and must be attached to human (citizen) 
duties. On the other hand, Vietnam has also claimed that respecting state sovereignty is 
a prerequisite for achieving the best practice of ensuring and protecting human rights 
(i.e. human rights are not above national sovereignty), while the socialist regime is the 
most appropriate regime for guaranteeing human rights.  
In addition, all of the aforementioned cognitions of Vietnam in relation to the 
human rights field are seen to fully reflect socialism’s traditional view on the role of 
international human rights law. In particular, socialism rejects a direct link between 
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international human rights law and a state’s citizens; it instead claims that individual 
rights should only be protected via the legal relationships between a state and its 
citizens, with international human rights instruments existing solely to help regulate 
relations among member states on relevant matters. It can therefore be seen that there 
has not been any sign of an actual change in Vietnam’s cognition of human rights values 
and interests that would align its views with those of the international community, 
especially Western states. Nevertheless, the state still decided to accede to the CAT.    
On the other hand, it has also been determined that Vietnam’s need to join 
international human rights treaties as well as to implement and comply with 
international standards of ensuring and protecting human rights did not initially arise 
from the state’s cognition of ensuring and protecting human rights in the domestic field. 
It instead resulted from the renovation of the country, which included undertaking 
activities to both fulfill the requirements of the international integration process for 
national development and help to protect and maintain the state’s sovereignty. It is 
therefore difficult to confirm that Vietnam’s decision to sign and ratify the CAT 
genuinely emerged from just the state’s cognition of ensuring and promoting domestic 
human rights protection, as claimed by Dr. Hoang Thi Tue Phuong at the University of 
Law – Ho Chi Minh City (personal communication, January 7, 2016). 
In relation to sub-research question 1.1 (which concerns normative pressures and 
the alignment of domestic and international human rights values and interests that shape 
a state’s decision behavior toward the ratification of international human rights treaties), 
based on all of the evidence provided by the case of Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT 
this thesis argues that the alignment of domestic and international values and interests 
on human rights does not play an actual role in predicting socialist state behavior 
toward the ratification of international human rights treaties. Moreover, in terms of 
answering a portion of the first puzzle outlined in part 2.2.7 and contributing to the 
knowledge gaps mentioned in the Literature Review chapter, this thesis affirms that a 
socialist state’s ratification behavior toward an international human rights treaty is not 
caused by changes in such a state’s cognition of human rights values and interests. 
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SECTION 2: THE ROLE OF COSTS & BENEFITS 
IN THE SOCIALIST STATE’S RATIFICATION DECISION 
 
In this section, it is important that the findings of the previous chapter can 
contribute to answering part of the first puzzle outlined in part 2.2.7 as well as to filling 
the knowledge gaps mentioned in the literature review chapter (especially in relation to 
whether a state’s ratification behavior toward international human rights treaties can be 
caused by such a state’s calculation of ratification’s costs and benefits). In other words, 
to answer sub-research question 1.2 (which concerns the role of costs and benefits in 
shaping the socialist state’s decisions to ratify international human rights treaties such 
as the CAT), based on the case of Vietnam’s decision to sign and ratify the CAT during 
the 2013–2014 period, it is necessary to determine whether material interests were the 
main reason that this socialist state decided to accede to an international human rights 
treaty. 
According to the findings of the previous chapter, a calculation of ratification’s 
costs and benefits did not only strongly influence Vietnam’s decision to accede to the 
CAT; it also played a crucial role in shaping the state’s timing choices for such signing 
and ratifying activities. First, it is clear that Vietnam expected to achieve various 
important tangible and intangible benefits by ratifying this convention. Indeed, the state 
determined that these benefits were essential, as they were closely associated with many 
important national interests related to political, security, diplomatic, legal, and 
socio-economic objectives that the socialist state was pursuing during that particular 
period of time (as outlined in part 4.4.2 of the previous chapter).  
For example, the first benefit brought by the state’s decision to join the CAT was 
the chance to participate in high-level international human rights forums, which 
included Vietnam’s successful election as a UNHRC member for 2014–2016. In this 
regard, the state in fact expected that such events would create a better legal ground to 
prove that Vietnam respects both human rights and international standards related to 
ensuring and protecting human rights domestically. The state also hoped that these 
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events would limit the criticisms and negative comments that both external political 
opposition and important partners (e.g. the U.S. and the EU) were making on Vietnam’s 
domestic human rights conditions. The state considered this one of the most crucial 
tasks for maintaining and protecting Vietnam’s national sovereignty, as it has always 
believed that such activities of outsiders not only interfere with its internal affairs (i.e. 
violate state sovereignty) but also aim to undermine the country’s current socialist 
regime.    
On the other hand, the socialist state also anticipated that Vietnam would be able 
to improve its image and political position in the international arena by using its 
commitment to and determination in ratifying the CAT to demonstrate that it is a 
responsible member of the international community. Indeed, the state explained that 
improving Vietnam’s political position in and reputation from the regional community 
(ASEAN) level to the international level (such as the Third Committee of the UN 
General Assembly) would create additional opportunities for Vietnam to enlist more 
international support for at least two significant contemporary issues that it is facing. 
The first issue is the fight against the exploitation of human rights and democracy issues 
to interfere in a sovereign state’s internal affairs; the second relates to Vietnam’s 
viewpoint concerning the resolution of recent territorial disputes and maritime conflicts 
in the South China Sea (i.e. respect the international law).  
The socialist state has also ascertained that after successes in some important 
international positions – such as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council 
(2008–2009), Secretary General of ASEAN (2013–2018), and member of the UNHRC 
(2014–2016) – many states have recognized Vietnam’s role and influence in both the 
Southeast Asia region and other international political forums and subsequently decided 
to develop and enhance their cooperation with the country in all areas. Moreover, 
Vietnam expected that its behavior in ratifying the CAT would have positive impacts on 
its bi- and multilateral trading relations with other states, especially those that had 
already joined the convention. 
More importantly, the state anticipated that improving the domestic human rights 
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situation in Vietnam would allow the country to seek further relationships and 
cooperative development with its international partners, especially those that the state 
has considered strategically important for development and security. For example, it is 
known that the U.S. would consider deepening its relationship with Vietnam and lifting 
its embargo on the state only when Vietnam shows improvement in this field; the EU 
and its member states have also treated such improvements as prerequisites for 
enhancing their investments in various economic, social, and cultural fields in the 
country. 
In overall, the CPV and the state considered that all of the aforementioned 
benefits are essential for the state’s international integration and cooperation processes, 
which are crucial factors for developing a country rapidly and sustainably while 
simultaneously maintaining and protecting national sovereignty. Another benefit of the 
state’s ratification behavior was the expectation that domestic citizens’ beliefs in the 
leadership of the CPV would be consolidated. Noticeably, alongside the need to respond 
to increasing pressures from outsiders related to Vietnam’s domestic human rights 
conditions, the timing the state chose for its CAT signing and ratifying activities is seen 
as being closely related to major events that the state considered important during that 
period. For instance, 2013–2015 has been labeled a decisive period for Vietnam, as the 
country had an opportunity to participate in high-level UN committees such as the 
UNHRC; many free trade agreements (FTA) and economic partnerships involving 
Vietnam were also expected to be successfully negotiated during this period, including 
the FTA between Vietnam and EU (launched in June 2012), the RCEP, the TPP, and the 
ASEAN Economic Community. 
Beyond Vietnam’s election to the UNHRC for 2014–2016 tenure, the final version 
of the TPP proposal was also signed by the involved parties (including Vietnam) in 
February 2016. The negotiations for the EU-Vietnam FTA were concluded in the same 
month, while the US decided to fully lift its arms embargo on Vietnam in May 2016. 
Based on all of the above, this thesis thus challenges the argument that developing states 
overall do not receive important payoffs for their ratifying behavior toward international 
162 
 
human rights treaties (Trachtman 2012). The case of Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT 
has proven that a developing country under a socialist regime does indeed receive 
significant rewards for its ratification behavior toward human rights treaties. 
Furthermore, the findings from Vietnam’s decision to accede to the CAT during 
the period of 2013–2014 also help to reject Nielsen & Simmons (2014)’s claims that 
ratification of the CAT was not related to European aid policies and programs in those 
states that are most likely to be rewarded for such behavior. This thesis also suggests 
that more broadly speaking, the findings from the Vietnam case can be treated as 
convincing evidence that helps to address the lack of empirical support that scholars 
claim exists in relation to using the reward-based model of state behavior to explain the 
ratification of international human rights treaties.  
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SECTION 3: STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SOCIALIST STATE’S 
RATIFICATION BEHAVIOR 
 
First, it is essential to recall that under socialist doctrine, the protection of state 
sovereignty covers not only a state’s national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
independence; it also includes the communist party and the socialist regime. It also 
concerns respect for the state’s supremacy both within its territory and over its citizen as 
well as the independence of the state’s foreign relations. As a result, the task of 
protecting state sovereignty in socialist states, including Vietnam, actually means 
protecting a country’s territorial integrity and independence as well as the communist 
party, the state, the citizens, and the socialist path. 
On the other hand, Vietnam has traditionally viewed fully respecting state 
sovereignty as essential for ensuring and protecting human rights. In other words, the 
socialist state has believed that if the state does not have a right to self-determination in 
this domain or has its sovereignty violated by outsiders, human rights would not be 
guaranteed within the nation. Moreover, the socialist state has affirmed that while many 
aspects of human rights can be internationalized, the actual task of ensuring and 
protecting domestic human rights conditions cannot be given that this work is seen to be 
best implemented by state; moreover, the maintenance and protection of state 
sovereignty must be treated as the top-prioritized task to which potential political or 
social instabilities that possibly create domestic conflicts must be prevented. 
Activities undertaken by dominant international and non-state actors (such as 
criticizing the state’s torture of detainees or persons held in custody, commenting 
negatively on particular domestic human rights situations or the state’s general human 
rights conditions, supporting domestic individuals and groups that are politically 
opposed to the socialist regime, or trying to influence or alter the socialist state’s 
domestic legal settings) have therefore not only been considered interferences in the 
state’s internal affairs that would create serious political and social instabilities within 
the country; they have also been viewed as plans that aim to undermine Vietnam’s 
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current socialist regime. Indeed, such violations of state sovereignty have been said to 
impose high demands on the state’s tasks related to fighting criticism in the human 
rights arena, especially when the CPV has viewed this arena as an important tool for the 
“peaceful revolution” strategies of Vietnam’s external political opposition.         
Moreover, it has indeed been shown that the socialist state chose joining core 
international human rights treaties as its solution for dealing with related matters. First, 
the state believed that ratifying international human rights treaties would allow it to 
prove to the international community that it does respect human rights; in turn, it would 
also help to limit the criticisms and negative comments about Vietnam’s domestic 
human rights conditions being made by outsiders, especially the political opposition. 
Secondly, the state expected that such behavior would also create opportunities for 
Vietnam to participate in high-level UN human rights forums, where it could voice its 
opinions and seek international support to fight things such as the trend to politicize 
human rights issues, the imposition of Western human rights values and protection 
frameworks, the promotion of the “double standard” viewpoint on human rights, and the 
exploitation of human rights issues to violate state sovereignty. Vietnam has reaffirmed 
in many documents that enhancing dialogues at international levels and increasing 
international cooperation in the field of human rights would in fact help the state to 
maintain its internal political and social stabilities as well as protect its socialist regime.  
As part 4.4.1 of this dissertation shows vis-à-vis obstacles that hindered an earlier 
decision for the state to join the CAT, there is also evidence that the state did not 
actually pay much attention to potential sovereignty costs related to ratification in 
comparison to relevant technical and socio-economic problems that could emerge when 
it was considering signing and ratifying the CAT. However, some participants at the first 
‘International Seminar on the CAT’ held in Vietnam in 2004 did mention that the 
contents of some of the convention’s provisions represented potential interferences in 
the state’s internal affairs. This study has found that Vietnam instead paid more attention 
to dealing with the exploitation of human rights issues, including accusations 
concerning the state’s torture of detainees or persons held in custody, by the external 
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political opposition to violate state sovereignty and undermine the regime. This actually 
then became one of the main motivations for Vietnam deciding to sign and ratify the 
CAT during the 2013–2014 period, when there was a strong increase in outsiders’ 
related criticisms and interferences. The socialist state believed that ratifying this core 
convention on political and civil rights would strongly help to reduce such external 
criticisms and interferences in relation to its domestic human rights conditions. 
Vietnam’s decision to ratify the CAT therefore indeed indicated that the fear of 
potential sovereignty violations caused by the human rights treaty itself did not actually 
play a determinant role in shaping the state’s ratification behavior. Moreover, it has been 
observed that such fear can be limited by the state making declarations and reservations. 
For example, when Vietnam and other socialist states ratified the CAT, they filed certain 
reservations and refused to recognize the competence of the Committee against Torture 
under Article 20 of the Convention and rejected being bound by provisions on optional 
mechanisms for settling disputes among state parties in regard to the interpretation and 
application of the CAT.  
The case of Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT during the period of 2013–2014 has 
shown that the socialist state considered the sovereignty violations caused by outsiders’ 
criticisms and interferences in a state’s human rights issues to be more significant than 
the sovereignty costs caused by treaty provisions. This was because beyond creating 
domestic political and social instabilities, such criticisms also hindered the country’s 
development and international cooperation processes. Moreover, the social state 
determined that a strong economy is an essential element for protecting national 
sovereignty. As such, in relation to sub-research question 1.3 (which concerns 
sovereignty’s role in shaping the socialist state’s behavior toward the ratification of the 
CAT) the case of Vietnam shows that the issues of sovereignty violation and 
interferences in a sovereign state’s internal affairs played a crucial role in shaping the 
socialist state’s decision behavior toward the CAT particularly during the 2013–2014 
period – when the state considered the ratifying decision necessary and important for 
maintaining and protecting both its sovereignty and the socialist regime.      
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As a result, beyond helping to fill the knowledge gaps and answering part of the 
first puzzle outlined in part 2.2.7 of the literature review chapter by clarifying how a 
socialist state actually considered its sovereignty when making decisions about ratifying 
human rights treaties, this thesis also contributes to contemporary debates among 
scholars about states’ ratification behavior toward human rights treaties (part 2.1.6 of 
the Literature Review chapter). This is done by challenging the view of Dutton (2012) 
that it may be difficult for states with poor human rights practices (i.e. the current 
socialist states) to decide to join international human rights treaties because they do not 
want to be held responsible for protecting their citizens’ human rights. The case of 
Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT provides evidence that to prevent being held 
responsible for human rights protection in the domestic field, the socialist state (which 
had a poor human rights record) in fact decided to accede to this convention to prove 
that it respects human rights and implement international standards of human rights 
protection domestically; it has been proven that such behavior was aimed at reducing 
outsiders’ criticisms of the state’s responsibility toward its domestic protection of 
human rights. 
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SECTION 4: FACTORS THAT PREDICT THE  
SOCIALIST STATE’S RATIFICATION BEHAVIOR 
 
In relation to the first research question (which concerns the factors that shaped 
Vietnam’s signing and ratification behaviors toward the CAT during the 2013–2014 
period), this thesis determines that two main factors can help to predict socialist state 
behaviors in this matter. They represent the two above-discussed theoretical approaches 
to studying state behavior toward the ratification of international human rights treaties, 
namely the reward-based model and the sovereignty approach.  
First, based on the case of Vietnam’s decision to sign and ratify the CAT during 
the 2013–2014 period, the thesis claims that socialist states would decide to accede to 
core international human rights treaties if their sovereignty (including their right to 
self-determination in the field of human rights as well as the broader socialist ideology 
and mechanisms related to domestic human rights protection) is significantly criticized 
and interfered with by outsiders – especially dominant international and non-state actors 
that possess political ideologies that are opposed to socialism. In such a context, the 
state can only maintain internal domestic stability and protect the regime by finding 
ways to effectively tackle the external interferences; these strategies should include 
proving that the socialist regime also respects human rights values and makes efforts to 
ensure and protect fundamental rights in the domestic arena. 
In this regard, the case of Vietnam demonstrates that the socialist state has 
perceived that the human rights field has become a major topic throughout international 
relations and created various important political, moral, and legal issues for the involved 
parties – regardless of their political regimes. Moreover, the state has also recognized 
that although some differences in the cognition of human rights values and the 
mechanisms to ensure and protect these rights have existed between socialist and 
Western states, international standards on human rights values should be respected and 
protected given that these fundamental rights have already been recognized by the entire 
international community. Therefore, acceding to core international human rights treaties 
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has been considered to be one of the most appropriate solutions for the socialist state to 
demonstrate that it respects human rights as well as relevant international human rights 
law. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, the state seemed to effectively 
address the sovereignty costs caused by ratifying the CAT by placing relevant 
declarations and reservations; it is thus clear that such costs did not actually affect the 
state’s decision in this matter.        
The socialist state has further perceived that such an approach would also create 
chances for the state to participate in high-level international forums on human rights, 
where it can enhance dialogues to fulfill several crucial objectives (such as narrowing 
differences in cognition about protecting and ensuring human rights in the domestic 
field, protecting and arguing for the socialist approach to human rights protection, and 
enlisting more support from other players within the international community). The 
socialist state believes that these actions, together with respecting and implementing 
international human rights instruments, have been essential for tackling outsiders’ 
negative criticisms and interferences in its domestic human rights affairs by forcing 
significant external political opposition parties (i.e. Western states) to recognize the 
socialist state’s achievements in improving its domestic human rights protection.   
However, the case of Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT also reveals that although 
the sovereignty factor played a very crucial role in influencing the socialist state’s 
decision to accede to international human rights treaties, this factor alone would not 
have been able to shape the state’s ratification behavior toward the CAT during the 
2013–2014 period in particular if the second factor (i.e. the tangible and intangible 
benefits that were very essential for the state’s various national political and economic 
interests at the time) was not in play. Indeed, the Vietnam case has demonstrated that at 
a certain point in time, the socialist state could no longer avoid or delay dealing with 
these human rights issues caused by outsiders when improving the domestic human 
rights protection of the state is made closely associated with important benefits that can 
strongly support other important political, diplomatic, security, and economic 
development issues of the state.               
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In fact, both relevant scholars and state officials have directly and indirectly 
ascertained that in the recent globalization context, Vietnam could not ignore or delay 
acceding to the CAT. This is especially true when the socialist state was increasingly 
pursuing its international cooperation and integration processes, believing that doing so 
would allow it to achieve significant national interests in political, economic, diplomatic, 
and security fields as required to develop and protect the country, the state, and the 
regime. For example, this thesis has affirmed that Vietnam could not avoid signing and 
ratifying a core international human rights treaty such as the CAT during the 2013–2014 
period, when it was at the stage of negotiating to enter important regional and 
international economic arenas and most of its important international partners had 
already acceded to and implemented the convention; in other words, there were both 
direct and indirect prerequisites for the socialist state to join these economic arenas.   
 Moreover, this thesis has also made it clear that this ratification behavior became 
essential for Vietnam at the particular time when the socialist state was expected to seek 
political and diplomatic support from the international community for maintaining and 
protecting not only its domestic human rights field but also indirectly its broader 
territorial sovereignty and integrity. In this regard, it has been indicated that improving 
the state’s domestic human rights situation via this ratification behavior would create a 
better ground for the socialist state to develop further relationships with the U.S. and its 
Western allies (which can be seen in the lifting of the U.S.’s arms embargo on Vietnam). 
The socialist state also expected its efforts to respect international law and enhance 
dialogues to narrow differences to help it to enlist more support from the international 
community and create additional advantages vis-à-vis resolving recent conflicts related 
to the South China Sea in both the short and long term.     
The case of Vietnam’s ratification behavior toward the CAT during the 2013–2014 
period thus makes it clear that crucial impacts caused by relevant tangible and 
intangible benefits that were closely related to the state’s core national interests and 
concerns about increasing sovereignty violations and interferences in internal affairs 
that could potentially create domestic political and social instabilities together shaped 
170 
 
the socialist state’s signing and ratification behaviors toward core international human 
rights treaties such as the CAT in such period when these behaviors were determined by 
the state to allow it to effectively tackle both issues simultaneously. This helps to answer 
the first puzzle outlined in part 2.2.7 of this thesis’s literature review chapter, which 
concerns the main factors that can help to predict socialist states’ behavior toward the 
ratification of international human rights treaties and explains why socialist states have 
decided to accede to international human rights treaties that require them to alter their 
existing domestic legal settings for better coping with treaty provisions (given that these 
states usually possess many factors that scholars view as barriers to ratifying human 
rights treaties, such as being classified as an autocratic regime, still having developing 
economies, and holding poor domestic human rights records). 
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SECTION 5: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS & 
THE SHAPING OF THE SOCIALIST STATE’S BEHAVIOR 
 
5.5.1 Internal Dynamics: The Necessary Condition 
Based on the case of Vietnam’s ratification behavior toward the CAT, this thesis 
has determined that the cognition of opening the country up and seeking more 
international cooperation to save and develop its economy played essential roles that 
helped to lead the socialist state to its later decision to join international human rights 
treaties. In particular, it has been observed that the process of renovating the country 
allowed the state to recognize the role of human rights in the contemporary global 
context as well as the importance of having a strong and independent economy that can 
support the maintenance and protection of the socialist regime and state sovereignty. It 
is believed that such initial cognitions were the main cause for the state’s further 
formation of various major policies that relate to its reasons for acceding to human 
rights treaties, including policies pertaining to engaging in multilateral foreign relations, 
international economic integration, and international integration in all other areas.   
Indeed, it is known that Vietnam faced many challenges and problems in the field 
of human rights when it increased enhancing economic cooperation and relationship 
development with dominant international and non-state actors, especially Western states 
that have political and social philosophies and systems that differ from socialism. The 
socialist state developed cognition of acceding to international human rights treaties 
during such time, which was expected to help the state to effectively respond to the 
above-mentioned challenges (which included the violation of state sovereignty, threats 
to the socialist regime and the path to socialism, and negative impacts on some of the 
state’s important national interests related to security and development). It is observed 
that the state initially built this internal cognition on the belief that implementing 
international standards of human rights protection from human rights treaties and 
enhancing dialogues would allow it to better argue against criticisms of its domestic 
human rights protection levied by international players that have different political 
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ideologies and systems. 
It can therefore be said that if Vietnam did not have a desire to open the country 
up and engage in international cooperation, the state would not have realized need to 
accede to international human rights treaties. Similarly, as affirmed by Mr. Nguyen 
Ngoc Bao, permanent member of the National Assembly’s Committee for Economics, if 
Vietnam did not wish to seek participation in common economic arenas at both regional 
and international levels, it would not have been necessary for the state to sign and ratify 
treaties (personal communication, January 13, 2016).  
Nevertheless, this thesis argues based on the findings from the case of Vietnam’s 
ratification behavior toward the CAT (as presented in the previous chapter) that internal 
dynamics alone (i.e. the state’s cognitions regarding the need to accede to international 
human rights treaties) were not sufficient to shape the socialist state’s actual decision to 
join an international human rights convention such as the CAT, especially during the 
2013–2014 period; the significant negative impacts caused by external dynamics were 
also necessary. Indeed, according to part 4.4.2 of the previous chapter, the socialist 
state’s decision to sign and ratify the CAT when it has been found to limit outsiders’ 
interferences in the state’s internal affairs (i.e. the domestic civil and political rights 
protection fields) as well as the exploitation of human rights issues to cause domestic 
instabilities within the state. It also enabled the state to respond to unavoidable external 
pressures and threats stemming from important international partners that are closely 
associated with the state’s major national interests. 
It has also been seen that without continuous strong recommendations being made 
by dominant external and non-state actors at international conferences about the CAT 
and relevant issues held in the country or at high-level international human rights 
forums (especially in connection with the UPR mechanism), the socialist state would 
not have been ready for its decision to ratify the CAT during the 2013–2014 period. This 
is because according to part 4.4.1 of the findings chapter, the state’s asynchronous 
domestic legal system and the country’s limited economic, social, and cultural 
conditions still appeared to be main obstacles that hindered the state’s joining behavior 
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at the time. Therefore, to contribute to the knowledge gaps outlined in part 2.1.6 of the 
literature review chapter, this thesis argues that domestic politics do not play a more 
determinant role in influencing the socialist state’s decisions about ratifying 
international human rights treaties than international politics do. This observation is 
discussed further below.  
 
5.5.2 External Dynamics: The Sufficient Condition 
By comparing and analyzing the findings presented in the second and third 
sections and part 4.4.2 of the previous chapter, this thesis observes that external 
dynamics played a determinant role that directly shaped Vietnam’s signing and 
ratification behaviors toward the CAT during the 2013–2014 period more than the 
aforementioned internal dynamics did. First, it has been clearly shown that the role and 
impacts of external and non-state actors strongly influenced almost every event related 
to the CAT and associated issues held by Vietnam from when the state initially started to 
research and consider the possibility of joining this convention (i.e. 2004) until it 
completed its actual signing and ratifying processes (i.e. 2013–2014). Of particular 
importance were the co-organization, participation, and recommendations of dominant 
international players (i.e. the EU and its member states) in events when the state first 
started to research the convention in 2004; various workshops and conferences 
concerning technical issues related to CAT ratification; and the large number of 
recommendations made by the international community at both UPR I (2009) and II 
(2014), which focused on the state’s continuous joining of international human rights 
treaties and particular signing and ratification of the CAT. 
In this regard, it is further seen that the recommendations from the first UPR cycle 
in 2009 strongly made the state seriously focus on its progress in researching and 
considering their joining of the CAT (which it had already initiated in 2004); this is 
demonstrated by the government’s allocation of related tasks to the Ministry of Public 
Security. The Vietnamese government then once again tried to speed progress up in 
2012, when the state’s important international partners were increasingly making direct 
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requests for the socialist state to improve its domestic civil and political rights 
protection and in particular to ratify the CAT. As these requests were considered to be 
closely related to the state’s important national interests in various key fields, it is 
believed that such activities of external and non-state actors (especially those with 
political ideologies and systems that differ from socialism) in fact caused the socialist 
state to quickly determine and implement its behavior and promptly respond to those 
external requests – which they viewed as increasing pressures and threats that could 
have negative impacts on various significant security, sovereignty, and development 
issues of the state. 
It is also obvious that the large number of recommendations related to CAT 
ratification made by international member states at the second UPR cycle in 2014 
contributed directly and significantly to Vietnam’s rapid decision behavior in this matter, 
helping to demonstrate the essential role of external dynamics in shaping the socialist 
state’s behavior toward the ratification of international human rights treaties. In this 
regard, by signing the CAT in 2013 and ratifying it in 2014 the socialist state wanted to 
show that it was seriously implementing UPR recommendations and thus proving that it 
was an active and responsible member of the international community and viewed 
issues of concern to the international community as important. 
In fact, the current Vietnam case reveals that the important role of international 
politics was well reflected in the state’s decision about ratifying a core international 
human rights treaty such as the CAT, as this decision was mainly taken to address the 
contemporary globalization context in which the state recognized the trend for human 
rights issues to be globalized. In other words, based on findings in both parts 4.2.2 
(which concern the CPV’s views of human rights in the contemporary global context) 
and 4.2.4 (which pertain to internal driving forces and the state’s ratification behavior 
toward international human rights treaties), it is clear that international politics have 
helped the socialist state to change its perception of the contemporary role of human 
rights (i.e. this field now causes not only legal issues but also political and moral 
problems for all nations, regardless of their political regimes). They have also made the 
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state realize that it cannot avoid being affected by this context, especially when it wants 
to enhance its international integration and cooperation to protect and develop the 
country and thus must find ways to tackle these issues appropriately. 
The determinant role of external dynamics can also be clearly determined via part 
4.4.2 of the previous chapter. Therein, although Vietnam’s decision to accede to the 
CAT during the 2013–2014 period was designed to fulfill many political, security, legal, 
diplomatic, and socio-economic objectives that were important to the state at that time, 
this thesis observes that those objectives that relate to external elements (including the 
need to fight against outsiders’ criticisms of Vietnam’s domestic human rights 
conditions and the exploitation of human rights issues to interfere in the state’s internal 
affairs and violate its sovereignty by the external political opposition, the need to make 
important state partners to recognize the socialist state’s achievements in ensuring and 
protecting human rights domestically, or the need to enlist more support from the 
international community in the field of human rights as well as in other significant 
matters of the state) have been paid more attention and emphasized by both related 
secondary and primary data (i.e. interviews with relevant government officials and 
scholars of Vietnam), which have already been outlined and discussed in details above. 
Based on all of the above, this thesis therefore argues that although the domestic 
politics within Vietnam have been considered necessary for the state’s cognition related 
to ratification of an international human rights treaty such as the CAT, factors stemming 
from external dynamics created an impact that indeed caused the socialist state to 
implement such cognition by actually signing and ratifying the CAT. These factors are 
thus a sufficient condition for the state’s joining behavior toward this convention during 
the particular period of 2013–2014. In other words, the case of Vietnam’s ratification of 
the CAT during the 2013–2014 period reveals that internal and external dynamics did 
not compete with each other in the shaping of the socialist state’s decision behavior 
toward the human rights treaty; instead, external dynamics played a more determinant 
role and, together with relevant existing internal dynamics within the state, shaped the 
state’s actual signing and ratification behaviors toward the convention during a certain 
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period of time. 
The above discussion has helped to answer and explain the second research 
question, which addresses whether and why external dynamics played a more 
determinant role in shaping Vietnam’s behavior toward CAT signing and ratifying 
decisions during the 2013–2014 period. The results from this particular case of Vietnam 
also allow the thesis to respond to part of the second puzzle outlined in part 2.2.7 of the 
Literature Review chapter, as well as to challenge the claim made by Moravscik (2000) 
that international politics are a less crucial driver than national politics in the (socialist) 
state’s consideration of its decision behavior toward human rights treaties.   
 
5.5.3 The Role of External Pressures and Threats 
This thesis observes that the previous findings from the case of Vietnam’s 
ratification of the CAT can help to clarify the actual role of external pressures and 
threats on the socialist state’s decision to accede to international human rights treaties. 
This is especially true of the contents related to the “Benefits and challenges brought by 
the process of international integration” and “Problem with the field of human rights 
and solutions from the state” in part 4.2.5 (which explores internal driving forces and 
the state’s ratification behavior toward international human rights treaties), part 4.3.1 
(on the role and impacts of external dynamics on Vietnam’s domestic human rights 
sector) and part 4.4.2 (which addresses Vietnam’s decision to sign and ratify the CAT 
between 2013 and 2014).  
Moreover, by analyzing such findings this thesis rejects the view claimed by 
Aloisi (2011) that with autocratic states in particular, threats and domestic instability 
have no actual impact on behavior toward the ratification of human rights treaties, as 
autocratic states would focus on maintaining domestic order and control rather than 
worrying about dealing with international human rights instruments when there are 
increasing pressures or frequent condemnations from the political opposition or the 
international community about its bad practices in relation to domestic human rights 
protection – especially when these pressures and threats become stronger. Instead, the 
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case of Vietnam’s CAT ratification during the 2013–2014 period demonstrates that 
threats and external pressures were in fact among the main reasons that the socialist 
state acceded to this core human rights convention.  
Indeed, the socialist state has emphasized that it is crucial to prevent any 
economic dependence on great global powers and institutions or potential political or 
social instabilities that could possibly cause internal conflicts. It has also stressed that a 
sovereign state must have the right to choose and implement measures that it believes to 
be most appropriate for its domestic human rights protection, where they can help the 
state to both implement domestic human rights protection while still balancing its social 
stability. It is also essential for the socialist state to find ways to deal with those 
increasing external pressures and threats made via the field of human rights that it 
believes to cause political and social instabilities in its domestic field. Therefore, 
pressuring the state to improve its domestic human rights protection via methods such 
as imposing human rights protection frameworks, making criticisms and trying to 
influence the state’s current domestic legal settings, providing support to domestic 
individuals and groups that politically oppose the state, and promoting the establishment 
of an independent national human rights organization have been viewed as activities 
that would cause internal instabilities – which can obviously not be ignored by the state.   
Similarly, increasing threats made by dominant international actors or important 
partners of the state that are intended to inter alia cancel bilateral dialogues, end the 
provision of non-humanitarian assistance, reconsider the further development of 
bilateral relationships, and stop promoting investments into the country if the state could 
not show improved domestic human rights protection also required the state to find 
ways to respond appropriately. This is because the benefits it gained from these 
activities (i.e. the benefits brought by the enhancement of international cooperation and 
integration) would strongly help the state to pursue and protect its major national 
interests in economic, security, and development areas. To this end, the Vietnam case 
has shown that the most appropriate option chosen by the state for dealing with such 
external pressures and threats was to actively accede to core international human rights 
178 
 
treaties. This provided the socialist state with better opportunities to participate in 
high-level international human rights forums, which in turn enabled it to enhance 
dialogues and enlist more support from the international community to deal with the 
previously mentioned pressures. Such ratification behavior of the socialist state also 
helped it to prove its respect for human rights and its will to implement international 
standards of human rights protection in the domestic arena, as well as the subsequent 
improvements related to human rights that allowed it to tackle the abovementioned 
threats.    
In relation answering to sub-research question 2.1 of the study (which concerns 
the role of external pressures and threats in Vietnam’s signing and ratifying decisions 
toward the CAT during the 2013–2014 period) and responding to portion of the second 
puzzle outlined in part 2.2.7 of the Literature Review chapter (which addresses the 
actual relationship between external pressures and threats and the autocratic state’s 
ratification behavior toward human rights treaties), the Vietnam case has shown that a 
state with a socialist regime while implementing international integration and 
cooperation processes cannot avoid responding to increasing external pressures and 
threats in the field of human rights when such pressures and threats cause domestic 
instabilities and have negative impacts on other major national interests in the context of 
globalization. This thesis therefore argues that there is currently a positive correlation 
between increasing external pressures and threats and the state’s need to respond, with 
the decision to accede to international human rights treaties being considered the most 
suitable choice for the socialist state given the current situation. 
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS 
 
This chapter contains three sections that help to conclude this dissertation. The 
first provides a summary of all of the study’s findings, including Vietnam’s processes of 
researching, considering, and ultimately deciding to sign and ratify the CAT; the 
decision-makers and other involved parties during these processes; the CPV’s 
perspectives, cognition, and policies toward international human rights treaties in the 
contemporary context; the internal driving forces that caused the socialist state to accede 
to human rights treaties; the impacts of external dynamics on the state’s decision in this 
matter; and the implications and objectives that Vietnam expected to achieve through its 
ratification behavior toward this core human rights convention.  
The second section identifies related academic contributions based on the analyses 
undertaken in the study’s findings and discussion chapters and relates them back to the 
four theoretical approaches employed in this study (i.e. normative, rationalist, 
reward-based, and sovereignty). This is done to explain autocratic state behavior toward 
the ratification of international human rights treaties and highlight relevant theoretical 
implications from a practical case concerning a socialist state.  
Finally, the chapter’s third section outlines the limitations that have come to the 
author’s attention when this research was being conducted. It also identifies relevant 
directions for future research that can be developed based on this study.    
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SECTION 1: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
 
First, in regard to Vietnam’s process of signing and ratifying the CAT, it is found 
that the state initially started to research and consider the possibility of joining the 
convention in late 2004. This was done through an international conference held in the 
country that was co-organized by (and featured participation from) relevant high-level 
officials from both Vietnam and important international and non-state actors (such as 
the embassies of some EU members and other Western states in Vietnam, the Delegation 
of the European Commission to Vietnam, the Danish Institute for Human Rights, UNDP, 
and UNICEF). To implement recommendations made by the international community 
about the state’s progress towards acceding to international human rights treaties during 
the Vietnam’s first UPR cycle, in 2009 the Vietnamese government subsequently 
assigned its Ministry of Public Security the task of studying the possibility for the state 
to sign and ratify the CAT (as initiated in 2004). 
In 2012, the government further established a committee that comprised relevant 
individuals from ministries and state agencies to help the Ministry of Public Security 
speed the progress of the above-mentioned task up. Following the completion of this 
task, Vietnam signed the CAT in November 2013. In 2014, the state subsequently 
conducted its second UPR cycle and received many recommendations for the 
ratification of the CAT. At the same time, the Ministry of Public Security and other 
relevant ministries and state agencies (including the MOFA, the Ministry of Justice, and 
the National Assembly’s Committee for Foreign Relations) were taking all of the steps 
necessary to complete the required procedure outlined by the domestic ‘2005 Law on 
the conclusion, accession to and implementation of treaties’ so that the CAT could be 
ratified by National Assembly. The convention was ultimately ratified by 100% of the 
deputies of the 13th National Assembly of Vietnam in November 2014. 
Secondly, in regard to the decision-maker(s) and other involved parties related to 
Vietnam’s process of signing and ratifying the CAT, it is found that with a socialist state 
such as Vietnam, the communist party is always the sole decision-maker for all 
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important state policies and issues; moreover, the decision-making process is primarily 
conducted within the CPV itself and kept out of public reach. This makes the party the 
main state actor, with its resolutions, policies, directives, and other outputs being 
viewed as decisive elements that shape the behavior of all government agencies in all 
matters of the country. Furthermore, CPV members hold almost all positions within 
government agencies at both central and local levels (including the National Assembly 
and its organs) and the principle of democratic centralism is strictly followed by 
socialist states; as such the parties involved in the process of considering and deciding 
on the ratification of the CAT (such as the Ministry of Public Security, the MOFA, the 
Ministry of Justice, and the National Assembly and its organs) must follow a top-down 
approach and implement all relevant party perspectives, instructions, and policies 
stemming from national congress resolutions as well as directives and resolutions of the 
Politburo Commitee and the party’s Central Committee and its Secretariat.  
In this regard, it is further found that in the current global context, the CPV has 
perceived the field of human rights as a top concern of various regions, international 
organizations, and the international community as a whole. Moreover, it has realized 
that ensuring human rights protection is becoming a major and important topic in 
international relations and is treated as a standard consideration in connection with 
many significant issues, especially those that pertain to cooperation and development. 
However, the communist party also believed that the characteristics of socialist states’ 
national human rights protection mechanisms are different from those of capitalist (i.e. 
Western) states. The most outstanding difference is that mechanisms from capitalist 
states represent a separation and curbing of state power among state organs and allow 
the participation of civil society, while a socialist state’s mechanisms to ensure domestic 
human rights are actually determined by relevant efforts made by its National Assembly 
and other related components of the domestic political system; moreover, civil society 
obviously does not have any role to play in this matter in socialist states.  
On a different note, Vietnam has also claimed that instead of being impartial and 
independent, some international human rights organizations actually work for political 
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purposes, which would create difficulties related to implementing domestic human 
rights protection in some states. However, disagreements still exist on some major 
issues of human rights protection, mostly as a result of the varied cognitions of different 
political ideologies and systems. As a result, the state believed that the field of human 
rights would have a strong possibility to cause conflicts among nations. Vietnam further 
realized that the UN could help to solve this problem by encouraging dialogues and 
cooperation and enhancing the sharing of knowledge and the development of trust and 
friendship among nations, which would allow states to narrow the gaps in their 
differences in this field.  
On the other hand, focusing on the CPV’s cognitions and perspectives about the 
contemporary human rights has revealed the CPV’s admission that the human rights 
field caused many important political, legal, and moral issues for all political regimes. 
The communist party of Vietnam also rejected the view that human rights are privately 
owned or discoverable values of Western states; instead, it said that they should be 
considered as common values of all of the world’s nations. The CPV further believed 
that a state’s cognition on human rights issues is actually shaped by the characteristics 
of its ruling class, with strong differences obviously existing between capitalist (i.e. 
Western) and communist states.  
More precisely, the CPV reaffirmed that in socialist states, human rights must be 
attached to human (citizen) duties that dictate that citizens must not act against the state 
and should respect others’ rights and freedom as well as the collective interests of the 
whole society. Moreover, the communist party did not consider human rights as natural 
rights, as the CPV argued that for something to fully become a right, it first needs to be 
recognized and regulated by the law. More importantly, the party also emphasized that 
for human rights to be guaranteed domestically, the state’s internal political and social 
stability must be maintained while its sovereignty is respected. In this regard, the 
socialist state determined that the matter of ensuring domestic human rights protection 
indeed belonged mainly to its own jurisdiction, which meant it was an internal state 
affair that should not be interfered with by outsiders.  
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The thesis then finds that based on the aforementioned perspectives, the CPV 
issued several important policies related to the human rights field. These policies 
included requests to provide more education and enhance the sharing of information 
pertaining to ensuring domestic human rights protection in accordance with socialist 
perspectives and to expand international cooperation in this field (as it was believed that 
this would help provide the state with more opportunities to demonstrate the socialist 
approach to human rights protection – especially at international levels – as well as to 
obtain more international support and resources to improve its current domestic 
implementation of human rights protection). The CPV anticipated that these policies 
would provide the state with better grounds to fight against the imposition of Western 
models of human rights protection in the context of Vietnam.  
Moreover, the communist party also requested that the state simultaneously 
enhance the protection of state sovereignty to maintain domestic political and social 
stability and find ways to strengthen domestic economic, social, and cultural conditions 
(as it believed that development of the country’s economy was the sustainable basis 
required to protect and promote the state’s important national interests). In this regard, it 
is noticeable that state sovereignty under socialist doctrine has two particular core 
contents, namely a nation’s supremacy of within its territory and right to undertake its 
foreign relations independently. The national independence attached with socialism is 
also at play. Therefore, in the view of a socialist state such as Vietnam, protecting state 
sovereignty in fact means protecting not only the country’s national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity but also the communist party, the state, the citizens, as well as the 
current socialist regime and its path. 
Analyzing Vietnam’s internal driving forces as well as the relevant external 
dynamics that affected the state’s decision to accede to international human rights 
treaties such as the CAT then reveals that based on the state’s internal cognition, the 
state’s desire to join human rights treaties was developed to tackle significant 
challenges imposed by outsiders (especially those with political ideologies and systems 
that are in opposition to socialism) during Vietnam’s process of enhancing its 
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international integration and cooperation that negatively affected the development and 
security of the country. In the human rights field in particular, the socialist state indeed 
faced much criticism of its domestic human rights conditions as well as pressure to 
accept Western values and frameworks of human rights protection (which Vietnam 
considered as interferences in the internal affairs of a sovereign state); more importantly, 
such activities even made the state believe that the human rights field had become a key 
component of the “peaceful revolution” strategies of the external political opposition 
groups that were aiming to undermine the socialist regime.  
As the socialist state treated these challenges as significant threats to its national 
independence and sovereignty, Vietnam believed that joining international human rights 
treaties would provide it with more opportunities to increase its international 
cooperation in the field of human rights and enhance dialogues at international levels, 
especially with dominant international and non-state actors as well as the political 
opposition. This would enable it to fight against outsiders’ unreasonable claims, 
demands, and criticisms in relation to its domestic human rights situation, the 
“double-standard” viewpoint, and the trend to politicize human rights issues. Using this 
approach, Vietnam hoped to promote the need to respect international law and equality 
in international relations as well as to oppose any unilateral approach that aims at 
threatening or forcing others to accept a particular cognition of human rights values and 
protection frameworks. At the same time, the state also aimed to seek more international 
consensus and support an effective fight against its external political opposition’s 
exploitation of human rights issues to interfere in its internal affairs, which the socialist 
state considered as a violation of its sovereignty. 
In regard to external dynamics’ role in and impact on Vietnam’s CAT ratification 
decision, it is found that the dynamics related especially to the state’s strategic 
international partners (such as the U.S., the EU and its member states, and some other 
Western states, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; the UN; and some large 
international human rights NGOs) indeed played a decisive role in causing the state to 
sign and ratify this convention during the 2013–2014 period. More specifically, during 
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this period of time there were various issues that made Vietnam respond by deciding to 
accede to a core international human rights convention such as the CAT. For instance, 
the U.S., the EU, and their Western allies increased their support to domestic individuals 
and groups who were politically opposed to Vietnam’s socialist regime. The U.S. also 
adopted various important resolutions about human rights conditions in Vietnam and 
threatened to both cancel bilateral dialogues with the country and stop providing 
non-humanitarian assistance to Vietnam (as opposed to lifting its arms embargo and 
developing deeper relationships with the state) if Vietnam did not improve its domestic 
human rights protection.   
The EU was simultaneously treating Vietnam’s improvements in the human rights 
field as a prerequisite for its decision to enhance investments into economic, social, and 
cultural domains of the state. Moreover, EU member states tried to influence the 
socialist state’s legal reform process, making Vietnam think that these Western states 
not only wanted to alter the state’s current domestic legal settings but also aimed at 
changing the country’s political regime and system. Similarly, during the 2013–2014 
period Vietnam also witnessed significant negative impacts that were caused by some 
large international human rights NGOs that protested against the state’s self-nomination 
to become a member at the UNHRC for 2014–2016; while Vietnam treated the election 
to the UNHRC as a very important opportunity that could help to support the state’s 
development and international integration processes and to maintain its sovereignty and 
political regime. On a different note, it is also found that the UPR cycles contributed 
strongly and directly to the state’s decision to join the CAT, while there is evidence that 
Vietnam committed to acceding to the CAT to nominate itself to become a member of 
the UNHRC for the 2014–2016 period. 
Finally, it is also found via secondary and primary data collected and analyzed 
from relevant sources in Vietnam that the state’s decision to sign and ratify the CAT 
during the 2013–2014 period was taken to fulfill various important political, security, 
diplomatic, legal, and development objectives that the country was facing at the time. In 
particular, the National Assembly’s Committee for Foreign Relations and the Ministry 
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of Public Security ascertained that ratifying the CAT would give the state better legal 
grounds to fight against slanderous and distorted comments about its torture of 
detainees and persons held in custody as well as general criticisms about Vietnam’s 
domestic human rights conditions being made by Western states and the international 
human rights NGOs that were protesting against Vietnam’s self-nomination to the 
UNHRC. Various data sources have said that the purpose of this ratification behavior of 
the socialist state was to make these international players acknowledge Vietnam’s 
achievements in the field of human rights and reduce both their criticisms of and 
activities against exploiting human rights issues (which the state viewed as interfering 
in its internal affairs, violating its sovereignty, and undermining the socialist regime). 
This was considered essential for the protection of the socialist state’s national 
sovereignty and security in the human rights arena.   
Furthermore, the ratification of the CAT would also assist the socialist state to 
enhance dialogues at international-level forums, which could help Vietnam to enlist 
more international support for many important matters that involve or relate to the state. 
For example, leaders of the Vietnamese MOFA affirmed that promoting dialogues and 
cooperation to solve differences and show respect for international law by deciding to 
join the CAT would help Vietnam to acquire more advantages and support for its 
viewpoint in the South China Sea conflicts (i.e. the need to respect international law) in 
both the short and long terms. Last but not least, according to many high-level officials 
and relevant scholars of Vietnam, the decision to ratify the CAT during that particular 
period (i.e. 2013–2014) not only contributed strongly to the state’s successful election at 
the UNHRC; the state also expected it to have positive impacts on bi- and multilateral 
trading relations between Vietnam and important partners, especially in those major 
regional and international FTAs, economic partnerships, and forums that were about to 
be negotiated at that time (such as the Vietnam-EU FTA, the RCEP, the TPP, and the 
ASEAN Economic Community). 
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SECTION 2: ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS &  
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Firstly, in regard to the normative approach, this thesis has argued that the case of 
Vietnam demonstrates that the socialist state’s ratification behavior toward a core 
human rights treaty such as the CAT was not caused by the alignment of domestic and 
international human rights values and interests. The thesis has rejected views that claim 
that normative pressure is an important element capable of shaping socialist state 
behavior toward the ratification of human rights treaties and that changing the state’s 
cognition in relation to human rights values and interests can help to overcome 
sovereignty-related fears caused by treaty ratification. In the case of Vietnam’s 
ratification of the CAT during the 2013–2014 period, it can be seen that although the 
socialist state may have had general cognition of civil and political rights protection 
(including the notion of torture prevention), there is insufficient information to confirm 
that the state’s decision to accede to the CAT at that particular time was actually caused 
by a change in its socialist cognition of human rights values and interests to become 
aligned with the prevailing international cognition.  
In fact, it is found that the socialist state’s cognition of human rights values and 
interests has been unchanged. For instance, socialism’s traditional view on the role of 
international human rights law is still found in Vietnam, where the socialist state has 
rejected a direct link between international human rights instruments and the citizens of 
the state and claimed that the protection of domestic individual rights should only exist 
via the legal relationship between the state and its citizens; international human rights 
mechanisms are there just to help regulate the relevant relationships among international 
member states in regard to the subject matter. Such a view of Vietnam can help to 
confirm that there was no actual alignment between socialist and international 
cognitions of human rights values and interests. Nonetheless, Vietnam still signed and 
ratified the CAT. It is therefore recommended that in a socialist state, the alignment of 
domestic and international human rights values and interests does not have any actual 
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role in influencing or predicting ratification behavior toward international human rights 
treaties. As for theoretical implications, it is suggested that the normative approach is 
not applicable for explaining the human rights treaty ratification behavior of an 
autocratic state that is under a socialist regime.  
 Secondly, in relation to the role of costs and benefits in the ratification decision 
of the socialist state (as explained by the rationalist approach and the reward-based 
model), this thesis reaffirms via the case of Vietnam that the state’s calculation of 
ratification’s costs and benefits not only strongly influenced its decision to join human 
rights treaties; it also played an essential role in shaping the state’s timing choices 
related to signing and ratifying activities. It is clear that material interests became core 
factors that shaped Vietnam’s signing and ratification behavior toward the CAT during 
the particular period of 2013–2014. Moreover, in this regard this thesis has observed by 
that tangible and intangible benefits became crucial in determining the socialist state’s 
behavior towards the ratification of the international human rights treaty as they were 
considered to be closely associated with or capable of creating significant impacts on 
major national interests that the state was pursuing at the time.  
As a result, this thesis has challenged the claim that developing states generally do 
not receive important payoffs for their ratification behavior toward international human 
rights treaties. In the case of Vietnam, it can be seen that the state obtained various 
important direct and indirect benefits after deciding its signing and ratification 
behaviors toward the CAT during the 2013–2014 period and that these benefits were 
essential for fulfilling national interests in various political, security, diplomatic, and 
socio-economical areas identified by the socialist state, including its election to the 
UNHRC for 2014–2016, the signing of EU-Vietnam FTA in 2015, the lifting of the U.S. 
arms embargo, and the signing of TPP in 2016.  
Furthermore, the thesis also rejects scholars’ arguments that the ratification of the 
CAT had no connection to European aid policies and programs. The case of Vietnam’s 
ratification of the CAT has clearly demonstrated that the socialist state’s decision to sign 
and ratify the CAT during the 2013–2014 period was rather strongly related to European 
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aid policies and programs. It has also been made clear that Vietnam in fact wanted to 
use such decision behavior to signal a form of cooperation to the international 
community (and its important international partners); in this context, it was essential for 
the state to conclude important FTA(s) as well as to participate in various large regional 
and international economic arenas. Finally, more generally speaking, the practical 
evidence obtained from the Vietnam case can also help to address the current lack of 
empirical support for the explanation related to the reward-based model. 
Thirdly, in relation to the role of sovereignty in the socialist state’s decision 
behavior toward international human rights treaties, this thesis ascertains that in the case 
of Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT between 2013 and 2014, the sovereignty factor 
played an essential role in shaping the socialist state’s behavior toward the ratification 
of human rights treaties. Moreover, in this regard the thesis has also determined that 
socialist states that have usually been claimed to have poor human rights records indeed 
decided to accede to international human rights treaties to avoid being held responsible 
for their poor human rights protection in the domestic arena; it has reaffirmed that such 
behavior was considered essential for the socialist state to prove that it respects and 
ensures domestic human rights and is willing to implement international standards of 
human rights protection domestically.  
As state sovereignty under socialist doctrine covers not only traditional national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity but also the communist party, the state, domestic 
socialist legal-political systems and settings, and the socialist path, the case of Vietnam 
and the CAT demonstrates that preventing sovereignty violations and interferences in 
internal affairs from outsiders (especially entities that politically oppose the state) via 
the human rights issue played a determinant role in shaping the socialist state’s behavior 
toward CAT ratification. This has been shown to even help overcome the core obstacles 
that the state identified as hindering its ratification behavior toward this convention, 
such as the lack of domestic economic, social, and cultural conditions and resources and 
the need for a synchronous legal system to effectively implement the convention in 
Vietnam. Other than that, the socialist state did not consider sovereignty violations that 
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could potentially arise from ratifying the human rights treaty important, as such it could 
tackle such violations by making relevant reservations and declarations that would limit 
the related impacts.     
In relation to the sovereignty approach vis-à-vis this case of a socialist state, this 
thesis recommends that instead of focusing just on the human rights treaty itself, the 
scope of this approach should be expanded to also cover the state’s determination of 
potential sovereignty violations caused by the larger international community 
(especially external political opposition to the state) to understand the sovereignty 
factor’s role in an autocratic state’s ratification decisions concerning these kinds of 
treaties. It also suggests that the sovereignty and reward (benefit) factors can together 
help to predict how a socialist state with a developing economy would behave toward 
international human rights treaties in the recent context of globalization. 
On a different note, in relation to comparing the impacts of external and internal 
dynamics on the state’s decision behavior, the case of Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT 
during the 2013–2014 period reveals that internal dynamics within the state helped to 
create a condition that allowed it to obtain cognition related to the need to accede to 
international human rights treaties in the recently emerged context of globalization; 
however, it has been seen that internal dynamics alone were not able to stimulate the 
socialist state to decide to actually sign and ratify the CAT or to help to predict the 
specific timing of such state actions . External dynamics caused by the state’s important 
international partners are seen to play a more determinant role and served as a condition 
that, together with the existing internal dynamics within the state, shaped the socialist 
state’s signing and ratifying activities toward the treaty during a specific period of time.   
Therefore, based on this case of Vietnam, this thesis challenges the academic view 
that claims that internal dynamics are more determinant than external dynamics in 
shaping autocratic state behavior toward international human rights treaties. Moreover, 
it shows that instead of competing with each other, internal and external dynamics 
supported each other to make Vietnam decide to sign and ratify the CAT during the 
particular period of time that it did. This study also challenges the argument related to 
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the importance of domestic vs. international politics in this matter by claiming that in 
socialist states, international politics are considered more significant than domestic 
politics as they usually create strong effects that relate to the state’s formation of 
policies, especially in the field of human rights. 
In regard to the role that threats and pressures play in influencing autocratic states’ 
behavior toward the ratification of international human rights treaties, the case of 
Vietnam and the CAT leads this thesis to reject the academic views that claim that in 
autocratic states in particular, threats and domestic instability do not have any actual 
impact on shaping behavior toward the ratification of human rights treaties. This is 
because these kinds of states would rather focus on maintaining domestic order and 
control than worry about pressures or frequent condemnations from external political 
opposition or the international community; in other words, with autocratic leaders, 
threats cannot act as a determinant factor that can shape a state’s behavior toward CAT 
ratification. However, in this case of Vietnam, it has been proven that increasing 
external threats and pressures in fact became core factors that shaped the socialist state’s 
accession behavior toward the human rights treaty, in an effort to effectively tackle such 
threats and pressures.  
In this regard, the case of Vietnam has shown that in the current context of 
globalization, the socialist state could not avoid responding to pressures and threats 
imposed by outsiders (especially important international players) in relation to the 
human rights field. This was because such threats and pressures would not only create 
domestic political and social instabilities within the state but also have negative impacts 
on many important national interests in various political, security, legal, and 
socio-economic fields being pursued by the state during its international cooperation 
and integration processes. It is therefore essential that the state uses appropriate 
approaches to prevent domestic instabilities that could possibly cause internal conflicts 
within the state as well as obstacles related to national interests that would hinder the 
country’s development process. As a result, this thesis suggests that the human rights 
field has seen a positive correlation between increasing external pressures and threats 
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and the state’s need to respond to them by deciding to accede to core international 
human rights instruments, which was considered one of most appropriate choices for the 
socialist state to make in the contemporary context. 
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SECTION 3: LIMITATIONS &  
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
 
The author is aware that the study has faced some limitations. First, due to limited 
timeframe and resources available, this research could only cover the case of Vietnam 
and its ratification of the CAT; however, three other socialist states with developing 
economies (namely China, Cuba, and Laos) have acceded to the CAT as well. As the 
human rights field is currently still considered as a politically sensitive study topic in 
socialist states, it is expected that seeking relevant secondary data and conducting 
interviews in these states would be very difficult. The language barrier would also 
hinder undertaking research in such states, as it is anticipated that relevant Communist 
Party and state documents in these countries are likely not in English. It is nonetheless 
regrettable that this research could not consider the cases of CAT ratification in China 
and Laos, as these countries are located in the same region as Vietnam. 
The second limitation of this study arises from some matters stemming from the 
socialist principle of democratic centralism that Vietnam strictly follows. This principle 
created some difficulties especially for arranging and conducting in-depth interviews 
with relevant government officials and CPV scholars about the issue. First, it was 
extremely hard to contact and request interviews with relevant government officials and 
communist party scholars who knew about or were involved in the issues researched in 
the thesis; they were very cautious about providing information, especially during 
in-depth interviews about human rights issues. Moreover, they must obtain official 
permission from the relevant higher authority to participate in interviews with 
individuals who do not work in the same agency.  
Second, when discussing the issues related to the study, the interviewees always 
tried to avoid providing, discussing, and sharing information and opinions that may not 
be well aligned with or do not follow what has been outlined in CPV’s resolutions and 
directives. In contrast, the author originally expected that the people who agreed to 
participate in the in-depth interviews would help to further explain and analyze issues as 
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well as provide some professional opinions that varied from official positions presented 
in secondary data issued by the communist party of Vietnam. Nevertheless, these 
interviews were seen as a useful contribution to the research, as they helped to provide 
additional detailed data and explanations and linked the contents of CPV directives and 
resolutions to the actual work that officials are undertaking. It was indeed anticipated 
these officials would not say anything very different or against what the communist 
party has issued. 
On the other hand, it was also difficult for the author to obtain secondary data 
from the state and the communist party, as relevant documents are not usually available 
or easily accessible to the public. Another limitation of the research is that the author 
could not conduct interviews with relevant external players that were involved in 
Vietnam’s ratification of the CAT, such as UNDP, the U.S., the EU and its member 
states, ASEAN, and NGOs. Although the author has both direct and indirect referrals 
from relevant individuals, representatives of these international and non-state actors 
indicated that they would have to be very cautious in commenting about Vietnam and 
the CAT and therefore would not want to answer interview questions. As a result, the 
author could not obtain primary data from these international and non-state actors for 
this study.    
In regard to future study, a few recommendations can be developed from the 
research conducted for this thesis. First, a study could focus on the ratification behavior 
of those ASEAN member states that have already ratified the CAT to learn about and 
compare elements that shaped these states’ decisions to accede to this convention. This 
is because ASEAN appears to be a region that also emphasizes the importance of state 
sovereignty and is claimed by scholars to be a “club of dictators”. In this regard, it 
would be particularly interesting to compare state behavior toward this convention 
between the ASEAN-4 (i.e. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) and the 
ASEAN-6 (i.e. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). 
It is necessary and important to see how these countries’ different political regimes and 
settings have affected state decisions about CAT ratification, as well as to determine 
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what is blocking ASEAN member states that have not yet joined the convention.  
Secondly, as mentioned above, there are a few other socialist states in the world 
(such as China, Cuba, and Laos) that have already acceded to the CAT, and it would 
interesting for future research to study these socialist states’ behavior toward the 
ratification of this convention to determine whether the reasons and factors that shaped 
their behavior toward the CAT are similar to those identified in the case of Vietnam.  
Lastly, future studies could also explore the CAT ratification behaviors of other 
(non-socialist) autocratic regimes in the world; analyzing and comparing the factors that 
caused state ratification behaviors in autocratic and socialist regimes are essential for 
clarifying arguments about autocratic state behavior toward the ratification of 
international human rights treaties in the existing literature.    
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APPENDIX 
 
I. Interview Questionnaires and Original Answers (in Vietnamese) from 
representative of the Public Security Ministry: 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết có phải Bộ Công an là cơ quan đề xuất Việt Nam 
tham gia ký kết và phê chuẩn Công ước chống tra tấn của Liên hợp quốc (CAT) 
không? (Would you please confirm whether the Ministry of Public Security was the 
recommending agency for the Vietnam’s joining of the CAT?) 
A: Đúng. 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết điều gì đã thúc đẩy Bộ Công an để đi đến quyết 
định đề xuất Việt Nam ký kết và gia nhập Công ước chống tra tấn trong giai đoạn 
2013-2014? Tại sao? (Would you please explain what promoted the Ministry of Public 
Security to recommend the signing and ratification towards the CAT?) 
A: Việc tham gia Công ước này là nằm trong kế hoạch và chương trình (chủ trương, 
chính sách) của Nhà nước, Chính phủ Việt Nam. Việc tham gia này nằm trong chuỗi các 
việc cần phải làm để bảo vệ quyền con người.  
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết Bộ Công an đã bắt đầu chuẩn bị cho việc đề xuất 
này từ lúc nào và trong thời gian bao lâu tính đến thời điểm chính thức trình 
Chính phủ đề xuất này? (Would you please tell me that w:hen did the Ministry of 
Public Security start to prepare for this recommendation, and how long did it take for 
this task to be officially submitted to the Government?) 
A: Công việc này được đặt ra từ năm 2004, đến năm 2012 mới chuyển về cho Cục tiếp 
quản. Từ khi chuyển việc này về cho Cục vào năm 2012 thì các công tác nghiên cứu và 
chuẩn bị cho việc kí kết và phê chuẩn được thực hiện rất nhanh.  
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Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết đã có những khó khăn gì trong giai đoạn chuẩn bị 
trên của Bộ Công an không? Tại sao? Và những khó khăn đó (nếu có) đã được giải 
quyết như thế nào? (Would you please describe those difficulties (if any) during the 
process of preparing such recommendation? And how were they overcome?) 
A: Hệ thống pháp luật hiện hành của Việt Nam chưa hoàn thiện, và Công ước này có 
cho thời gian để nội lực hóa. Cùng thời gian đó thì Hiến pháp 2013 được thông qua, sau 
đó thì một loạt các bộ luật nhằm bảo vệ quyền con người được thông qua, nên đã góp 
phần giúp quá trình thực thi Công ước này của Việt Nam được triển khai nhanh chóng. 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết Đảng và Chính phủ có hướng dẫn hoặc chỉ đạo gì 
trong quá trình chuẩn bị công việc đề xuất trên của Bộ Công an hay không? Xin 
vui lòng giải thích thêm. (Was there any guidance, directive or instruction from the 
CPV and the Government for the Public Security Ministry’s process of preparing the 
recommendation? Please explain in more details.) 
A: Đây là công việc nằm trong kế hoạch và chương trình (chủ trương, chính sách) 
chung của Đảng, Nhà nước, Chính phủ, nhằm thúc đẩy việc bảo vệ quyền con người tại 
Việt Nam. 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết việc Bộ Công an đề xuất Chính phủ ký kết Công 
ước này vào năm 2013 là có nhằm vào một ý nghĩa cụ thể nào không? Xin Ông/Bà 
vui lòng giải thích thêm. (Was there any specific purpose that the recommendation for 
the signing of this Convention was made in 2013? Please explain in more details.) 
A: Từ sau khi ký thì thế giới đánh giá cao Việt Nam và Việt Nam được bầu vào Hội 
đồng Nhân Quyền của Liên hợp quốc, tất nhiên cái này nó thúc đẩy cái kia, một cách 
ngẫu nhiên và khách quan, chứ ko phải cố tình ký để được vào Hội đồng Nhân quyền. 
Việt Nam là quốc gia thành viên tích cực của cộng đồng quốc tế. VN đã khẳng định như 
vậy nên Việt Nam phải chứng minh thông qua việc gia nhập Công ước này. 
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Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết, đối với công việc của Bộ Công an có liên quan 
đến việc gia nhập Công ước này, có hay không những sự hỗ trợ và/hoặc ảnh hưởng 
từ những thành phần quốc tế đến từ khu vực Đông Nam Á và quốc tế (ví dụ: các 
cơ quan của ASEAN, các nước thành viên ASEAN, các cơ quan của LHQ, các 
nước thành viên của quốc tế có liên hệ nhiều đến Việt Nam như Hoa Kỳ, Nhật Bản, 
Úc, Liên Minh Châu Âu, và các tổ chức quốc tế khác, v.v.) trước và trong giai đoạn 
Việt Nam tham gia Điều ước này (những năm trước 2013 đến khi việc phê chuẩn 
được hoàn tất vào năm 2015)? (Would you please tell me that, in regard to work of the 
Ministry of Public Security that related to the joining of this Convention, had there been 
any support and/or influence from regional and international elements (i.e. organs and 
members of the ASEAN, UN’s organs, dominant international actors and non-state 
actors like the U.S., Japan, EU, as well as international NGOs, etc.) before and during 
the process of Vietnam’s joining this Convention (before the year 2013 till the 
completion of the ratification process in early 2015)?) 
A: Bộ Ngoại giao Mỹ có ký hỗ trợ với Bộ Công an Việt Nam nhưng Việt Nam chưa 
nhận được, Bỉ cũng có, v.v. Việt Nam vừa rồi có nhận gói hỗ trợ từ UN (UNDP) để tổ 
chức Hội thảo ở Phú Quốc, mời các chuyên gia sang để nói cho nghe cách làm các báo 
cáo quốc gia. Hà Lan cũng nhận đào tạo cán bộ VN sang học kinh nghiệm về cách làm 
báo cáo. Nhưng quá trình từ nghiên cứu đến phê chuẩn đều hoàn toàn là kinh phí của 
Chính phủ Việt Nam. ASEAN thì không có liên quan. 
 
Q: Theo nhận định của Ông/Bà, tại sao Việt Nam lại quyết định gia nhập CAT 
trong giai đoạn 2013-2014? Những lợi ích và mục tiêu nào mà Ông/Bà nghĩ Việt 
Nam mong muốn hướng tới/đạt được khi quyết định ký kết và phê chuẩn Công 
ước quốc tế này? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (In your opinion, why did 
Vietnam decide to accede to the CAT during the period of 2013-2014? What would be 
those benefits and objectives that Vietnam would expect to fulfill and receive via the 
decision to sign and ratify this Convention? Please explain in more details.) 
A: Đây là chủ trương của Nhà nước, xét thấy tham gia là tốt, vì về mặt đối nội thì nhằm 
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tham khảo, xác lập những chuẩn mực chung về quản lý giam giữ và đối xử với những 
người bị bắt, bị xử lý, bên cạnh việc xác lập các nghĩa vụ, thì cũng để bảo đảm các 
quyền lợi hợp pháp của họ theo một chuẩn mực chung, được thừa nhận rộng rãi. Còn về 
mặt đối ngoại thì việc gia nhập Công ước này thể hiện sự thiện chí, trách nhiệm, vai trò 
của một quốc gia tiến bộ, tuy rằng các nước này đằng sau đều có dáng dấp của các nước 
lớn. Việt Nam tham gia Công ước này một cách tích cực, xem xét, quan sát rất lâu, từng 
bước nội lực quá các quy định cho phù hợp.   
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II. Interview Questionnaires and Original Answers (in Vietnamese) from 
representative of the National Assembly: 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết đơn vị (Bộ/Ngành) nào là cơ quan đề xuất Việt 
Nam tham gia ký kết và gia nhập Công ước chống tra tấn (CAT)? (Would you 
please tell me which was the agency or ministry of Vietnam that recommended the state 
to sign and ratify the CAT?) 
A: Bộ Công an 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết tại sao (hoặc điều gì đã thúc đẩy) Ủy ban thường 
vụ Quốc hội đồng ý thông qua với ý kiến đề xuất ký kết và tham gia Công ước 
này? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (Why did (or what had promoted) the 
National Assembly’s Standing Committee agree with the recommendation from the 
Ministry of Public Security on the signing and acceding to this Convention? Please 
explain in more details.) 
A: Những quy định theo Hiến pháp của Việt Nam những năm gần đây có những bước 
phát triển một cách đột phá, thể hiện Việt Nam rất mong muốn trở thành một nước dân 
chủ, và Pháp luật thì phải thực sự đi vào cuộc sống, mang lại sự bình đẳng cho người 
dân trước Pháp luật. Đó là mong muốn chung của luật pháp cũng như của Quốc hội Việt 
Nam. Ủng hộ vì đã viết trong Hiến pháp 2013, đã thể hiện rõ quyền dân chủ, quyền con 
người – nên có các luật và nghị định là nhằm triển khai theo nội dung của Hiến pháp.  
 
Q: Ông/Bà có nghĩ rằng việc Chính phủ quyết định ký kết điều ước này vào năm 
2013 là có nhằm vào một ý nghĩa cụ thể nào không? Vì sao? 
(Was there any specific purpose that the Government decided to sign this Convention in 
2013? Why?) 
A: Thể hiện sự cầu thị của VN. Những luật và Hiến pháp, tất cả điều đó là phải theo sự 
đòi hỏi phát triển của đất nước, theo nhịp phát triển của đất nước, hòa nhập với thế giới, 
có những điều cần phải sửa đổi thì phải sửa. Có thể Hiến pháp hoặc luật đó đúng trong 
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thời điểm này nhưng chưa chắc phù hợp (đúng) trong thời điểm khác, thì buộc phải thay 
đổi cho phù hợp. Do đó Hiến pháp 2013 ra là để phù hợp với thời điểm này, và để đáp 
ứng phát triển kinh tế đất nước, cũng như là phù hợp với sự phát triển của người dân, 
trong giai đoạn xu thế thế giới đang có những bước chuyển biến. Nó như công cụ, lúc 
nào cần thì phải có, lúc nào cần thì phải sửa để cho nó phù hợp với cuộc sống, phù hợp 
với xu thế phát triển thời đại. Đấy là nguyên lý. Vậy ký Công ước này là để phù hợp với 
tình hình chung của đất nước để chơi chung với thế giới. Có những luật phải được phê 
chuẩn chậm lại vì nếu đưa ra bây giờ sẽ ko phù hợp với quy định của các Công ước 
quốc tế thì chúng ta phải chậm lại, rà soát lại, không thì khi ký Công ước thì sẽ gây 
nhiều trở ngại trong việc chấp hành quy định quốc tế. 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết, công việc liên quan đến việc gia nhập Công ước 
này (ký kết và phê chuẩn) trong giai đoạn từ năm 2013 đến đầu năm 2015 có khó 
khăn gì không? Nếu có, tại sao và làm thế nào những khó khăn này được các bên 
giải quyết? (Had there been difficulties during the signing and ratification period 
between 2013 and early 2015? If yes, why and how were these hardships overcome by 
the related parties?)  
A: Nội dung trả lời cho câu hỏi này được bao gồm trong câu trả lời cho câu hỏi tiếp 
theo. 
 
Q: Được biết Việt Nam đã quyết định mở cửa với thế giới để dần hợp tác và hội 
nhập quốc tế trong nhiều lĩnh vực (trong đó có Nhân quyền) ngay đầu thời kỳ Đổi 
Mới (từ năm 1986), vậy những rào cản nào Ông/Bà nghĩ rằng đã ngăn chặn hoặc 
làm chậm đi quá trình gia nhập Công ước LHQ về chống tra tấn (đã có từ năm 
1987) của Việt Nam? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (It is known that Vietnam 
has decided to open up and take steps for international cooepration and integration in 
many areas (including the field of human rights) since the Renovation Period starting in 
1986, what were the obstacles that hindered or slowed down the process of acceding to 
the CAT by Vietnam until 2013, where the CAT came into effect in 1987)? Please 
explain in more details.) 
A: Một đạo luật khi đưa ra Quốc hội thì phải được thảo luận rất kĩ, qua rất nhiều công 
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đoạn (quy trình từ đơn vị đề xuất – Chính phủ – giao Bộ Ngoại giao và Bộ Tư pháp, 
v.v… rồi ra Quốc hội để thảo luận, lấy ý kiến Đại biểu Quốc hội, các ủy ban thuộc Quốc 
hội lại rà soát lại tất cả, sau đó mới mang ra Quốc hội thảo luận, tại từng nhóm Đại biểu 
Quốc hội, rồi lại đem ra hội trường để biểu quyết). Các đại biểu hiện nay được trang bị 
thông tin tương đối nhiều; chưa kể văn hóa của VN bây giờ là văn hóa mở, khi mình 
nghiên cứu luật của mình thì mình nghiên cứu luật của các nước khác trước, rồi mình 
hỏi tại sao người ta lại quy định như vậy. Việt Nam tương đối tiếp thu nhanh, thay đổi 
nhanh, về những đạo luật mang tính phục vụ con người. Điều đó cần cho người dân, cho 
xã hội, thì đó là tư duy (nhận thức trước), trên thực tế có thể còn khác biệt, chưa hoàn 
toàn được vậy, nhưng đây là đà để phát triển, để dân chủ hơn. Thì giờ đây là đồng thuận 
cao. Thứ nhất là thay đổi về nhận thức, thứ hai là Việt Nam hội nhập quốc tế rất sâu 
rộng, và nhanh nhất, so với các nước khác trong khu vực. 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết, có hay không những sự hỗ trợ và/hoặc ảnh 
hưởng của những thành phần quốc tế từ khu vực Đông Nam Á và quốc tế (ví dụ: 
các cơ quan của ASEAN, các nước thành viên ASEAN, các cơ quan của LHQ, các 
nước thành viên của quốc tế có liên hệ nhiều đến Việt Nam như Hoa Kỳ, Nhật Bản, 
Úc, Liên Minh Châu Âu, và các tổ chức quốc tế khác, v.v.) đối với việc quyết định 
gia nhập của Việt Nam trước và trong giai đoạn Việt Nam tham gia Công ước này 
(những năm trước 2013 đến khi việc phê chuẩn được hoàn tất vào đầu năm 2015)? 
(Would you please tell me that whether there had there been any support and/or 
influence from regional and international elements (i.e. organs and members of the 
ASEAN, UN’s organs, dominant international actors and non-state actors like the U.S., 
Japan, EU, as well as international NGOs, etc.) before and during the process of 
Vietnam’s joining this Convention (before the year 2013 till the completion of the 
ratification process in early 2015)?) 
A: Không có ý kiến. 
 
Q: Theo nhận định của Ông/Bà, tại sao Việt Nam lại quyết định gia nhập CAT 
trong giai đoạn 2013-2014? Những lợi ích và mục tiêu nào mà Ông/Bà nghĩ Việt 
Nam mong muốn hướng tới/đạt được khi quyết định ký kết và phê chuẩn Công 
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ước này? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (In your opinion, why did Vietnam 
decide to accede to the CAT during the period of 2013-2014? What would be those 
benefits and objectives that Vietnam would expect to fulfill and receive via the decision 
to sign and ratify this Convention? Please explain in more details.) 
A: Đối với một quốc gia trong việc phê chuẩn một công ước quốc tế, thì đối với Quốc 
hội, là rất ủng hộ. Bởi vì với một nền kinh tế phát triển chung của thế giới hiện nay thì 
xu thế hội nhập để phát triển – càng ngày càng phát triển. Khi đó chúng ta cần một sân 
chơi chung, thì đó là Công ước quốc tế, Hiệp định quốc tế. Một đất nước muốn phát 
triển thì phải hội nhập sâu rộng các điều ước quốc tế; đối với Việt Nam thì mới đây là 
gia nhập cộng đồng ASEAN, như một mái nhà, thì phải phù hợp nhau trước nhất là về 
mặt tư duy, trong cộng đồng đấy thì có những điều khoản gần như là phải sát cánh với 
nhau, để cùng hướng tới mục đích phát triển đất nước, và mang lại sự công bằng cho 
khu vực. Cộng đồng ASEAN này thì chưa đc bằng Châu Âu, nhưng có lộ trình. Những 
nước trong cộng đồng này đều phải có những quan điểm chung như nhau, phải ủng hộ 
nhau, cùng tư duy, cùng luật lệ, thì mới chơi chung với nhau được. Áp lực là không, áp 
lực lên sự phát triển của xã hội là có, chứ không phải áp lực từ bên ngoài, mà là áp lực 
là nội lực, đòi hỏi từ chính mình là có. Áp lực hội nhập là một phần thôi. Áp lực chính 
mình là điều kiện cần, áp lực hội nhập là điều kiện đủ. Khi mình tham gia các sân chơi 
chung thì mới phát sinh và buộc phải tham gia các công ước quốc tế, còn trước đây 
mình chưa tham gia thì mình không để ý đến.   
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III. Interview Questionnaires and Original Answers (in Vietnamese) from 
representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết đơn vị (Bộ/Ngành) nào là cơ quan đề xuất Việt 
Nam tham gia ký kết và gia nhập Công ước chống tra tấn (CAT)? (Would you 
please tell me which was the agency or ministry of Vietnam that recommended the state 
to sign and ratify the CAT?) 
A: Bộ Công an. 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết, khi được cơ quan đề xuất xin lấy ý kiến kiểm tra 
bằng văn bản đối với việc đề xuất Việt Nam tham gia Công ước chống tra tấn 
(CAT), các ý chính trong văn bản kiểm tra của Bộ Ngoại giao là gì? (Would you 
please outline the main points in the official MOFA’s Examination Opinions document 
when the recommending agency (i.e. the Public Security Ministry) seeked in regard to 
the joining of the CAT?) 
A: Văn bản ý kiến kiểm tra của Bộ Ngoại giao theo quy định của Khoản 2 Điều 10  
Luật ký kết, gia nhập và thực hiện Điều ước quốc tế năm 2015 gồm các nội dung cơ bản 
sau: sự cần thiết ký Công ước; đánh giá sự phù hợp của Công ước với các nguyên tắc cơ 
bản của pháp luật quốc tế; đánh giá sự phù hợp của Công ước với lợi ích quốc gia, 
đường lối đối ngoại VN; đánh giá sự phù hợp của Công ước với các điều ước quốc tế về 
cùng lĩnh vực mà VN là thành viên; cấp ký, danh nghĩa ký, tên gọi, hình thức, ngôn ngữ, 
hiệu lực, kỹ thuật văn bản… Ngoài ra, Bộ Ngoại giao đề xuất một số nội dung sau: Kiến 
nghị về tên gọi, phạm vi dự thảo Đề án để nội dung dự thảo phù hợp với phạm vi nêu ra 
trong tên gọi; Kiến nghị bỏ một số mục trong Đề án vì không cần thiết; Kiến nghị về 
mục tiêu, giai đoạn thực hiện, phân công trách nhiệm và các lưu ý khác; Đề nghị nêu lý 
do việc chọn phương thức ký sau đó phê chuẩn Công ước thay vì chọn hình thức gia 
nhập Công ước; Đề nghị bổ sung đánh giá rõ hơn mức độ tương thích giữa quy định của 
CAT với quy định trong pháp luật Việt Nam; Kiến nghị về bảo lưu tuyên bố; Kiến nghị 
về áp dụng Công ước; Kiến nghị liên quan đến thủ tục điều ước quốc tế ứng với cách 
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thức trở thành thành viên Công ước.  
 
Q: Đối với các công tác của Bộ Ngoại giao liên quan đến công việc gia nhập Công 
ước trên của Việt Nam, xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết Đảng và Chính phủ đã có 
những hướng dẫn hoặc chỉ đạo gì trong quá trình thực hiện công việc trên? Xin 
Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (In regard to the work of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs that related to the state’s joining of this Convention, was there any guidance, 
directive or instruction from the CPV and the Government for the Public Security 
Ministry’s process of preparing the recommendation? Please explain in more details.) 
A: Theo yêu cầu của Văn phòng Chính phủ, phù hợp với chức năng, nhiệm vụ, Bộ 
Ngoại giao là cơ quan phối hợp với Bộ Công an (cơ quan chủ trì) trong việc gia nhập 
Công ước. Cụ thể, Bộ ngoại giao tham gia đóng góp ý kiến trong quá trình xây dựng và 
thực hiện Đề án gia nhập Công ước; cho ý kiến kiểm tra đối với hồ sơ trình Chính phủ 
về việc gia nhập Công ước; góp ý hồ sơ trình Chủ tịch nước phê chuẩn Công ước. 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết, các công việc/thủ tục liên quan đối với việc gia 
nhập Công ước này ở giai đoạn giữa việc ký kết (năm 2013) và phê chuẩn (năm 
2015) có khó khăn gì không? Nếu có, tại sao và làm thế nào những khó khăn này 
được các bên giải quyết? (Had there been difficulties during the signing and 
ratification period between 2013 and early 2015? If yes, why and how were these 
hardships overcome by the related parties?) 
A: Việc Việt Nam ký và phê chuẩn Công ước chống tra tấn thể hiện quyết tâm chính trị 
của Nhà nước Việt Nam trong việc ghi nhận và bảo đảm thực thi nhân quyền theo các 
khuôn khổ pháp lý quốc tế, góp phần quan trọng trong việc Việt Nam trúng cử thành 
viên Hội đồng nhân quyền của LHQ nhiệm kỳ 2014-2016. Khoảng thời gian từ thời 
điểm ký Công ước đến phê chuẩn Công ước phù hợp với lộ trình đề ra tại thời điểm 
nghiên cứu gia nhập Công ước, không có sự trì hoãn cũng như có khó khăn gì trong quá 
trình thực hiện các thủ tục này. Thủ tục gia nhập Công ước được thực hiện theo luật 
định. Theo quy định Khoản 4 Điều 70 Hiến pháp và Điều 2 Nghị quyết 
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719/2014/UBTVQH13 ngày 6/1/2014 hướng dẫn thực hiện Khoản 2 Điều 2 Nghị quyết 
số 64/2013/QH13 ngày 28/11/2013 của Quốc hội quy định một số điểm thi hành Hiến 
pháp nước CHXHCN Việt Nam, việc phê chuẩn Công ước sẽ qua các bước như sau: (i) 
Bộ Công an (Cơ quan đề xuất) trình Chính phủ; (ii) Chính phủ trình Chủ tịch nước và 
(iii) Chủ tịch nước trình Quốc hội phê chuẩn.  
 
Q: Được biết Việt Nam đã quyết định mở cửa với thế giới để dần hợp tác và hội 
nhập quốc tế trong nhiều lĩnh vực (trong đó có Nhân quyền) ngay đầu thời kỳ Đổi 
Mới (từ năm 1986), vậy theo Ông/Bà thì những rào cản nào đã ngăn chặn hoặc làm 
chậm đi quá trình gia nhập Công ước LHQ về chống tra tấn của Việt Nam đến tận 
năm 2013? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (It is known that Vietnam has 
decided to open up and take steps for international cooepration and integration in many 
areas (including the field of human rights) since the Renovation Period starting in 1986, 
what were the obstacles that hindered or slowed down the process of acceding to the 
CAT by Vietnam until 2013, where the CAT came into effect in 1987)? Please explain in 
more details.) 
A: Từ rất sớm, pháp luật Việt Nam đã có quy định để tôn trọng và bảo vệ quyền không 
bị tra tấn hoặc đối xử, trừng phạt tàn bạo vô nhân đạo. Điển hình là việc Nhà nước VN 
đã tham gia nhiều văn kiện của Liên hợp quốc về bảo vệ quyền con người và quy định 
về bảo vệ quyền con người, chống tra tấn trong nhiều văn bản quy phạm pháp luật  
như Hiến pháp, các bộ luật, luật, pháp lệnh, nghị đinh, thông tư… (đặc biệt trong Hiến 
pháp năm 1992, Bộ luật hình sự năm 1999 (sửa đổi, bổ sung năm 2009), Bộ luật tố tụng 
hình sự năm 2003, Bộ luật dân sự năm 2005, Luật thi  hành án hình sự năm 2010, Luật 
khiếu nại năm 2011, Luật tố cáo năm 2011, Luật trách nhiệm bồi thường của Nhà nước 
năm 2009, Luật phổ biến giáo dục pháp luật năm 2012, Pháp lệnh tổ chức điều tra hình 
sự năm 2004…). Việc gia nhập, ký kết các văn kiện của LHQ và hình thành những quy 
định về bảo vệ quyền con người, chống tra tấn trong pháp luật Việt Nam là tiền đề và cơ 
sở quan trọng cho việc gia nhập Công ước chống tra tấn năm 2013. Vậy nên, những văn 
kiện quy phạm pháp luật trước khi ký Công ước này là cần thiết để tạo một hệ thống 
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pháp luật vững chắc và phù hợp với những điều mà Việt Nam đồng ý thực thi sau khi 
gia nhập Công ước. 
 
Q: Đối với công tác Ngoại giao, xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết có hay không những 
sự hỗ trợ và/hoặc ảnh hưởng của những thành phần quốc tế từ khu vực Đông Nam 
Á cũng như các tổ chức và các nước trên thế giới (ví dụ: các cơ quan của ASEAN, 
các nước thành viên ASEAN, các cơ quan của LHQ, các nước thành viên của quốc 
tế có liên hệ nhiều đến Việt Nam như Hoa Kỳ, Nhật Bản, Úc, Liên Minh Châu Âu, 
và các tổ chức quốc tế khác, v.v.) đối với việc quyết định gia nhập của Việt Nam 
trước và trong giai đoạn Việt Nam tham gia Công ước này (những năm trước 2013 
đến khi việc phê chuẩn được hoàn tất vào năm 2015)? (Would you please tell me that, 
in regard to the diplomatic work, whether there had there been any support and/or 
influence from regional and international elements (i.e. organs and members of the 
ASEAN, UN’s organs, dominant international actors and non-state actors like the U.S., 
Japan, EU, as well as international NGOs, etc.) before and during the process of 
Vietnam’s joining this Convention (before the year 2013 till the completion of the 
ratification process in early 2015)?) 
A: Vì Bộ Ngoại giao chỉ là cơ quan phối hợp trong việc kí kết, gia nhập Công ước này 
(do Bộ Công an chủ trì), vậy nên, Bộ Ngoại giao không nắm giữ thông tin cho vấn đề 
nêu trên. 
 
Q: Theo nhận định của Ông/Bà, tại sao Việt Nam lại quyết định gia nhập CAT? 
Những lợi ích và mục tiêu nào mà Ông/Bà nghĩ Việt Nam mong muốn hướng 
tới/đạt được khi quyết định ký kết và phê chuẩn Công ước quốc tế này? Xin 
Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (In your opinion, why did Vietnam decide to accede 
to the CAT during the period of 2013-2014? What would be those benefits and 
objectives that Vietnam would expect to fulfill and receive via the decision to sign and 
ratify this Convention? Please explain in more details.) 
A: không có ý kiến.  
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IV. Interview Questionnaires and Original Answers (in Vietnamese) from 
representative of the Ministry of Justice: 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết đơn vị (Bộ/Ngành) nào là cơ quan đề xuất Việt 
Nam tham gia ký kết và gia nhập Công ước chống tra tấn của Liên hợp quốc 
(CAT)? (Would you please tell me which was the agency or ministry of Vietnam that 
recommended the state to sign and ratify the CAT?) 
A: Bộ Công an. 
 
Q: Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết những ý chính trong văn bản thẩm định của Bộ 
Tư pháp khi cơ quan đề xuất xin ý kiến thẩm định bằng văn bản là gì? (Would you 
please outline the main points in the official Ministry of Justice’s Evaluation Opinions 
document when the recommending agency (i.e. the Public Security Ministry) seeked in 
regard to the joining of the CAT?) 
A: Ý chính trong văn bản thẩm định của Bộ tư pháp là cần điều chỉnh pháp luật Việt 
Nam vì chưa tương thích. 
 
Q: Đối với việc gia nhập Công ước này, xin Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết Đảng và 
Chính phủ đã có hướng dẫn hoặc chỉ đạo gì trong quá trình chuẩn bị công việc đề 
xuất trên hay không? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (In regard to the work 
that related to the state’s joining of this Convention, was there any guidance, directive 
or instruction from the CPV and the Government for the Public Security Ministry’s 
process of preparing the recommendation? Please explain in more details.) 
A: Đây là chương trình chung của Chính phủ (xây dựng, đề xuất, rà soát). 
 
Q: Ông/Bà có nghĩ rằng việc Chính phủ quyết định ký kết Công ước này vào năm 
2013 là có nhằm vào một ý nghĩa cụ thể nào không? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích 
thêm. (Was there any specific purpose that the Government decided to sign this 
Convention in 2013? Why?) 
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A: Để đảm bảo Quyền con người theo Hiến pháp 2013. 
 
Q: Đối với các công tác có liên quan đến việc Việt Nam gia nhập Công ước này, xin 
Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết trong khoảng thời gian giữa việc ký kết (năm 2013) và 
phê chuẩn (năm 2015) có khó khăn gì hay không? Nếu có, tại sao và làm thế nào 
những khó khăn này được giải quyết? (Had there been difficulties during the signing 
and ratification period between 2013 and early 2015? If yes, why and how were these 
hardships overcome by the related parties?) 
A: Không có khó khăn gì trong công tác của Bộ tư pháp. 
 
Q: Được biết Việt Nam đã quyết định mở cửa với thế giới để dần hợp tác và hội 
nhập quốc tế trong nhiều lĩnh vực (trong đó có Nhân quyền) ngay đầu thời kỳ Đổi 
Mới (từ năm 1986), vậy theo Ông/Bà thì những rào cản nào đã ngăn chặn hoặc làm 
chậm đi quá trình gia nhập Công ước LHQ về chống tra tấn của Việt Nam đến tận 
năm 2013? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (It is known that Vietnam has 
decided to open up and take steps for international cooepration and integration in many 
areas (including the field of human rights) since the Renovation Period starting in 1986, 
what were the obstacles that hindered or slowed down the process of acceding to the 
CAT by Vietnam until 2013, where the CAT came into effect in 1987)? Please explain in 
more details.) 
A: Khó khăn lớn nhất là nguồn lực hạn chế. Và sau Hiến pháp 2013 thì thể hiện quyết 
tâm chính trị là phải thể hiện quyền công dân. 
 
Q: Đối với công tác có liên quan đến việc gia nhập Công ước này của Việt Nam, xin 
Ông/Bà vui lòng cho biết có hay không những sự hỗ trợ và/hoặc ảnh hưởng của 
những thành phần quốc tế từ khu vực Đông Nam Á cũng như các tổ chức và các 
nước trên thế giới (ví dụ: các cơ quan của ASEAN, các nước thành viên ASEAN, 
các cơ quan của LHQ, các nước thành viên của quốc tế có liên hệ nhiều đến Việt 
Nam như Hoa Kỳ, Nhật Bản, Úc, Liên Minh Châu Âu, và các tổ chức quốc tế khác, 
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v.v.) đối với việc quyết định gia nhập của Việt Nam trước và trong giai đoạn Việt 
Nam tham gia Công ước này (những năm trước 2013 đến khi việc phê chuẩn được 
hoàn tất vào năm 2015)? (Would you please tell me that, in regard to the related work 
of the Vietnam’s signing and ratification of the CAT, whether there had there been any 
support and/or influence from regional and international elements (i.e. organs and 
members of the ASEAN, UN’s organs, dominant international actors and non-state 
actors like the U.S., Japan, EU, as well as international NGOs, etc.) before and during 
the process of Vietnam’s joining this Convention (before the year 2013 till the 
completion of the ratification process in early 2015)?) 
A: Chủ yếu là sự hỗ trợ kỹ thuật và có yêu cầu từ phía đối tác (là sự tuân thủ). 
 
Q: Theo nhận định của Ông/Bà, tại sao Việt Nam lại quyết định gia nhập CAT? 
Những lợi ích và mục tiêu nào mà Ông/Bà nghĩ Việt Nam mong muốn hướng 
tới/đạt được khi quyết định ký kết và phê chuẩn Công ước quốc tế này? Xin 
Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (In your opinion, why did Vietnam decide to accede 
to the CAT during the period of 2013-2014? What would be those benefits and 
objectives that Vietnam would expect to fulfill and receive via the decision to sign and 
ratify this Convention? Please explain in more details.) 
A: Đây là yêu cầu cả nội tại và yêu cầu quốc tế trong hội nhập (nhằm đáp ứng cả hai 
yếu tố đối nội và đối ngoại) – là hội nhập chính trị - văn hóa.   
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V. Interview Questionnaires for relevant domestic scholars & associations: 
 
1. Theo đánh giá riêng của Ông/Bà, tại sao Việt Nam lại quyết định gia nhập 
Công ước chống tra tấn của LHQ (CAT) trong giai đoạn 2013-2014? Những lợi 
ích và mục tiêu nào mà Ông/Bà nghĩ Việt Nam mong muốn hướng tới/đạt được 
khi quyết định ký kết và phê chuẩn Công ước này? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải 
thích thêm. (In your opinion, why did Vietnam decide to accede to the CAT during 
the period of 2013-2014? What would be those benefits and objectives that Vietnam 
would expect to fulfill and receive via the decision to sign and ratify this 
Convention? Please explain in more details.) 
2. Ông/Bà nghĩ như thế nào về vai trò ảnh hưởng/chỉ đạo của Đảng đối với quá 
trình Việt Nam tham gia ký kết và gia nhập Công ước chống tra tấn của LHQ? 
Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (In your opinion, what do you think about 
the decisive or influential role of the CPV towards the signing and ratifying 
processes of Vietnam on the CAT? Would you explain in more details please?) 
3. Theo Ông/Bà thì cộng đồng trong nước (người dân, các học giả, các hiệp hội, 
v.v) có vai trò và ảnh hưởng gì đến quyết định gia nhập và phê chuẩn Công 
ước trên của Việt Nam hay không? Vì sao? (Do you think the domestic 
community (i.e. citizens, scholars, associations, etc.) had any role and/or influence 
on the Vietnam’s decision to sign and ratify the CAT? Why/Why not?) 
4. Ông/Bà có tin rằng, theo thời gian (bắt đầu từ thời kì Đổi Mới năm 1986 đến 
hiện nay), Nhà nước Việt Nam đã dần thay đổi nhận thức của mình về các giá 
trị và lợi ích liên quan đến các vấn đề Nhân quyền, được chứng minh qua việc 
quyết định gia nhập Công ước trên của Việt Nam? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải 
thích lý do. (Do you believe that, from time to time (i.e. from the ‘Renovation 
Period’ in 1986 to today), Vietnam has changed its cognition on the values and 
interests of human rights, which the decision to aceede to the CAT would be 
considered as an evidence for that? Would you explain in more details please.) 
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5. Được biết Việt Nam đã quyết định mở cửa với thế giới để dần hợp tác và hội 
nhập quốc tế trong nhiều lĩnh vực (trong đó có Nhân quyền) ngay đầu thời kỳ 
Đổi Mới (từ năm 1986), vậy xin Ông/Bà hãy cho biết, dưới góc nhìn riêng của 
mình, những rào cản nào đã ngăn chặn hoặc làm chậm đi quá trình gia nhập 
Công ước LHQ về chống tra tấn (đã có từ năm 1987) của Việt Nam đến tận 
năm 2013? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (It is known that Vietnam has 
decided to open up and take steps for international cooepration and integration in 
many areas (including the field of human rights) since the Renovation Period 
starting in 1986, what were the obstacles that hindered or slowed down the process 
of acceding to the CAT by Vietnam until 2013, where the CAT came into effect in 
1987)? Please explain in more details.) 
6. Ông/Bà có nghĩ rằng việc Việt Nam chọn ký kết và phê chuẩn Công ước này 
trong khoảng thời gian từ năm 2013 đến năm 2014 có nhằm hướng đến một ý 
nghĩa hoặc mục đích cụ thể nào hay không? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích lý 
do. (Do you believe the Vietnam’s decision to sign and ratify the CAT during the 
period of 2013-2014 was to aim at particular implications or objectives? Would you 
explain in more details please?) 
7. Ông/Bà có nghĩ rằng quyết định gia nhập Công ước chống tra tấn của Việt 
Nam có sự ảnh hưởng đến từ các thành phần quốc tế thuộc khu vực và quốc tế 
(các tổ chức khu vực, quốc tế, và các nước thành viên trên thế giới có liên quan 
đến Việt Nam) hay không? Nếu có, Ông/Bà nghĩ những sự ảnh hưởng này đã 
được thực hiện thông qua các cách nào? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. 
(Do you believe that the Vietnam’s decision to accede to the CAT was influenced 
by relevant external parties from its regional and international community (i.e. 
regional and international organizations, international member states, etc.)? If yes, 
how did these external parties influence the state on this issue (i.e. via which ways 
and/or approaches)? Would you explain in more details please?) 
8. Giữa Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, nhân dân (và cộng đồng trong nước), và các 
thành phần thuộc khu vực và quốc tế (bao gồm các tổ chức và các nước có liên 
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quan chặt chẽ đến Việt Nam), thì đối tượng nào Ông/Bà nghĩ rằng họ là những 
nhân tố tạo nên những sự tác động/ảnh hưởng mạnh mẽ nhất dẫn đến quyết 
định ký kết trên của Việt Nam vào năm 2013 và sau đó là phê chuẩn vào năm 
2014? Xin Ông/Bà vui lòng giải thích thêm. (Among the CPV, the citizens (i.e. 
the domestic community), and relevant regional and international parties, which 
one do you think to had caused the most determinant impact/influence on the state’s 
decision to sign and ratify the CAT between 2013 and 2014? Would you explain in 
more details please?)  
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VI. Interview Questionnaires for relevant external parties:   
 
1. In your opinion, what were the factors/reasons that caused Vietnam to decide 
joining the Convention against Torture (CAT) at the period of 2013-2014? In this 
regard, what were the goals/ objectives/ benefits that you think Vietnam aimed to/ 
expected to achieve via such joining behavior? If possible, please explain in more 
details. 
2. Do you believe that there were influences and/or impacts from regional and 
international actors and non-state actors that related to the Vietnam’s decision of 
acceding to the CAT in that particular period of time? If yes, were they or were they 
not essential for the state’s decision behavior, and why? Please explain in more 
details. 
3. What were the hardships and/or obstacles that you think they were the main factors 
blocking Vietnam from acceding to this Convention earlier? And whether and how 
they had been resolved at the time the state decided to sign and ratify the 
Convention between 2013 and 2014? Please explain in more details. 
4. Who/ which agencies/ organizations/ actors or non-state actors or what issues do 
you think were the most influential ones that shaped the state’s joining decision 
towards this Convention? Why? 
5. Do you believe that, from time to time (i.e. since 1986 to today), Vietnam has been 
slowly changed its cognition on human rights values and interests, which has been 
resulted by its decision to accede to the CAT? Please explain in more details. 
6. From your perspective, what blocked Vietnam from joining this Convention earlier 
(as Vietnam has already decided to open up the country for more international 
integration and cooperation, including the field of human rights, since its 
Renovation Period (also called “Doi Moi”) in 1986)? Please explain in more 
details. 
